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exeCutive Summary
This volume reports the main findings from a multi-country research project that was designed to 
develop a better understanding of how rural water supply systems are performing in developing 
countries. We began the research in 2004 to investigate how the provision of support to 
communities after the construction of a rural water supply project affected project performance 
in the medium term. We collected information from households, village water committees, focus 
groups of village residents, system operators, and key informants in 400 rural communities in 
Bolivia, ghana, and Peru; in total, we discussed community water supply issues with approximately 
10,000 individuals in these communities.
To our surprise, we found the great majority of the village water systems were performing well. our 
findings on the factors influencing their sustainability will, we hope, be of use to policy makers, 
investors, and managers in rural water supply.
evolving approaches to rural water supply and post-construction support
Since the mid-1990s a number of donors, working with national and regional water resources 
ministries in developing countries, have designed and implemented community-managed rural 
water supply (RWS) programs that incorporate one or more components of the demand-driven 
model: (1) involving households in the choice of technology and of institutional and governance 
arrangements; (2) giving women a larger role in decision making than had been the norm; and 
(3) requiring households to pay all of the operation and maintenance costs of providing water 
services and at least some of the capital costs. The new model would, it was hoped, improve on 
the earlier dismal record of rural water supply projects, many of which had quickly fallen into 
disrepair.
Few of the community-managed RWS programs planned for systematic provision of post-
construction support. But, increasingly, observers have argued that it is unrealistic to leave rural 
communities to their own devices after a water project is completed, and that for rural water 
supply systems to be successful, communities need some post-construction support (PCS), such as 
follow-up training, and technical assistance visits by engineers.
Two broad approaches to providing PCS have emerged. The first is to ensure that spare parts and 
technical services are available, but to leave the responsibility largely to communities themselves 
to seek out such services and to pay for them when needed. The second is a more supply-driven 
approach: to provide communities with unsolicited support for repairs, technical assistance, 
training, and trouble-shooting.
focus of the research
We wanted to investigate the effect of supply-driven post-construction support on system sustainability 
when added to a well-designed community-managed rural water supply program. In all three 
countries, we selected villages that had received improved water supply projects three to twelve years 
earlier as part of such programs. About half the villages in our sample were “treatment” villages—
that is, they had received supply-driven post-construction support arranged by the rural water 
supply program—and half were “controls”—that is, they had not received such support. In all three 
countries, we used secondary data to help us choose districts or regions where the characteristics of 
villages and households in the treatment and control villages were likely to be similar.
In all three countries, we found some unexpected challenges. our research design required 
that the water systems in some villages be “successes” and in others “failures,” in order to have 
variation in our dependent variable. In fact, we found far fewer project failures in either treatment 
or control villages than expected: the great majority of the water systems were being sustained.
Another threat to our research design was the complexity of PCS provision in the study settings. 
Though we had tried to select PCS programs that were supply-driven, we found that such 
programs often do not work that way in practice. The MoM program in ghana turned out to 
be the only true supply-driven PCS program in our three study sites: villages in this program 
were receiving quarterly visits from environmental health assistants to monitor the technical, 
management, and financial status of their rural water supply systems. More commonly, we found 
that both treatment and control communities in the three countries were seeking out PCS when 
their water systems broke down or when there was a management problem or conflict. Thus in 
practice much PCS was demand-driven. Communities sought help from wherever they could get 
it—including nongovernmental organizations, nearby municipalities, or even large commercial 
enterprises.
overview of findings
The demand-driven, community-management model seems to be working, at least in the medium 
term. not only were the rural water systems producing water (i.e., not broken down), but almost all 
the households in these communities were obtaining at least some of their water from the systems. 
And in all three countries the vast majority of village water committees (vWCs) were functioning as 
planned.
Communities had been involved in pre-construction planning and helped with capital costs.
Community members in all three countries felt that they had been involved in the pre-construction 
planning of their water systems. In all three countries, more than 90 percent of the focus groups 
that we held with village leaders and/or women reported that the community had been involved 
in tariff design. In about two thirds of the villages in Bolivia and Peru (vs. 42 percent in ghana), 
people felt they had been involved in the choice of technology. In just under half the villages in 
all three countries, people felt they had contributed to decisions on the location of the proposed 
infrastructure. In all three countries, communities contributed 5–10 percent of the capital costs of the 
project, though in many cases labor and/or land contributions were allowed to substitute for cash.
Community water supply projects were still working. All the piped systems studied in Peru, and 
all but one of those studied in Bolivia, were functioning at the time of our field visit. Among the 
households in our sample in Peru and Bolivia, 93 percent or more had operational taps at the 
time of our field visit. In 55 percent of the communities in Bolivia and 76 percent in Peru, all the 
household taps were working. In 90 percent of the villages in ghana, all project boreholes were 
still working. In Bolivia, all the households who were interviewed reported using water from the 
improved water system; in ghana 97 percent; and in Peru 95 percent. In ghana, households 
were collecting 34 liters per day from boreholes in volta and 24 liters per day in Brong Ahafo.
Villages used post-construction support from wherever they could get it. The systems in all three 
countries did occasionally break down, but in the majority of cases the vWCs had been able 
to arrange for repairs. Most of the sample villages in all three countries reported they had had 
one or more breakdowns in the last six months, but in Bolivia breakdowns were typically fixed in 
one to two days, in Peru in five days, and in ghana in 18 days. even communities that were not 
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collecting enough revenues to pay for operation and maintenance costs were finding the resources 
needed to fix their systems when they broke down. especially in ghana, many of these resources 
came from outside the community. Communities were using a wide variety of government- and 
ngo-provided PCS services to keep their systems working. Some of the services were provided at 
their own request (“solicited PCS”) and others arrived on the initiative of government or ngo or 
church organizations (“supply-driven PCS”).
Consumer satisfaction was high. given that in general the water systems were working and that 
communities were able to make repairs, levels of household satisfaction were very high in most 
villages in all three countries. on average, in Bolivia 83 percent of households in each village 
reported being “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with their system’s operation and maintenance regime, 
and 78 percent were “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with the performance of their vWC. In Peru, 
61 percent of the households reported that they were satisfied overall with their improved water 
system. In ghana, 88 percent of the households reported they were satisfied with the repair and 
maintenance services of the water system, and more than 80 percent of the women’s focus groups 
said they were satisfied with the system.
There are also some troubling findings:
Households were still using unprotected water sources. Although almost all households reported 
using the new water systems, for some this was not their only water source. In ghana, 38 percent 
of households were still using water from unprotected sources for drinking and/or cooking. The 
percentages were lower in Peru (21 percent) and Bolivia (23 percent), but still worrisome. We 
speculate that until households obtain their drinking and cooking water exclusively from improved 
sources, the health benefits of the investments in improved sources will not be fully realized.
The finances of many village water committees were in poor shape. Households in the sample 
villages were paying very little for the improved water services. As designed, these rural water 
supply programs did not require communities to finance the capital costs of construction or to 
provide for capital replacement or expansion; the cost-recovery objective was simply to collect 
enough revenues from users on an ongoing basis to pay operation and maintenance costs. But a 
substantial minority of villages in our study were not achieving even this modest objective.
Generally, more analysis is required to assess the impact of PCS on sustainability and satisfaction. 
our cross-sectional research design and the varied character of PCS in all three countries made 
it very difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the contribution of different forms of PCS to 
system sustainability or to household satisfaction. our results merit further investigation in other 
field sites.
In none of the three countries did we find a statistically significant association between a village 
receiving a technical PCS visit (to help with repairs or maintenance) and having a working 
water system. But post-construction technical training of system operators or caretakers was 
positively associated with system performance in both ghana and Bolivia. In Bolivia, the share of 
households who were satisfied was, on average, 15 percentage points higher if the village had 
received a PCS visit that provided financial or managerial (though not technical) assistance.
All in all, we found no evidence that supplying communities with free repairs or free technical 
assistance, or that implementing an intensive supply-driven post-construction support program like 
MoM in parts of ghana, improved either technical sustainability or household satisfaction.
implications for sustaining and expanding rWS systems
These findings seem to support the concept of the demand-driven community management 
model—that communities can and should take full responsibility for their systems. The unsolicited 
PCS activities that appear most promising are those that help communities to renew and further 
develop their capacities: post-construction training for system operators and non-technical support 
visits to help village water committees with administrative functions or water use disputes.
Important puzzles remain, however, for policy makers, investors, and managers in rural water 
supply. one is that even those communities whose cost-recovery systems seem to be meeting 
program objectives—by paying 5–10 percent of capital costs and collecting tariffs to cover 
operation, maintenance, and repairs—are not moving toward a financially sustainable future 
in which they can either (1) replace infrastructure when it reaches the end of its economic life, 
or (2) expand system capacity to accommodate population and economic growth. The donor-
funded rural water supply programs studied have been structured as one-time investment 
programs, designed to meet only immediate needs. This means that the moral obligation 
assumed by higher-level government and donors is not over. The current financing system 
ensures that these communities will keep returning for capital subsidies, just as some are doing 
now for repairs.
In a significant number of villages, the water committees are not collecting tariffs at all, or are 
collecting too little revenue from households to cover the financial costs of major repairs—much 
less the costs of system expansion or capital replacement. our findings suggest three principal 
reasons why. First, generating substantial cash balances creates difficult problems for the 
committees. These rural communities, many of them quite remote, lack access to a convenient, 
secure banking system for managing cash. Moreover, many households have little cash to spare, 
and cash flow is irregular and highly seasonal. Households are also often distrustful of the 
accounting and security of cash balances, and water committee members may distrust each other 
or not want the responsibility of securing cash. Second, when the committees do accumulate cash 
balances, villages often want to spend these monies on other development projects; in such a 
situation, it makes sense to try to raise funds only when the need arises. Third, water committees 
may well be right to believe that future capital and repair subsidies will be forthcoming when 
needed, whether from donors, ngos, or higher levels of government. In the projects studied, not 
only was the bulk of the capital provided at no cost to the communities at the time of construction, 
but a significant number of village water committees had obtained donations, free spare parts, 
and free repairs from a wide variety of ngos, church organizations, private individuals and 
companies, and even local governments.
The water supply systems in the communities in our sample are not financially sustainable without 
new infusions of capital relatively soon—both to replace existing infrastructure and to provide for 
growth. It may be that the sector’s current capital financing model—and the post-construction 
activities of ngos and other actors—creates a moral hazard that will undermine the principle of 
community self-reliance in the post-construction phase and discourage communities from making 
their own investments in water infrastructure to support economic growth.
Achieving long-term financial sustainability in these systems will require a different policy model. 
Methods for achieving better coordination of the policies of ngos with government and with each 
other seem especially important and worthy of future research. one important role for ngos in 
the future could be as catalysts for post-construction support (e.g., training and/or locally-based 
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models for raising capital), rather than as dispensers of subsidies for communities that cannot 
manage to repair their own water projects.
In summary, the demand-driven, community-management planning model has come a long 
way towards a working model in the rural water sector. The next frontier seems to be the design 
of a policy framework that will enable communities to handle the twin challenges of system 
rehabilitation and expansion.
XVI
1Part 1: introduCtion

3ChaPter 1:  
introduCtion1
Much is still unknown about how to design effective projects for village water supply. Past studies 
have examined pre-construction factors and shown that demand-responsiveness, community 
participation, and social capital in the village are all important determinants of success. But 
even projects with a high level of demand, high social capital, and high levels of pre-project 
participation can have problems after construction. The reasons include lack of availability of 
spare parts, lack of training, and an inability to raise funds for maintenance and repair. A program 
that provides post-construction support focusing on one or more of these common issues seems 
like a logical solution.
This volume reports the main findings from a multi-country research project that was designed to 
develop a better understanding of how rural water supply systems are performing in developing 
countries. We began the research in 2004 to investigate how the provision of support to 
communities after the construction of a rural water supply project affected project performance 
in the medium term, defined as the period of system operation three to twelve years after initial 
construction. We collected information from households, village water committees, focus groups 
of village residents, system operators, and key informants in 400 rural communities in Bolivia, 
ghana, and Peru; in total, we discussed community water supply issues with approximately 10,000 
individuals in these communities.
In the course of investigating the effects of post-construction support (PCS), we learned much 
about how rural water supply systems are faring in parts of the three countries studied. We believe 
these observations will be of broad policy interest to professionals in the water sector because they 
contradict the general perception that most rural water systems fail and that success depends on 
recovering costs through sizeable, ongoing contributions from users.
In this chapter we first discuss the evolution of approaches to rural water supply and post-
construction support by government agencies or project authorities in developing countries 
and then, in Section 1.2, appraise the factors that influence the sustainability of such projects, 
particularly when communities themselves manage the projects. Section 1.3 of the chapter 
describes our research design, and Section 1.4 the fieldwork conducted for the country case 
studies in Peru, Bolivia, and ghana. Part 2 of the volume contains these three case studies, 
and Part 3 draws together the findings and discusses their implications for the maintenance and 
expansion of rural water supply systems.
1.1 approaches to rural water supply and post-construction support
In the 1980s it became widely recognized among sector professionals that many rural water 
supply programs in developing countries were performing poorly (Briscoe and De Ferranti 1988; 
Churchill et al. 1987; Therkildsen 1988). no matter what type of technology they relied on, 
systems were not being repaired and were falling into disuse. Cost recovery was minimal, and 
revenues were often insufficient to pay for operation and maintenance, much less capital costs. 
this chapter was written by alexander Bakalian, Jennifer davis, Kristin Komives, Heather Lukacs, Linda Prokopy, richard thorsten, 1 
Wendy Wakeman, and dale Whittington. Parts of it draw heavily on Lockwood (2003), which was commissioned for the present 
study. We appreciate the helpful comments of rob chase, Marc Jeuland, donald t. Lauria, Vijayendra rao, robert roche, and Jennifer 
Sara.
4Communities did not have a sense of ownership in their water projects, and households were not 
satisfied with the projects that donors and national governments installed.
An intense discussion ensued within the water resources profession about why success in rural 
water supply was so difficult to achieve. engineers blamed poor construction, anthropologists 
described a lack of community participation, political scientists reported rent-seeking and poor 
governance structures, and economists complained of poor pricing and tariff design.
Demand-driven, community management model for RWS projects
In the 1990s a consensus emerged that pre-project planning procedures for rural water supply 
programs needed to be more “demand-driven.” The necessary components of a demand-driven 
process differ somewhat depending on whom one asks, but most observers would agree that 
project planning should (1) involve households in the choice of technology and of institutional and 
governance arrangements; (2) give women a larger role in decision making than has been the 
norm; and (3) require households to pay all of the operation and maintenance costs of providing 
water services and at least some of the capital costs (Sara, gross, and van den Berg 1996; Sara 
and katz 1997; Whittington, Davis, and McClelland 1998). The rationale for involving households 
in the choice of technology was to ensure that engineering designs were responsive to local 
needs and realities. Women should assume a greater role in decision-making because they were 
the ones who best knew the local realities and were primary beneficiaries of the projects. Cost 
recovery through user fees served three purposes. First, requiring households to pay for services, 
once operational, provided revenues to keep the system running and reduced dependence on 
higher levels of government. Second, charging households (part of) the capital cost of system 
construction up front, before installing the water supply system, established a “demand filter” that 
in principle prevented water systems from being built in communities for which they were low-
priority development projects. Third, requiring capital contributions by communities was expected 
to foster a sense of community ownership of the facilities, which in turn was expected to solidify a 
commitment to use and maintain the facilities.
The consensus on the need for a demand-driven planning model was largely silent on the 
relative importance of the components. Were all three components necessary for success? And 
was it possible to implement some elements first and follow up with others later? It was implicitly 
assumed that, if other elements of the model were present and spare parts were available for 
purchase, communities would take responsibility for managing and maintaining their water systems 
without further post-construction support.
The most controversial component of the policy advice in the demand-driven, community 
management model has been the requirement for households to pay a share of the capital costs, 
and all of the operation and maintenance costs, of providing rural water services. Three common 
arguments are made against charging poor rural households for improved water systems. First, 
in many cases the households that lack improved water sources are the poorest of the poor, and 
efforts to require such households to pay something for services (or efforts to target investments 
to communities that are collectively willing and able to pay) have often created unease among 
aid organizations working in the sector. Small ngos such as church-based organizations and 
other charities, especially, want to help poor people in direct, tangible ways. Projects to provide 
improved water supplies to poor rural households have often received strong support from both 
ngo staff and their donor base, and requiring people to pay for such services has run counter 
to the rationale and desire of many ngos to assist such communities. Second, the provision of 
5the evidence for the existence of such positive effects on health from improved water supplies is, however, surprisingly limited. See 2 
Fewtrell et al. (2004) for a recent review.
See <www.un.org/milleniumgoals> However, the need for 3 simultaneous investments across sectors has not been widely accepted by 
economists. See, for example, Hirschman (1958) and Schumpeter (1939).
improved water services is seen to have large positive effects on health: a traditional economic 
efficiency criterion calls for the use of a Pigouvian subsidy to equate marginal social benefits with 
marginal social costs.2
A third, and somewhat different, line of argument in support of providing improved water services 
free of charge is that poor households are caught in a vicious cycle of poor health, limited 
education, and low economic productivity, and that improved water (and sanitation) services 
are one change that helps people to break out of this “poverty trap” (Sachs 2005). From this 
perspective, subsidized rural water projects are not only equitable and morally obligatory, but also 
engines of economic growth. This argument for simultaneously investing in health, education, and 
infrastructure is reflected in the desire to meet the multisectoral Millennium Development goals 
by 2015.3 Although there is no firm evidence that investments in water supply projects induce 
economic growth in poor rural communities, the “poverty trap” metaphor resonates strongly with 
ngos and other donors uncomfortable with the cost-recovery component of the demand-driven, 
community management model.
ngos and multilateral donors have been more willing to shift nonpecuniary costs (such as time 
and labor commitments) on to community members. The demand-driven, community management 
model holds that much of the human resource cost of managing rural water projects should be 
transferred to village water committees (vWCs). This proposal has been relatively uncontroversial.
Since the mid-1990s a number of donors, working with national and regional water resources 
ministries in developing countries, have designed and implemented rural water supply programs 
that incorporate one or more components of the demand-driven, community management model.
Few of these programs planned for systematic provision of post-construction support; community 
management was assumed to be feasible from a technical perspective. Increasingly, however, 
observers have argued that it is unrealistic to leave rural communities to their own devices after a 
water project is completed, and that for rural water supply systems to be successful, communities 
need some PCS, such as follow-up training, and technical assistance visits by engineers 
(Blagbrough 2001; IRC 2001, 2003; kleemeier 2000; Lockwood 2002, 2003; Rosensweig, ed., 
2001; Schouten and Moriarty 2003).
As listed by Lockwood (2002:22), beyond technical support for the operation and maintenance of 
physical infrastructure, PCS has four main functions:
Technical assistance: providing advice and guidance on a range of topics in support of the •	
community management structure, as well as providing independent advice in cases where some 
form of arbitration may be necessary.
Training: ongoing training of village water committee members in a variety of disciplines, from •	
physical operation and maintenance to bookkeeping and hygiene promotion; capacity building 
at the community level.
Monitoring and information collection: regular monitoring of system performance and feedback •	
of information for remedial action.
6Coordination and facilitation: helping to establish links between community management •	
structures and external entities, from either the state or private sector.
Institutional models for post-construction support
Two broad approaches to providing PCS have emerged. The first, “demand-driven” approach is to 
ensure that spare parts and technical services are available, but to leave the responsibility largely 
to communities themselves to seek out such services and to pay for them when needed. The 
second is a more “supply-driven” approach: to provide communities with unsolicited support for 
repairs, technical assistance, training, and trouble-shooting.
Systematic post-construction support for communities has been rare, and few countries have 
adequate institutional frameworks to provide such support. Where such support arrangements 
exist, they focus largely on the operation and maintenance (o&M) of hardware, and aspects 
such as auditing of accounts and chlorination of water, and they tend to be overburdened. very 
important non-technical issues such as ensuring the continued involvement of women, promoting 
sustained changes in hygiene behavior, and the protection of water sources tend to receive too 
little emphasis. (Because the broader benefits and potential impacts of rural water supply systems 
go far beyond a narrow technical focus, support services that do not also include “software” 
aspects cannot be considered fully successful.)
Several institutional models for post-construction support are in use (Box 1.1).
In practice, the choice of institutional arrangements for post-project support needs to be 
context-specific. In highly decentralized countries such as Bolivia and ecuador, or in countries 
such as India where a decentralized approach to water and sanitation services is being actively 
pursued, it makes sense to provide technical assistance and build capacity at local levels. But 
in more centralized countries, such as Paraguay, Tunisia, or yemen, local governments will have 
little to offer in terms of management capacity and decision-making authority. In many cases, 
the support mechanisms on the ground may combine different models. Further, the models are 
likely to evolve over time. Decisions about such arrangements are closely linked to broader 
sector reform and the status of the decentralization process in the country concerned. Clearly 
defined regulation in certain key areas, such as technical norms and standards and water 
quality, is a positive factor in the success and acceptance of models of support (Rosensweig, 
ed., 2001:134).
no clear lessons have emerged about whether or not PCS is better done by the project-
implementing agency. Some of the more common experiences are described in Box 1.2.
In providing post-project institutional support arrangements, probably the single greatest challenge 
is financing their recurrent costs. encouraging governments to contribute financially to support 
services in a resource-scarce environment will always be difficult: the product is not “visible” and 
not obviously useful as a political tool. even where local government may be mandated to provide 
support service functions, such tiers of government often face many financial constraints. At the 
other end of the spectrum, over-reliance on external donor funding can endanger the sustainability 
of the entire support system, as happened in Honduras with the circuit rider model (Rosensweig, 
ed. 2001). Many RWS projects supported by World Bank loans depend on the private sector 
playing a specific role to complement the efforts of the public sector. But the private sector is 
unlikely to provide systematic support to rural populations where there is relatively little profit in so 
7doing; ultimately, the test of its participation will lie in the willingness of users themselves to pay for 
post-project support goods and services.
Working in support of rural communities requires agency staff with a range of skills and attributes 
covering technical, social, and financial aspects, as well as themes such as hygiene education 
and conflict resolution. Political interference and frequent changes in personnel can easily 
cause difficulty in post-construction support services. other factors influencing success include a 
supportive policy environment.
1.2 assessing sustainability in rural water supply
There is little systematic evidence as to how the demand-driven, community management model—
with or without PCS—is working in practice. Are projects that use the demand-driven, community 
Box 1.1: Institutional support mechanisms for post-construction support
The environmental Health Project has classified institutional support mechanisms for PCS based on case studies 
in Latin America (Lockwood 2002; Rosensweig 1998; Rosensweig, ed., 2001; Rosensweig and Perez 1996):
Centralized model:•	  Support services are provided by a government agency or ministry operating from a 
centralized point, directly engaging with community management structures. until recently, this model of 
support was used in Costa Rica, where the Directorate of Rural Works of the Costa Rican Institute of Water 
Supply and Sewerage provided back-up coverage from a central operation based in the capital to six 
administrative zones of the country. A deconcentrated model with six regional offices has recently superseded 
this system.
Deconcentrated model:•	  Support services are provided by a central government agency operating through 
regional or departmental level offices that have a degree of autonomy. Morocco uses a deconcentrated 
model with teams operating at the provincial level. In Honduras the national Water Supply and Sewerage 
Company has a nationwide system of deconcentrated support offices, based on the circuit-rider model 
whereby a technician on a motorcycle visits a number of rural communities on a regular basis and dispenses 
advice and technical know-how; these technicians now provide support to more than two million Hondurans 
in rural areas.
Devolution model:•	  The authority and responsibility for provision of support services is transferred from a 
central government agency to a decentralized tier of government, usually at the municipal level. In various 
regions of nicaragua, the Rural Water Supply Management of the nicaraguan Water Supply and Sewerage 
Company (enACAL-gAR) has worked with municipal authorities to develop networks of municipal operation 
and maintenance promoters. Because they work with technical oversight from enACAL-gAR operations staff 
based in regional offices, this model is best described as a deconcentrated—devolution hybrid. In ghana, 
district government teams provide oversight but also receive support from decentralized central ministry 
offices at the regional level. In Bolivia, municipal governments are responsible for long-term support under a 
devolution model, but also receive support from deconcentrated central ministry offices. In China, municipal 
or county governments operate and maintain systems under a devolution approach.
Delegated model:•	  Responsibility for provision of support services is delegated (by contract) from a central 
or local government agency to a third party, which could be an ngo, a private company, or a relevant 
user association. The Honduran Water Board Association is a delegated support system operating in 
approximately 300 member communities.
Source: Adapted from Lockwood (2002:14)
8management approach being sustained? What influences their sustainability and how are these 
influences best measured?
Definitions of sustainability
early discussions of sustainability in the water supply and sanitation sector were concerned mainly 
with the financial aspects of service delivery and the need to make projects financially self-sufficient 
(see Black 1998).
Subsequent discussions of sustainability have taken a broader view, centered on the concept of 
the capacity of a RWS project to continue delivering a flow of benefits long after project inputs 
have ceased (Bamberger and Cheema 1990; Hodgkin and WASH Project Staff 1994:5; valadez 
and Bamberger, eds. 1994) or “after the withdrawal of all forms of support from the external 
agency” (CInARA/IRC/WSP 1997). Many authors have built from this basic idea, noting that the 
concern is not so much with the project per se, but rather with the water supply (and/or sanitation) 
system itself and the service it provides (Carter, Tyrell and Howsam 1999; Sara and katz, 1997; 
Box 1.2: Assigning institutional responsibility for post-construction support
Project partner (NGO or private company) as implementer and local government as provider of •	
support services. In several World Bank-supported projects in Latin America, the same ngo or contractor 
responsible for constructing systems and/or providing software implementation services is held responsible 
for the post-construction “guarantee period.” After this period, primary responsibility for indefinite back-up 
support is most often transferred to the municipality (equivalent to local government) authorities, with or 
without assistance from other players. The municipality is also involved in project implementation, but usually 
in a management or co-financing capacity. In a World Bank-supported community water supply project in Sri 
Lanka, systems are constructed and training is provided by ngos or private companies contracted by the 
project, but local government will eventually share responsibility for support and oversight of the community-
based organizations running the rural systems.
Central government as implementer and provider of support services. •	 In Paraguay, the national 
environmental Sanitation Service (SenASA) was responsible for both construction and long-term support, 
based on a centralized model of service delivery, but problems with this model led the government to look 
at other options for back-up support, such as encouraging private sector involvement and facilitating the 
formation of associations of water committees. In countries including Morocco, Rwanda, and yemen, central 
water ministries have been responsible for system construction and then for back-up support, but with a 
strong emphasis on the complementary role of the private sector. Tunisia relies on deconcentrated offices of 
a central ministry (Rosensweig, Stanbury, and grimm 1990), and Costa Rica has deconcentrated its rural 
directorate of the central Water Supply and Sanitation Agency into six regional offices (Lockwood 2002). 
Both these countries have put responsibility for implementation (or oversight of implementation) and long-
term post-construction service in the hands of single ministries. In Honduras, too, post-construction services 
are provided by the project implementing institution.
Central government as implementer, delegating support services to a third party.•	  In several cases, 
central government agencies were initially responsible for system implementation but then delegated 
responsibility to a third party for long-term support. In some areas of Paraguay, multi-community associations 
of water committees are taking responsibility for long-term service provision, and elsewhere in that country 
private companies are taking on minimum subsidies to operate and maintain piped rural systems.
Source: Adapted from Lockwood (2002:14)
9Webster et al. 1999). For many rural households, the perceived benefit of a project may simply be 
the continued convenience of having (running) water near or within the household. Hence, their 
definition of sustainability may be closer to meaning whether or not water continues to flow to 
them over time.
With the growing importance of the community management model for RWS, sustainability has 
also been defined in terms of the capacity of the community itself to maintain the service (IRC 
2001). But, as noted above, authors have increasingly argued that few communities will be able 
to manage their own water supply systems without some form of external assistance, and the 
need for such support is now gaining broad acceptance. Thus, classifying a community-managed 
RWS system as sustainable should not preclude the community from having access to continuous, 
external back-up support of some kind.
Factors influencing sustainability of community-managed RWS projects
Taken together, a few studies offer some broad insights about factors that commonly influence 
sustainability in rural water supply (Hodgkin and WASH Project Staff 1994; Sara and katz 1997; 
Sugden 2003);
• Pre-project issues • Post-project issues
Community participation Finance and tariff collection
Demand-responsive approaches user satisfaction
empowerment Capacity of water committees
Technical design Definition of roles and responsibilities 
Construction quality  for system management
gender and poverty focus ongoing training
Training
evidence from a wide range of literature and project documentation suggests that in community-
managed RWS projects, five main groups of factors affect post-project sustainability:
Technical factors, including design, performance, and maintenance issues.•	
Financial factors, including the ability to cover recurrent costs.•	
Community and social factors, including willingness to support projects.•	
Institutional factors, including policy and external follow-up support.•	
environmental factors, including the dependability of the water source.•	
The two most prominent determinants of sustainability in community-managed RWS appear to 
be tariff collection to cover recurrent costs and the presence of some form of long-term external 
support. As a World Bank evaluation report states: “Sustainability can only be ensured if tariffs 
generate enough resources to operate the system, finance the expansion of the service to new 
customers, and ultimately replace the infrastructure after its useful life” (World Bank 1999:  
iv). Some form of long-term external support is also clearly critical to post-project sustainability. 
Such support can help communities face a range of challenges, including technical problems, 
organizational difficulties, and social conflict.
The second tier of factors influencing the sustainability of community-managed rural water supply 
projects includes preventive maintenance and spare parts availability; community management 
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among this list of factors, these are perhaps the most abstract and difficult to define or measure, although there is now a growing body 4 
of knowledge about this can be done (for example, see World Bank 2002).
the private sector is defined here as including nGos as well as individual artisans and entrepreneurs ranging from one person on 5 
a bicycle serving 30 handpumps, all the way through to small companies providing maintenance contracts for piped systems with 
household-level connections.
obviously, deterioration of source water quantity will be of major concern in areas of low rainfall, or poor groundwater re-charge, where 6 
there is greater sensitivity to over-extraction. But even where water is relatively abundant, a source can fail to satisfy demand, whether 
because of population expansion, abuse of the supply for non-domestic purposes, or contamination from agricultural by-products or 
chemicals.
capacity, user satisfaction and willingness to pay for services; continued training and hygiene 
education interventions; and water source production and quality.
Some of the main factors affecting sustainability can be considered as “internal” to a community, 
and therefore at least partly within its sphere of influence. These are:
Preventive maintenance of facilities.•	
Tariff collection and cost recovery to cover routine operation and maintenance of water supply •	
infrastructure.
Adequate capacity (technical, financial, administrative etc.) within the community to manage a •	
system, or to engage with an external party to operate and manage the system on its behalf.
The continued involvement of community women, along with men, in all aspects of system •	
management and maintenance.
Adequate social cohesion or social capital to manage the system, and adequate motivation or •	
willingness to contribute the necessary time and money.4
Factors that are seen to be largely “external” to the community are:
Access to, or availability of, spare parts, tools, and equipment for the community to carry out •	
repairs.
The availability of some form of external follow-up support, not only to help empower •	
community management structures to maintain the infrastructure they are responsible for, but 
also training for households to promote hygiene and behavioral change.
The presence and strength of private companies and entrepreneurs•	 5 providing goods and 
services and skilled technicians to carry out complex repairs.
The existence of a supportive policy environment, legal frameworks underpinning the legitimacy •	
of water committees, and clearly defined roles for operation and maintenance.
A system source that continues to produce water of sufficient quantity and quality to satisfy •	
users.6
Distinguishing between “internal” and “external” influences on the sustainability of community-
managed RWS projects is useful for analytical purposes but is somewhat arbitrary. Several of the 
internal elements are linked with (and, to a certain degree, conditional on) external factors being 
in place. For example, adequate management capacity of community structures may be correlated 
with continued technical support and training in key areas over time. Likewise, the success of 
cost-recovery efforts, as a key post-project determinant of sustainability, may be influenced by 
the extent to which individuals and committees are supported, re-trained, and guided in relation 
to tariff structures and broader financial management. Without such external guidance, cost-
recovery efforts may slowly weaken, and perhaps be unable to keep pace with the costs of system 
expansion or replacement of major system components. Clear and widely disseminated national 
or regional rules and regulations will also benefit community management and tariff collection 
efforts. Like cost recovery and community management, women’s long-term involvement in the 
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it did not seem interesting to study the effect of PcS in poorly designed programs because there is ample evidence in the literature (e.g., 7 
narayan 1995; Sara and Katz 1997) that these programs would have many failures and that PcS alone could not salvage them.
nor did we have the time or resources to measure baseline conditions in treatment and control villages, and then wait for the effects 8 
of the treatment (PcS) to unfold. rather we collected information from both treatment and control villages in the current period, after 
some villages had received PcS. Because of this, we were forced to ask people we interviewed today about conditions in the past, both 
before and after their rural water system was constructed. this approach is not ideal because people’s memories are imperfect and some 
baseline data simply were not available to us.
management of RWS project benefits can be influenced by external factors. especially in cultures 
where the role of women is strictly limited, it often happens that once the interventions of project 
staff finish, any gain in women’s involvement falls back, or is given only token recognition. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the long-term involvement of women can be facilitated by the 
continued, if infrequent, intervention of a “trusted” outsider.
1.3 research design
It is important to understand our initial research design in order to appreciate the strengths and 
limitations of the findings presented in this volume. We wanted to investigate the effect of post-
construction support on system sustainability when added to a well-designed, demand-driven, 
community managed rural water supply program.7
A gold-standard research design for such an investigation would consist of a randomized 
controlled experiment in which baseline conditions would be measured in villages, all of which 
had received an improved water system as part of such a well-designed rural water supply 
program (Baker 2000). Subsequently, post-construction support would be randomly assigned to 
treatment villages but not to control villages, and then any differences in treatment and control 
villages could be confidently attributed to the PCS intervention.
We did not have the time or resources to follow this approach. The best we could do was 
to try to find situations where some villages had received PCS and other similar villages had 
not.8 In order to establish the direction of causation between PCS and system performance, 
we needed to find well-designed rural water supply programs in which some villages (i.e., 
the treatment villages) had received PCS without asking for it and other villages (the control 
villages) had not. Therefore, in the design stage of the research project we searched for rural 
water supply programs in developing countries around the world that used a “state of the art” 
demand-driven, community management model and also used a supply-driven (automatic) 
PCS program to assist villages after construction. Demand-driven, community managed rural 
water supply programs that have been in operation for several years are not common, and 
such programs with supply-driven PCS components are rare around the world. We selected 
programs in Bolivia, ghana, and Peru that we believed came closest to meeting these research 
design criteria. As a result, our research design led us to study donor-funded rural water supply 
projects, and thus communities that were not randomly selected from either a global or country 
perspective.
In all three countries, our sample villages had received improved water supply projects three to 
twelve years earlier as part of a demand-driven, community managed, and donor-supported rural 
water supply program. About half the villages were treatment villages—that is, they had received 
some forms of post-construction support arranged by the RWS program and half were controls—
that is, they had not received any such support. In all three countries, we used secondary data 
to help us choose districts or regions where the characteristics of villages and households in the 
treatment and control villages were likely to be similar.
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In Bolivia, both the treatment and control villages were part of PRoSABAR (Proyecto de 
Saneamiento Básico Rural), a rural water supply and sanitation program that grew out of a Water 
and Sanitation Program pilot project supported by the World Bank. We selected 99 PRoSABAR 
villages in the Chuquisaca and Cochabamba departments. Sample villages were located in 
the central highlands at elevations of 1,800–3,000 meters, where rainfall varied from 30–69 
centimeters per year. Within each of these two departments, we sought to cover about 25 
communities that had received some form of PCS under PRoSABAR and another 25 that had not. 
However, the determination of “treatment” and “control” communities was problematic because 
the municipal records regarding the provision of PCS were often incorrect. Communities were 
later reclassified into the “treatment” or “control” group based on interviews, reports, and records 
related to PCS in each community. We ultimately studied 99 communities; 50 in Chuquisaca and 
49 in Cochabamba.
In Peru, both treatment and control villages were in the Cuzco region. The 43 treatment villages 
were part of the Swiss-funded SAnBASuR program, which provided PCS; the 56 control villages 
were supported by the World Bank-financed FonCoDeS social investment fund, which distanced 
itself from projects after their completion. As in Bolivia, the sample villages in Peru were in the 
central highlands, though their elevations were slightly higher (2,500–4,000 meters); annual 
rainfall was about 70 centimeters. The average village size in Peru (588 people) was a third 
smaller than in Bolivia (870 people).
In both Peru and Bolivia, the rural water systems studied were almost all gravity-fed piped 
distribution systems with unmetered private connections; in some villages a few public taps were 
installed for unconnected households. At the time of the fieldwork, the systems in these two 
countries were on average seven years old. Capital costs in Bolivia were approximately uS$80 per 
capita at the time of construction (uS$400 for an average household with five members); costs in 
Peru were probably comparable.
In ghana, the “treatment” villages were selected from four districts of volta region and the 
“control” villages from five districts in the Brong Ahafo region. The treatment villages had received 
their water supply projects through a Danida-funded rural water supply program that, since 2003, 
included a PCS component called Monitoring of operations and Maintenance (MoM). The 
control villages in Brong Ahafo had taken part in a community water supply program supported 
by the World Bank that did not seek to provide PCS. Both treatment and control villages were in 
lowland forest at elevations of 74–503 meters, where annual rainfall was about 120 centimeters. 
The average age of the water systems in sample villages in ghana was six years. only villages 
with boreholes and non-mechanized public handpumps were included in the sample. We limited 
the sample of both control and treatment villages to communities that had received no more than 
two boreholes as part of the water supply program. This effectively also limited the size of the 
villages that we included; at the time of our field visits in 2005 the population of sample villages 
ranged from 200 to 5,000 people. These selection criteria yielded a potential sample frame of 98 
villages in volta and 120 villages in Brong Ahafo. All 98 volta villages were selected, and 104 out 
of the 120 Brong Ahafo villages were randomly selected.
Field conditions in all three countries presented some unanticipated challenges. our research 
design required that the water systems in some villages be “successes” and in others “failures” in 
order to have variation in our dependent variable. In fact we found far fewer project failures in 
either treatment or control villages than expected.
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Given the choice of sending technical personnel to a community that has requested assistance and another community that is due for 9 
a regularly scheduled check up visit, but is presumed to be doing well, it is natural for a manager of a PcS program to be inclined to 
direct resources to where the problem is.
especially with the public handpump technology used in Ghana, breakdowns are to be expected and repairs are often necessary. 10 
control villages must be able to obtain spare parts and mobilize the technical expertise necessary to make repairs. Without these, all 
handpumps in villages in a rural water supply program (and some gravity-fed distribution systems as well) will be out of service after 
only a few years.
Another threat to our research design was the complexity of PCS provision in the study settings. 
As explained above, we tried to identify PCS programs that were supply-driven, but we found that 
even supply-driven PCS programs often do not work that way in practice. The MoM program 
in ghana turned out to be the only true supply-driven PCS program in our three study sites: 
villages in this program received quarterly visits from environmental health assistants to monitor 
the technical, management, and financial status of their rural water supply systems. More 
commonly, we found that communities in the three countries were seeking out PCS when their 
water systems broke down or when there was a management problem or conflict.9 We also found 
that communities could often get help from more than just one source, including ngos, nearby 
municipalities, or even large commercial enterprises, and that some villages may have had the 
political clout to obtain financial assistance from a member of parliament or a wealthy relative of 
a village resident living abroad. Thus, even in villages that took part in PCS programs that were 
designed to be supply-driven, in practice much PCS was demand-driven, in the sense that many 
communities sought help from wherever they could get it. Many of the control villages (villages 
without supply-driven PCS) in our study sites had various demand-driven forms of PCS available to 
them.10 In any well-designed demand-driven, community managed rural water supply program, at 
least initially, even villages without PCS have access to spare parts and to some technical expertise 
(even though, for a variety of reasons, these villages might not retain or mobilize to use the 
training or procurement systems that were put in place at the time of project construction).
To sum up, though our research question was whether post-construction services supplied by 
government would improve the performance of village water systems, the baseline condition in the 
control villages was never no PCS. The implementation of our initial research design revealed the 
complexity of causal connections between PCS and system performance.
1.4 data collection and profile of sample villages
our fieldwork began in Peru in the middle of 2004, in ghana later in 2004, and in Bolivia in 
early 2005. Data collection activities in each country were similar, but not the same. generally, 
a data collection team spent one day conducting the fieldwork in each village. In the course of 
a day, the team held a group interview with members of the village water committee, interviewed 
the water system operator or caretaker (and borehole attendant if applicable), conducted a focus 
group with women from a diverse set of backgrounds, ages, ethnic, and income groups, and 
administered surveys to the heads of household (or spouses) in approximately 25 households.
In Bolivia, we worked with leaders to draw community maps and selected random samples of 
households. In Peru and ghana, enumerators were scattered more or less throughout a village 
and were instructed to interview every fifth household or follow some other similar sampling rule. 
In Bolivia and Peru, interviews were conducted in either Spanish or quechua; in ghana in either 
Twi or ewe. In addition to the survey and focus group information collected by the fieldwork teams, 
technical staff made an engineering assessment of the water supply system in each village. In 
Peru and ghana, data collection also included a focus group discussion with village leaders. In 
ghana, the most heavily used borehole in each village was observed for one day, and data were 
14
collected on the quantity of water obtained. Most of the information used in the three country 
studies comes from the interviews with village water committee members, water system operators, 
and households.
our fieldwork showed that the sample villages in Bolivia and Peru were small and remote; in 
ghana they were on average larger and more accessible. Most of the sample villages in Peru and 
Bolivia had electricity, and many households were connected directly to this service. In ghana, 
only 32 percent of the sample villages were connected to the electricity grid. In all three countries, 
the majority of households reported that they were farmers. Average education levels were low; 
the typical respondent in all three countries reported having had “some” primary education. In 
Peru, 60 percent of the households who were interviewed reported annual cash income of less 
than uS$150 (vs. 42 percent in Bolivia). In ghana, households reported median monthly cash 
expenditures of about uS$57. The average household had five members in Peru and Bolivia (vs. 
six in ghana). High percentages of households in Bolivia (86 percent) and ghana (75 percent) 
reported trusting their neighbors (vs. 51 percent in Peru).
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ChaPter 2:  
PoSt-ConStruCtion SuPPort and SuStainaBility in rural drinkinG 
Water ProjeCtS in CuzCo, Peru11
Summary
Peru is one of the few countries in the world to have an active program for post-construction 
support covering enough villages to enable quantitative analysis. of the 99 villages included in 
our study, about half took part in a rural water supply program that was designed to include post-
construction support (PCS) while half received a water project with no intentional PCS. We find 
that, in practice, both the programs provided demand-driven PCS. Water systems in both groups 
of villages were performing remarkably well at the time of our fieldwork: most of the private 
taps were functioning, consumers were using the systems and were largely satisfied, and most 
consumers believed the systems would still be functioning in five years’ time. The lack of variation 
among some of our dependent variables made it difficult to assess the importance of PCS overall. 
village water supply systems in Cuzco were likely to be functioning whether or not they received 
PCS. Many of the sampled communities had delivered water consistently over 10–15 year periods 
without PCS, and though many systems broke down, communities had often been able to mobilize 
resources to get them running again. A smaller set of communities whose water systems were not 
functioning as well were demanding post-construction support more frequently. This suggests that 
post-construction assistance would prove most beneficial to communities that are struggling with 
intermittent service, limited coverage, and frequent breakdowns.
2.1 introduction
In this case study our main hypothesis is that the sustainability of a village water supply system is 
linked not only to the existence of specific conditions and factors before and during construction, 
but also to specific factors well beyond the end of construction. To examine the role of post-
construction support (PCS) in sustainability, we analyzed the experience of nearly 100 villages 
in Cuzco Department that implemented a water project between 1993 and 2001 with help 
from either of two funding sources: FonCoDeS, Peru’s national social investment fund, and 
SAnBASuR, a program funded by the Swiss development agency CoSuDe. unlike FonCoDeS, 
which has no explicit goal of supporting projects after completion, SAnBASuR has provided short-
term post-project support in conjunction with local governments.
Choice of study area
only two of Peru’s 24 political departments, Cuzco and Cajamarca, have post-construction 
assistance programs for village water supply projects. In Cuzco, SAnBASuR is the only program 
with an emphasis on post-construction. Initially, we also considered studying two programs in 
Cajamarca—PRoPILAS and APRISABAC—but found that neither of these met our requirements of 
focusing specifically on water supply and of having implemented projects that were mature enough 
for an assessment of sustainability.
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the major exception in the region is La convencion province, which slopes northwest into the Peruvian rain forest basin of the amazon 12 
river; this province was excluded from our analysis due to its geographic and hydrological differences from the rest of cuzco.
Most of Cuzco’s 13 provinces lie in the mountainous Sierra Sur region, where the river valleys 
range from 2,500–5,000 meters in height. Most villages obtain their water from rivers, lakes, and 
springs set near the mountain peaks.12
Programs evaluated
Both SAnBASuR and FonCoDeS strive to reduce poverty, respond to local demand, encourage 
community participation, and encourage self-sufficiency through training for new village leaders 
and household members. Both programs have emphasized community participation and demand-
responsiveness before water supply projects commence, and local committee management after 
the water systems begin to function. Both programs have used intermediaries to fund their projects, 
albeit through different mechanisms.
FonCoDeS is the principal investment arm of the Peruvian rural water supply sector and is 
responsible for much of the growth in piped water supply in Peru’s rural areas. The fund invested 
$361 million in rural water supply during the 1990s. FonCoDeS transfers responsibilities 
for completed investments to the community and does not offer defined post-project support. 
once a project is complete, a nucleo ejecutor—a group established by the community to work 
with FonCoDeS during planning, construction, and transfer of water project—operates the 
project for six months. During this time, an inspector-resident ensures that villagers have received 
enough training and that a new organization elected by the community is ready to assume full 
responsibility for the project. FonCoDeS then transfers legal responsibility for the project to a 
junta administradora servicios saneamientos (jASS)—an administrative committee created by the 
village—which replaces the nucleo ejecutor. FonCoDeS’ official role ends with the transfer.
The Swiss-funded SAnBASuR (Saneamiento Basico en El Sierra Sur) currently works only in Cuzco 
Department. It collaborates with the Ministry of Health, CTAR (the transitional regional government 
of Cuzco), local district governments, ngos (which serve as executing interlocutors for projects), 
and local communities. SAnBASuR provides basic water and sanitation services, stressing training 
for village water committees, hygiene education, and system construction, and strengthens the 
institutional capacity of municipal districts, village water committees, and their counterparts. 
SAnBASuR constructed 141 projects, benefiting 50,000 people, over the period 1996–2000 in 
four Cuzco provinces; it subsequently expanded to three other provinces and had completed 238 
projects as of june 2004.
SAnBASuR’s training and capacity-building activities have evolved since the program began 
in 1996. Today, jASS organizations are monitored for six months after project completion to 
determine whether they are capable of taking on full management responsibilities. After the final 
transfer, MInSA employees are responsible for monitoring water quality, while local governments 
are responsible through their contracts with SAnBASuR for working with the jASS groups on 
ongoing system needs. SAnBASuR produces operation and maintenance and educational 
manuals for every village. on written request, it also provides additional technical support 
and training for the jASS groups, though it encourages communities to solve their problems 
independently or with local government assistance before contacting the program authorities. only 
seven communities had requested this follow-up assistance from SAnBASuR at the time of writing. 
villages can also rely on assistance through partnerships they establish with ngos and local 
governments as a result of the program.
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Thus, whereas FonCoDeS has distanced itself from projects after their completion, SAnBASuR 
has provided short-term post-project support in conjunction with local governments. Like 
FonCoDeS, however, it has also encouraged self-reliance among its client communities, urging 
them to collaborate with local ministries of health and education and local governments. Table 
2.1 summarizes key similarities and differences between the two programs.
Outline of study
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the approaches used 
for sample selection and data gathering. Section 2.3 reviews the attributes of the villages with 
FonCoDeS and SAnBASuR projects and compares the experiences of the two groups. Section 
2.4 uses bivariate analysis to look for correlations between indicators of project sustainability and 
likely determinants of sustainability. Section 2.5 uses multivariate regression analysis (ordinary least 
squares and logit models) to examine the relationships between sustainability and different types of 
post-construction support, and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Sampling frame and data gathering
Data were collected from fieldwork in 2004 and 2005 pertaining to SAnBASuR and FonCoDeS 
projects completed between 1993 and 2001. Though for the youngest of these projects the 
period since completion is too short for a reliable assessment of sustainability, it is long enough to 
provide preliminary indications for this purpose.
Table 2.1: Key similarities and differences in FONCODES and SANBASUR programs
Program characteristic FONCODES SANBASUR
Community initiation of project yes yes
Pre-project community participation required yes yes
Community contributions encouraged/required yes yes
Women’s participation encouraged yes yes
gravity-fed water system technology yes yes
operator & water committees trained before operation yes yes
Private connections built yes (post-project)a yes
Written materials provided yes yes
Water management committee organized during project yes yes
operation and management transferred to water committee yes yes
non-water and sanitation projects available yes no
exclusive focus in Cuzco Department no yes
Post-construction support offered by program or via 
interlocutor agency or local government
no yes
Source: Author(s)
a FonCoDeS did not install private connections. However, a 2000 evaluation of FonCoDeS water projects noted that 52 percent of 
households surveyed did have private connections. Households or communities probably built these connections after the transfer of the 
projects (oeD 2000)
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enumerators were trained to first attempt to randomly select households from a complete list, if available, or divide villages into equally 13 
sized neighborhoods with different water access and economic characteristics. if neither of these options was available, the field 
teams divided villages into geographic areas and assigned enumerators to randomly select every nth household depending on village 
population. in practice, this last option was used most frequently. appendix 2.1 provides a summary of these techniques excerpted from 
the enumerators’ training manual.
In each of the villages studied, data were collected from an interview with a system operator, 
focus groups with both village leaders and women, a survey of 25 households, and a technical 
assessment of the system, which was performed by an engineer.
Sampling frame
We focused on Cuzco villages that were large enough to operate their own systems and small 
enough not to qualify as municipalities. Both SAnBASuR and FonCoDeS provided us with lists of 
the villages to which they had provided water services, complete with information on the dates when 
construction was completed and the number of project beneficiaries in each location. We used this 
information to select villages that ranged in size from 400–2,500 people. All the projects within our 
sample frame were gravity-fed water schemes—the dominant system type in Cuzco. our initial sample 
of 99 villages represented all 56 FonCoDeS and all 43 SAnBASuR villages that met our criteria.
The first phase of fieldwork was completed in September 2004. During this phase the field 
coordinators realized that some of the villages on the FonCoDeS list had not in fact received 
water projects through this investment program. The consultant, PACT Peru, worked with the 
research team to find substitutes to include in our sample, but we were left with fewer villages than 
we needed for statistical rigor. Substitutes also had to be found for a few SAnBASuR villages in 
which enumerators had failed to obtain meaningful data.
Due to these issues, a second round of fieldwork was undertaken in june 2005. The research 
team and consultant worked together to replace 20 visited villages in the sample with 20 other 
communities that had received water projects under either FonCoDeS or SAnBASuR. We 
received a new list of villages from FonCoDeS and (to increase comparability) removed all 
villages in provinces where SAnBASuR does not work. As we had already exhausted all the 
SAnBASuR villages with more than 400 residents, we enlarged our sampling frame to include 
villages with between 350 and 400 people. We also eliminated FonCoDeS villages that were 
larger than 1,500 people (since the largest SAnBASuR village in our sample had 1,470 people). 
We then randomly selected villages from the new sampling frame.
A few communities in our sample received both FonCoDeS and SAnBASuR projects. For 
analytical purposes, they are considered SAnBASuR villages, because SAnBASuR entered these 
communities after they had completed their FonCoDeS projects.
Survey instruments
The questionnaires for Peru were the first to be developed of the three countries studied in this 
volume. They were:
Household Survey.•	  Administered by enumerators to 25 households in each village, this survey 
covered current and pre-project water use practices, household participation and attitudes about 
the planning, implementation, and ongoing project, infrastructure uses, social capital questions, 
and socioeconomic information about the household.13 overall, there were 1,360 male 
respondents and 1,089 female respondents to the household questionnaire.
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System Operator Survey.•	  Administered by an engineer to the primary system operator in each 
village, this survey focused on system functioning and attributes, forms of post-construction 
support received, operators’ roles and responsibilities, and other activities. A final section was 
completed by the engineer to report on the physical condition of the water system.
Focus Group with Village Leaders.•	  Within each village, a focus group brought together formal and 
informal leaders in the community. questions centered on village attributes (size, distance, socio-
economic status, etc.), participation during the planning and construction phases, attitudes about 
the performance and quality of the water system, and the degree of social capital in the village. 
groups typically contained five to ten people and were administered by the field coordinator.
Focus Group with Women.•	  A separate focus group convened women of different ages, 
ethnicities, and social status in the village. Female enumerators were trained to administer this 
survey. Women were asked about their water use and satisfaction with the water they were 
receiving. other questions on participation and post-construction were similar to those in the 
surveys of leaders and water committees, to enable us to triangulate some of the results.
Focus Group with Village Water Committee (VWC).•	  Administered by the field coordinator, this 
survey of resident water committee members focused on membership structure and dynamics, 
forms of external assistance the village was receiving to keep its system functioning, attitudes 
about operation and water quality, and other forms of infrastructure. Field coordinators also 
located vWC members who were engaged during the planning and construction phases and 
questioned them about those phases of the project.
Field work activities
Field teams, each consisting of a field coordinator and four enumerators, spent one day in 
each village conducting all the surveys. enumerators spoke either Spanish or quechua during 
their interviews. An engineer separately visited each village to interview the system operator and 
examine the facilities.
As noted above, a second round of fieldwork was undertaken in mid-2005. The teams succeeded 
in obtaining data in nearly all of the cases.
2.3 Profile of the villages and their water supply systems
This section compares the experiences of villages with SAnBASuR and FonCoDeS projects. After 
reviewing the basic characteristics and pre-construction experiences of the two groups of villages, 
it compares the types and amounts of post-construction assistance the villages received and then 
looks at four dimensions of project performance that seem likely to influence project sustainability.
Village characteristics
There are some notable differences between the two groups of villages. SAnBASuR villages are 
much more isolated than FonCoDeS villages (on average, they are more than 60 km from the 
nearest paved road) and they have less access to electricity, lower incomes, and lower education 
levels; they also have higher social capital, on average, than FonCoDeS villages (Table 2.2).
Pre-construction factors
Table 2.3 illustrates the experience of the two groups of villages during the pre-construction phase. 
We know from previous sector studies that pre-construction factors can have large and significant 
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impacts on project sustainability and effectiveness. Both the FonCoDeS and SAnBASuR 
programs put a broad emphasis on demand-responsiveness and community participation in 
decision-making during the pre-construction phase. According to data from the leaders’ and the 
women’s focus groups, FonCoDeS and SAnBASuR villages had similar pre-project discussions 
of key decisions. However, our household-level evidence shows that SAnBASuR villages were 
generally more involved in pre-construction: they received significantly more training, they 
contributed significantly more days of labor, a greater percentage of households contributed labor, 
they were more aware of the project before construction began, and they attended more meetings 
than their counterparts in FonCoDeS villages.
Post-construction support
As expected, SAnBASuR villages received more post-construction support than FonCoDeS 
villages (Table 2.4); operators in SAnBASuR villages reported higher levels of most types of 
technical support and were significantly more likely to have attended training workshops or to 
have received written manuals or materials. Thirty-two percent more households in SAnBASuR 
Table 2.2: Village characteristics: FONCODES and SANBASUR
Measure Data source
FONCODES
Average
SANBASUR
Average
Anova
p-value
System age Household 7.57 years 6.13 years 0.007a
number of households in village Leaders 176 194 0.446
number of people in village Leaders 776 724 0.702
nearest paved road (km) Leaders 13.6 62.1 0.000a
Distance to river or stream (km) Leaders 1.86 5.89 0.013b
Percent Mestizo in village (ethnicity) Leaders 76.7 93 0.012b
Land ownership (topos)c Household 3.34 2.72 0.131
Percent households with electricity Household 73.5 44.6 0.000a
Cash income (range 1–4; 4 is highest) Household 2.41 1.98 0.007a
education level head of household 
(range 0–9; 9 is highest)
Household 2.45 2.14 0.040b
education level spouse household head 
(range 0–9; 9 is highest)
Household 2.61 2.26 0.031b
How much do people in this community 
trust each other in terms of money 
(range 1–3; 3 is most trust)
Leaders 1.8 2.07 0.027b
Source: Author(s)
Note: In this and all the tables in this section, we present averages for both FonCoDeS and SAnBASuR villages and then the p-value 
for the F-statistic in a one-way analysis of variance test (Anova). For the household data, the mean of continuous variables is used as 
a village variable, while for village-level data we have used the median of ordinal variables. A significant p-value indicates that the 
averages for FonCoDeS and SAnBASuR villages are statistically different.
a Difference between villages is significant at less than .01 level.
b Difference is significant at less than .05 level.
c Approximately 3 topos = 1 acre of land.
23
villages reported receiving some form of post-construction training pertaining to the water system. 
But overall, while SAnBASuR villages generally received more post-construction support than 
FonCoDeS villages, they did not receive large amounts of such support.
Interestingly, FonCoDeS villages were more likely than SAnBASuR villages to report that they 
had received spare parts (although this is a statistically insignificant difference) and more likely 
to have ever requested technical assistance. Committees in FonCoDeS villages also reported 
that they received more in-person visits to help with repair and maintenance. This finding is quite 
surprising. FonCoDeS was not designed to automatically supply post-construction support such 
as training. However, a handful of FonCoDeS villages were clearly demanding post-construction 
support and receiving it at the operator and committee levels.
Project performance
Below we compare the experiences of FonCoDeS and SAnBASuR villages with respect to 
four components of project performance: physical performance, consumer satisfaction, financial 
performance, and perceptions of future sustainability.
Physical performance
In most other water supply projects we are familiar with in the developing world, a large number 
of private taps fail shortly after projects are constructed. yet in both groups of villages, the systems 
Table 2.3: Pre-construction factors
Measure Data source
FONCODES 
Average
SANBASUR 
Average
Anova
p-value
Pre construction training [%of villages] Household 29.7% 52.3% 0.000a
number of decisions discussed pre- 
construction (out of total of  
14 options presented)
Leaders 9.07 8.89 0.873
Labor payments (average days) Committee 10.89 25.5 0.000a
Percent households contributed labor Committee 78% 97% 0.514
Score for pre-construction participationc Committee 34 34.7 0.567
Total amount of women’s participation c Women’s 
group
20.96 20.90 0.965
number of days of labor contributed Household 18 30.1 0.000a
Aware of project before construction began Household 89.7% 95.1% 0.035b
Sum of participation scoresc Household 40.3 54.6 0.000a
Meetings attended pre construction (range 
0–4; 4 is attended more than 10 meetings)
Household 2.18 3.03 0.000a
Source: Author(s)
a Difference between villages is significant at less than .01 level.
b Difference is significant at less than .05 level.
c Defined as the sum of values for a set of twelve questions concerning the level of community participation on a series of project 
decisions. This table appeared in every survey except the System operator’s Survey.
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were functioning remarkably well: at the time of our survey a remarkable 95 percent of taps were 
working in FonCoDeS villages and 93 percent in SAnBASuR villages (Table 2.5). on average, 
both sets of villages had water available 19–20 hours per day, and more than two thirds of 
villages had water 24 hours a day.
A majority of schemes in both groups of villages had had major breakdowns in the previous six 
months. The incidence of breakdowns was notably higher in FonCoDeS villages, where, according 
to the system operators, 89 percent of villages had had a major breakdown. Also, if system 
operators are to be believed, breakdowns took significantly longer to fix in FonCoDeS villages.
on five out of six household-level measures of problems with the system, SAnBASuR projects 
were outperforming FonCoDeS projects. For example, households in SAnBASuR villages 
were significantly less likely to have had a leak in the past six months and they were significantly 
less likely to have had a pipe breakage in the past month. However, SAnBASuR villages were 
significantly more likely than FonCoDeS villages to have had a pipe breakage in the past six 
months.
Table 2.4: Post-construction support
Measure Data source
FONCODES 
Average
SANBASUR 
Average
Anova
p-value
Technical support through  
in-person visits
operator 19% 26% 0.463
Technical support through operator 
attending training workshops
operator 27% 47% 0.048a
Technical support supplied through 
written manuals/materials 
operator 13% 30% 0.047a
Technical support through spare 
parts provided to village
operator 22% 12% 0.206
ever requested technical assistance 
for a problem
operator 33% 14% 0.028a
In-person visits from external 
agencies to help with repairs/ 
maintenance
Committee 20% 7% 0.057b
In-person visits from external 
agencies to help with billing, 
accounting, etc.
Committee 4% 9% 0.273
Written manuals/material supplied Committee 30% 18% 0.194
Spare parts provided to village Committee 9% 5% 0.373
Post-construction training Household 21% 53% 0.000c
Source: Author(s)
Note: We have not presented results for financial support, which was negligible across all villages.
a difference is significant at less than .05 level.
b difference is significant at less than .1 level.
c difference between villages is significant at less than .01 level.
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Financial performance
Financial performance was better in SAnBASuR villages than in FonCoDeS villages (Table 
2.6), but it must be noted that only 16 percent of SAnBASuR village water committees stated 
that they were collecting enough money to cover major repairs. A significantly higher percentage 
of households in SAnBASuR villages reported that they were currently paying for water, but their 
responses show they were only paying an average of less than two soles (less than uS$1) per month.
consumer satisfaction
on all measures, consumers in SAnBASuR villages seemed to be more satisfied than those in 
FonCoDeS villages (Table 2.7). The differences are statistically significant in the case of leaders’ 
satisfaction with ongoing maintenance, women’s perceptions of water safety, women’s satisfaction 
levels, households’ satisfaction with management and operation, and households’ overall 
satisfaction levels. But though they are statistically significant, they are not large.
Perceptions of sustainability
We asked multiple sources about the future sustainability of their water supply systems. Predictably, 
the longer the time horizon, the fewer respondents thought the system would still be functioning 
(Table 2.8). This pattern is consistent across surveys.
Table 2.5: Physical performance and interruptions
Measure Data source
FONCODES 
Average
SANBASUR 
Average
Anova
p-value
Taps working operator 95% 93% 0.489
Hours of operation (per day) Household 18.8 19.9 0.249
Major unplanned interruptions in 
water supply service for at least 
one day in past 6 months
operator 89% 59% 0.129
number of days to fix major problem operator 4.53 1.06 0.047a
Major unplanned interruptions in 
water supply service for at least 
one day in past 6 months
Leaders 70% 55% 0.117
number of days to fix major problem Leaders 2.08 2.58 0.755
Leaks at household level in  
past month
Household 35% 25% 0.005b
Leaks at household level in past  
6 months
Household 58% 51% 0.189
Leaks on main pipe in past month Household 23% 21% 0.464
Leaks on main pipe in past 6 months Household 50% 43% 0.253
Pipe breakages in past month Household 28% 20% 0.054c
Pipe breakages in past 6 months Household 24% 39% 0.003b
Source: Author(s)
a Difference is significant at less than .05 level.
b Difference between villages is significant at less than .01 level.
c Difference is significant at less than .1 level.
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Table 2.6: Financial performance
Measure Data source
FONCODES 
Average
SANBASUR 
Average
Anova
p-value
Amount collected enough to 
operate system
Committee 46% 49% 0.841
Amount collected enough to  
make minor repairs
Committee 61% 92% 0.001a
Amount collected enough to  
make major repairs
Committee 7% 16% 0.225
Currently pay for water Household 69.5% 83.5% 0.037b
Amount paid (soles/month) Household 2.03 1.88 0.794
Source: Author(s)
a Difference between villages is significant at less than .01 level.
b Difference is significant at less than .05 level.
Table 2.7: Consumer satisfaction
Measure Data source
FONCODES 
Average
SANBASUR 
Average
Anova
p-value
Satisfaction with repair service for 
major breakdowns (range 1–5;  
5 is very satisfied)
Leaders 3.5 3.65 0.359
Satisfaction with ongoing 
maintenance (range 1–5;  
5 is very satisfied)
Leaders 3.19 3.65 0.017a
Satisfaction with quality of 
construction (range 1–5;  
5 is very satisfied)
Committee 3.98 4.16 0.153
Safety of water (percent groups 
reporting water is safe)
Women’s group 67% 82% 0.093b
Satisfied with water (range 1–5;  
5 is very satisfied)
Women’s group 3.22 3.68 0.013a
Satisfied with maintenance and 
repair (range 1–3; 3 is satisfied)
Household 2.8 2.88 0.388
Satisfied with management and 
operation (range 1–3;  
3 is satisfied)
Household 2.54 2.81 0.018a
overall satisfaction level (range  
1–3; 3 is satisfied)
Household 2.70 2.86 0.095b
Source: Author(s)
a Difference is significant at less than .05 level.
b Difference is significant at less than .1 level.
27
2.4 explaining variation in sustainability: regression analysis
The comparisons above suggest some patterns of difference between the two programs, although 
some of these patterns are weaker and less significant than we had anticipated. This section 
analyzes the bivariate relationships among indicators of project sustainability and factors—
including post-construction support—that the literature suggests are likely to affect sustainability. 
While theory suggests more specific relationships, which we shall consider in the multivariate 
analysis reported in Section 2.5, bivariate analysis allows us to freely examine the strength, 
direction, and significance of many of the variables that seem crucial for analysis.
For this purpose we incorporated 50 continuous variables into a Pearson’s R-correlation matrix 
that included at least two variables for each of eight categories of factors and four categories of 
sustainability indicators:
Factors (34 variables)
Project pre-construction planning (6)•	
Project construction contributions (4)•	
Project post-construction support (4)•	
Project ongoing management (2)•	
Project water source (3)•	
village population and density (3)•	
Table 2.8: Perceptions of sustainability
Measure Data source
FONCODES 
Average
SANBASUR 
Average
Anova
p-value
Belief system will function for  
next year
Leaders 100% 100% n/A
Belief system will function for 5 years Leaders 63% 91% 0.001a
Belief system will function for  
10 years
Leaders 41% 56% 0.143
Belief system will function for  
next year
Committee 96% 98% 0.686
Belief system will function for 5 years Committee 83% 86% 0.682
Belief system will function for  
10 years
Committee 52% 59% 0.556
Belief system will function for  
next year
HH 95.6% 98.3% 0.019b
Belief system will function for 5 years HH 82.4% 88.7% 0.022b
Belief system will function for  
10 years
HH 68.6% 72% 0.416
Source: Author(s)
a Difference between villages is significant at less than .01 level.
b Difference is significant at less than .05 level.
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Factor scores attempt to combine multiple measures of a construct into a single measure. they typically generate values that follow a 14 
normal distribution, with a mean near zero and a variance depending on the variation among their component elements. using factor 
analysis improves the likelihood that a category is reflected by the construct, as opposed to using single variables to represent all 
categories. Moreover, factor analysis can be superior to using an index, which does not usually reflect the variation contained in each 
of its components.
village location in region (3)•	
village socioeconomic status (6)•	
village social capital (3)•	
Sustainability indicators (16 variables)
Physical performance of system (7)•	
Financial performance—cost recovery (4)•	
Consumer satisfaction with water, operation, and administration (3)•	
Attitudes concerning future performance (2)•	
The values used for these variables were derived in three ways. Some came directly from 
questionnaire responses. others were constructed, based on responses to questionnaires. For 
example, the cost-recovery variable denotes whether or not household tariffs in that village are 
covering operating costs; it is constructed based on responses to the village Water Committee 
Survey about financial collections from households as well as about the average cost of operating 
the water system.
A third group of variables involves multiple dimensions of measurement. For example, “consumer 
satisfaction” incorporates results from survey questions concerning water attributes, repairs, 
management, and other issues. In such a case, using one variable to capture all these dimensions 
of satisfaction is difficult to justify. Hence we used principal-components analysis to generate factor 
scores for these variables and then estimated models with the factor scores.14
Factor-scored variables also assist us in triangulating some responses to questions that were posed 
to different survey respondent groups. The following example illustrates this technique. Four of 
our surveys asked questions about community participation during the pre-construction phase. 
We used confirmatory factor analysis to generate a latent variable (PReCon), with four indicators 
each representing the responses from one of the surveys, and a fifth indicator, representing 
household knowledge about planning prior to construction. Factor analysis requires that one 
variable’s coefficient be set to one with a variance of zero, so we placed the fifth variable in this 
position. The main results appear in Table 2.9. The individual model results suggest that all of 
the estimates are positive, and all of them except those for household participation are significant 
between a 5 and 10 percent rejection level. Model-fit statistics indicate that these coefficients 
jointly differ from the null hypothesis but that the overall model fit is quite limited. The above 
results are then used to generate factor scores for the latent variable PReCon, which represents 
the strength of each factor within the score.
results
Though there were 544 possible significant relationships among the 34 factors and 16 
sustainability indicators tested, we found only 104 significant relationships (19 percent of 
the possible number), using Pearson’s R. even more surprising was the fact that many of the 
relationships detected were either not hypothesized or ran counter to our expectations. Table 2.10 
summarizes the results for each category of sustainability indicators; details are in Appendix 3.1.
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The physical performance of projects is correlated with measures of post-construction support in 
only 10 percent of the possible cases, rather than the 70 percent that was expected (row 1 of 
Table 2.10).
For the other three categories of sustainability indicators, the correlations with post-construction 
support are more frequent. But several of the relationships regarding financial performance are 
rather surprising. Fewer than half the significant relationships conform to our initial hypotheses. 
Larger amounts of pre-construction community planning and village contributions during the 
construction phase, for example, are negatively associated with the size of payments that 
households make for water. And measures of social capital are negatively correlated with 
Table 2.9: Example: confirmatory factor analysis of community participation 
(N=95 villages)
Indicator Type Estimate
Significance
(z score)
Household knew system built  
pre-construction
Categorical 1.00 n/A
Household Survey score Continuous 0.281 0.51
Leaders’ Survey score Continuous 2.976 1.88a
vWC Survey score Continuous 0.669 1.97b
Women’s Survey score Continuous 2.324 1.87a
Source: Author(s)
a Difference is significant at less than .1 level.
b Difference is significant at less than .05 level.
Table 2.10: Summary of bivariate results
Category
Possible 
relationships
Significant 
relationshipsa
Hypothesized 
relationships
% of hypothesized to 
total relationships a
Physical 
performance
238 24 (10.08%) 17 (70.83%) 7.14%
Financial 
performance
136 38 (27.94%) 16 (42.1%) 11.76%
Consumer 
satisfaction
102 27 (26.47%) 22 (81.48%) 21.57%
Future 
performance
68 15 (22.06%) 9 (60%) 13.26%
totals 544 104 (19%) 64 (61.54%) 12.7%
Source: Author(s)
a The percentages in the “Significant relationships” column represent the percentages relative to the total possible relationships, while 
those in the “Hypothesized relationships” column represent the percentages relative to the significant ones.
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measures of revenue sufficiency, defined as the ability of villages to meet the costs of operational 
needs and major and minor repairs through revenue collected from households. By contrast, the 
relationships between the factors and our measures of consumer satisfaction and attitudes to future 
performance conform better with our expectations.
Table 2.11 lists the associations between different measures of post-construction support (PCS) 
and indicators of sustainability. The three PCS measures most closely associated with sustainability 
are: the totality of post-construction support (technical, visits, financial, spare parts, etc.) that the 
water committee receives; whether the household has been visited by an external agency; and a 
total factor score derived for the latent PCS category (this score includes the first two of these PCS 
measures).
From the bivariate analysis as a whole, the low overall incidence (12.7 percent) of significant and 
hypothesized relationships suggests that there are fewer than expected significant correlations 
Table 2.11: Associations between post-construction support and sustainability
Sustainability 
category
Sustainability 
indicator PCS indicator Cases Pearson Significance
Physical 
performance
number of 
distribution line 
breaks last 6 
months
Factor score 90 0.228 0.031a
Physical 
performance
Average number 
of operating hours 
per day
Household visited 96 0.357 0b
Financial 
performance
Percent of 
households paying 
for water
Household visited 98 0.279 0.005b
Financial 
performance
Revenue sufficiency 
score
Household visited 77 0.231 0.04a
Consumer 
satisfaction
Total household 
satisfaction
Types of water 
committee support
97 0.299 0b
Future 
performance
5 year performance 
(factor score)
Types of water 
committee support
97 0.26 0.01a
Future 
performance
10 year 
performance
Factor score 76 0.366 0.01a
Future 
performance
10 year 
performance
Household visited 80 0.345 0b
Future 
performance
10 year 
performance
Types of water 
committee support
80 0.395 0b
Source: Author(s)
a Difference is significant at less than .05 level.
b Difference between villages is significant at less than .01 level.
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as shown in appendix 2.3, coefficients are greater than either –0.5 or 0.5 in fewer than 10 percent of all of the significant 15 
relationships found.
between (continuous measures of) the presumed determinants of sustainability and our indicators 
of sustainability.15 even the statistically significant relationships are weaker than anticipated in 
a clear majority of cases. Sustainability outcomes are only weakly affected by pre-construction 
factors, post-construction support, or other independent variables.
This result is largely attributable to the lack of variation in the indicators of sustainability. The 
bivariate results do suggest, however, that effective forms of PCS include household visits and 
various types of support provided to water committees. other measures of PCS such as system 
operator training do not emerge as significant indicators of sustainability.
The weak significant relationships among the variables studied affect the specifications and 
findings of our multivariate models. They suggest that specifications different from those we used 
would be necessary to achieve both model convergence and plausible estimates of the relevant 
determinants of sustainability.
2.5 explaining variation in sustainability: multivariate analysis
In the multivariate analysis we consider project sustainability from a village-level perspective, using 
both aggregated household and village-level data. We consider factors such as external post-
construction support and management and administrative capacity that have not been analyzed 
quantitatively in previous studies.
Model overview and justification
Figure 2.1 provides the conceptual model.
PRECON CONST PCS SOURCE MGMT SIZE LOCATE
SOCIO-
ECON
SOC. 
CAPITAL
PROJECT FACTORS VILLAGE FACTORS
 
SUSTAINABILITY
Physical 
Performance
Financial 
Performance
Consumer 
Satisfaction
Future 
Performance
Figure 2.1: Operational model of sustainability
Source: Author(s)
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We hypothesize that the four dimensions of project sustainability (physical performance, financial 
performance, consumer satisfaction, and expectations about future performance) (Si) are explained 
by a vector of project factors (Pi), which includes post-construction support, and a vector of village 
factors (Ci). A sample equation appears below:
Si = α + Pi xi + Ci zi + e
To represent the four dimensions of sustainability we use the following measures (Table 2.12):
Physical performance•	
Are the household taps, distribution lines, and main lines working?•	
How often does the system break down?•	
Financial performance•	
How much do people pay for the water they use?•	
Are household revenues sufficient to cover annual operating and maintenance costs?•	
Consumer satisfaction•	
How satisfied are users with water attributes, system operation, and administration/•	
management of the system?
Attitudes toward future performance•	
Do consumers believe the system will function over a ten-year period?•	
Table 2.12: Summary of sustainability indicators used in analysis
Category Indicator Surveys Variable type Data source
Physical 
performance
Percentage of working 
taps
operator Continuous Survey response
number of breakdowns 
in last six months (log)
operator Continuous Survey response 
(transformed as log)
Financial 
performance
Percentage of households 
paying for water service
Household Continuous Survey response 
(aggregated)
Community recovering 
o&M costs with 
household contributions
Committee Binary Annual revenues from 
users—(monthly o&M 
costs*12 months)
Consumer 
satisfaction
overall satisfaction Household Factor village average of factor 
scores from household 
responses to ten questions 
concerning water and 
management attributes.
Future 
performance
Ten-year period operator, 
Leaders, 
Committee
Factor Multiple survey responses 
to whether system will 
function next ten years
Source: Author(s)
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To represent the physical- and financial-performance dimensions of sustainability, we use individual 
variables; we could not generate factor scores due to the weak significant relationships among 
the variables. Therefore: to represent the physical-performance dimension of sustainability we use 
data on the percentage of taps working in the village and the number of breakdowns reported in 
the last six months (transformed into log values for estimation purposes); and to represent financial 
performance, we use the percentage of households reporting that they paid for water service and 
a binary variable indicating whether or not the reported annual household collections covered 
reported operation, maintenance, and repair costs for the previous year.
For both overall consumer satisfaction and attitudes concerning future performance, we generate 
factor scores as explained in Section 2.4 above. The advantage of using factor analysis in this 
context is that it models explicitly the creation of categories of our variables. This approach 
contrasts with that used in prior studies, which made assumptions that the variable(s) truly 
represented the categorical constructs in the multivariate analysis. The factor score for overall 
consumer satisfaction derives from responses to questions about satisfaction with the system, 
construction quality, operation, and management; the factor score model converged successfully 
and provided statistically significant results that occurred in the same direction of association. 
The score for attitudes towards future performance combines responses from three surveys as to 
whether respondents believed their systems would function over a ten-year period; we used binary 
data (yes/no responses) to generate factor scores, which converged successfully and whose factor 
loadings appear in the same direction.
As shown in Table 2.13, we assume that the measures of project sustainability can be explained 
by:
Project-based factors, including water source characteristics, community involvement during the •	
planning process, demand responsiveness as indicated by household contributions to the project 
during construction, management capacity of the local administrative water committee, and 
post-construction support such as training, external visits, financial support, and spare parts.
non-project factors, including village size, location, social and economic status, and social capital.•	
Most of the project-related factors included in the analysis derive from the literature, but a factor 
that has received less attention in earlier studies is the technical and management capacity of a 
village. We believe that this capacity enables a village to maintain system performance, generate 
enough financial support, keep users satisfied with the benefits, and provide assurance that the 
system will function over time. To that end, our models include explanatory variables representing 
the number of years of experience of the system operator and of the village water committee. We 
use a proxy for consumer demand—the mean amount of household labor expended per village—
since labor was by far the most common type of community contribution. other project-related 
variables include a continuous variable indicating system age, and a dummy variable indicating 
whether the project was constructed by FonCoDeS or SAnBASuR. The latter variable helps 
control for unobserved program differences.
our models also control for community factors. We hypothesize that the size of village 
population (measured by the number of households) influences sustainability. To measure the 
community’s economic status, we constructed a factor score that combines information from 
economic indicators such as the average daily wage for non-skilled labor, the percentage of 
households defined as poor by village leaders, the average number of non-animal assets owned 
by households, the median household income group, and the average amount of land owned. 
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Table 2.13: Summary of sustainability factors used in analysis
Category Indicator Surveys Variable type Measurement type
Project 
participation
number of decisions 
that involved 
community
Leaders Index Sum of 14 possible decisions 
Project demand 
responsiveness
Mean number of labor 
hours contributed by 
households
Household Continuous Survey response, averaged for 
each village 
Project: 
technical 
capacity
number of years 
operator working in 
village
operator Continuous Survey response 
Project: 
managing 
capacity
number of years water 
committee has served 
in village
Committee Continuous Survey response
PCS: 
households
Percentage of 
households receiving 
an external visit in post-
construction period
Household Continuous Percentage of households per 
village
PCS: village operator or water 
committee received 
PCS
operator, 
Committee
Binary Multiple survey responses 
whether community received 
any technical or non-technical 
PCS
Project: program 
source
FonCoDeS or 
SAnBASuR program
n/A Binary Research design
Project:  
system age
number of years new 
system has operated
Committee Continuous Survey response
Community: 
water source 
quantity
Length of rainy season 
(months)
Leaders Continuous Survey response
Community: 
distance to 
water
number of kilometers 
from village to water 
source
Leaders Continuous Survey response
Community: size number of households Leaders Continuous Survey response
Community: 
economic 
status
Average daily wage, 
% poverty, median 
household income, 
average land 
ownership, average  
# assets
Leaders, 
Household
Factor Factor score created from set 
of indicators listed
Community: 
social capital
Average degree of 
social capital 
Household Index village average of household 
responses to seven questions 
Source: Author(s)
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Finally, our social capital measures include a social capital index corresponding to the average 
level of trust that households reported, as measured by seven questions concerning different 
groups and situations.
We use ordinary least squares regression to estimate determinants of physical performance 
(percentage of taps operating and number of breakdowns), the percentage of households paying 
for water service, and household satisfaction (models 1–3 and 5). We use logistic regression to 
estimate whether or not a village recovered its operating costs from annual collections and to 
measure perceptions of ten-year performance (models 4 and 6). Both specifications rely on robust 
standard errors for hypothesis testing.
model results
Table 2.14 summarizes the results from model estimation. Controlling for project and non-project 
determinants of sustainability, they suggest that certain types of post-construction support, notably 
training and household visits, are linked with household payment for water supply, customer 
satisfaction, and positive attitudes toward future performance.
Physical performance
The first model indicates that very few factors influence the percentage of taps that are working 
in Cuzco villages. This finding is not surprising, given that approximately 95 percent of taps were 
working in all villages at the time of our data collection. villages that have had more frequent 
post-construction household visits are more likely to have operational systems—indicating that 
among villages where many taps are not working, a small group has received few, if any, visits. 
Communities where operators or village water committee members have been visited are more 
likely to have experienced breakdowns in the last six months, suggesting that communities with 
more breakdowns need more help. Stronger determinants of system breakdowns include demand 
responsiveness and operator experience—leading to fewer breakdowns—and community size—
leading to more breakdowns. other project-related determinants of physical performance vary in 
strength and significance, yet none appears statistically important beyond a 10 percent rejection 
level (we use this as our yardstick because the sample is relatively small).
Financial performance
villages in which a larger share of households reported receiving external visits also contain a 
larger share of households that pay for water service. The percentage of households paying for 
service depends on several project-related factors. Communities that had more pre-construction 
participation and those involved in the SAnBASuR program are more likely to have households 
pay for service and are more capable of reaching operational cost-recovery objectives. villages 
with older systems, and villages that relied heavily on contributed labor, are more likely not to 
charge households for water service. Community factors stand out less frequently than project-
related factors as important determinants of financial performance. villages that experience longer 
rainy seasons more often attain revenue sufficiency. Larger villages pay significantly more often for 
water service. other factors play statistically insignificant roles in meeting financial goals.
consumer satisfaction
Measures of post-construction support for households and for water system officials are strongly 
associated with overall consumer satisfaction. other project-related factors affecting consumer 
satisfaction are rather surprising. villagers in areas with older systems are more satisfied on 
average with their water systems than villagers in other areas, yet communities with long-standing 
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water committees are less likely to voice satisfaction with their water and management services. 
Community factors resemble our hypotheses more closely: villages with high levels of consumer 
satisfaction tend to be those with higher median social capital and longer rainy seasons, while 
villages farther away from their water sources are more dissatisfied.
Perceptions of sustainability
Some three out of four villagers thought that their system would still be functioning in five years’ 
time. According to our model results, this perception is not influenced by post-construction 
support. However, respondents who live in villages receiving post-construction support are more 
likely to believe that their system will function over a ten-year period. The only other factor related 
to villagers’ confidence about their system’s future performance is the length of time that water 
committees have served; surprisingly, the longer the committee has served, the less confident the 
villagers are about the sustainability of the system.
To sum up, our models are clearly not perfect representations of the sustainability of water projects 
in Cuzco villages. The fit of each model, as indicated by R-squared values, is quite limited. Some 
factors, such as economic status, are unimportant across any individual measure of sustainability. 
other proxies (mean contributed labor, number of years a water committee has existed) yield 
counterintuitive results. nevertheless, the models do indicate that some elements of post-
construction support are associated with improving elements of sustainability.
2.6 discussion and Conclusions
We studied villages in the Cuzco Department of Peru that received a water project through either 
SAnBASuR or FonCoDeS. We tried to control for such differences among the villages in order 
to isolate the effects of post-construction support on the sustainability of water projects.
our study encountered some difficulties that limited our ability to make inferences and generalize 
our findings. In particular, many of the village water systems were performing better than expected, 
particularly in terms of physical measures such as the high percentages of taps that worked in 
villages and the relatively short lengths of time needed to make many repairs. This is good news 
for many villages, but the lack of variation among some of our dependent variables made it 
difficult to assess the importance of PCS.
As expected, SAnBASuR villages generally received more post-construction support than 
FonCoDeS villages. System operators in SAnBASuR villages received more technical support 
and training and a larger percentage of households in SAnBASuR villages received training 
after construction. This said, SAnBASuR villages did not receive extremely high levels of post-
construction support, and FonCoDeS villages received more PCS than we had expected.
ultimately, both the SAnBASuR and FonCoDeS systems provided for demand-driven PCS. 
SAnBASuR worked with and trained local municipalities and interlocutor ngos to provide post-
construction support, but SAnBASuR villages had to request the support themselves. Additionally, 
because the SAnBASuR villages were much more remote than FonCoDeS villages, they 
presumably had a harder time demanding PCS. Thus we observed lower levels of PCS in SAnBASuR 
villages than we had expected. In the FonCoDeS program, nothing inherently prevented villages 
from also requesting support (in some cases probably from the same municipal agencies that 
SAnBASuR had trained). There is also some evidence that FonCoDeS villages had demanded 
post-construction support in the form of spare parts and in-person visits from external agencies.
39
The facilities in both SAnBASuR and FonCoDeS projects were generally functioning well, with 
residents largely using private taps to obtain their water. SAnBASuR villages had slightly higher 
levels of consumer satisfaction than FonCoDeS villages. SAnBASuR villages had also achieved 
better financial performance than FonCoDeS villages—though only 16 percent of SAnBASuR 
water committees reported that they were collecting enough money to cover major repairs. 
SAnBASuR villagers also perceived that their systems would remain functional longer than did 
FonCoDeS villagers.
An examination of bivariate relationships shows that indicators of sustainability are only weakly 
affected by pre-construction factors, post-construction support, or other independent variables. 
This result is largely attributable to the lack of variation in the dependent variables. The bivariate 
analysis does suggest, however, that effective forms of PCS include household visits and types of 
support provided to water committees. (other measures of PCS such as system operator training 
do not emerge as significant indicators of sustainability.)
The results of our multivariate analysis show that village water supply systems in Cuzco are likely to be 
functioning whether or not they receive PCS. A surprising number of sampled communities had been 
delivering water on a consistent basis over moderate to even longer periods (10–15 years) without 
PCS. Many systems broke down, yet communities had often been able to mobilize their resources 
to get the systems running again. However, it is also clear that a smaller set of communities, whose 
water systems were not functioning as well, were demanding post-construction support more 
frequently. This suggests that post-construction assistance would prove most beneficial to communities 
that are struggling with intermittent service, limited coverage, and frequent breakdowns.
Post-construction assistance is having some impact on the implementation of “user pays” principles 
of system financing: villages in which more households had received visits from external agencies 
were more likely to have users paying for water service. These findings are interesting because the 
reported purpose of many of these visits was not to coax households to pay for service; typically 
they featured hygiene education and “how-to” training for the use of household yard taps. yet the 
results suggest that households are more likely to value their water supply service if they are visited 
for these related purposes after construction. village-level PCS had neither reduced the incidence 
of non-payment nor encouraged cost recovery. only a few villages had received direct external 
financial or non-technical financial management assistance. given that households were paying 
less than uS$1 per month, on average, for service, it is not surprising if PCS had little influence 
on community financial practices. There appears to be a great deal of room for improvement in 
financial management at the village level.
Households in communities that had received both village and household-level forms of PCS were 
more satisfied than households in communities that did not receive both forms of assistance. While 
this is an important initial finding, we believe that more specific models, incorporating individual 
household factors, may improve the ability to predict individual user satisfaction among specific 
sets of attributes.
our models failed to generate meaningful estimates of the effect of PCS on village attitudes 
towards whether the systems would be functioning in five years’ time. This may reflect the broad 
confidence communities had in their systems; about 75 percent of respondents thought their 
systems would still be functioning in five years’ time. over a ten-year horizon, however, those 
villages where water committees or operators were receiving PCS were more likely to be confident 
that their system would keep running.
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indeed, any form of PcS may encourage such a misperception, which could perhaps be modified by some type of education about the 16 
exact nature of support available.
This relationship between PCS and optimism about sustainability can perhaps be attributed to 
community realizations that a wider support network for the water system exists, going beyond 
the system operator and water committee. This realization is valuable, but it could have perverse 
financial implications if households think that this wider support network will step in and make any 
major repairs or expansions to the system when necessary.16
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aPPendix 2.1: ProtoCol uSed for SamPlinG houSeholdS
This appendix is an excerpt from the field manual developed for the study.
There are different methods of selecting households for the household surveys in each community. 
each technique depends upon the level of information available in each village. The following 
outlines the protocol that field coordinators should use to determine how to sample households 
at the village level. These options are ordered from best-case to worst-case scenarios. Field 
coordinators must select the option that best fits the amount of information available at the village 
level.
first steps
upon arrival in a village, the field coordinator will seek out village leaders and ask to see a 
list of households in the village. Some villages will have a list of households either from census 
information or from village resources. If a village does have a complete list of households no 
more than two years old, field coordinators will use the option 1 strategy for household selection, 
described below.
If a village does not have a complete, updated list of households, the field coordinator will ask 
village leaders to work with him/her in devising a sample map of households. For some SAnBASuR 
projects, a preliminary map from the initial diagnostic (pre-project) study may already be available; 
field coordinators should check their documents to see if they have this map in hand. The field 
coordinator will work with the village leaders to sketch this map. In particular, this map should 
identify: (1) the location of the main pipeline within village limits; and (2) higher-wealth and lower-
wealth residential areas, providing a rough estimate of their relative sizes. upon completion of this 
map, the field coordinator will use the option 2 strategy for household selection, described below.
Field coordinators may be unable to sketch a residential map of the area, possibly because they 
cannot find village leaders or others in the village who have the necessary information to sketch 
an informal map. This represents a worst-case scenario, and field coordinators should do their 
best to obtain either a list of households or a village map. In this case, field coordinators should 
proceed to the option 3 strategy for household selection, described below.
option 1: Complete list of households available in the village
upon obtaining a complete list of households from the village, field coordinators will use simple 
random sampling to draw 40 households from the list. The simplest method for doing this is to 
write down numbers from one to the last number of households on small scrap sheets of paper, 
place them in a hat, bowl, etc., and then randomly select 40 numbers. Field coordinators with 
computers that have random-number generating programs may use these programs as an 
alternative to this strategy.
These numbers will represent your sample of households. Field coordinators will collect address 
or location information for each household, and work with village leaders or registry keepers 
to determine what areas of the village these households are located in. Field coordinators will 
divide these into four proportional areas of different sizes, then send enumerators to each area 
to conduct household interviews during the day. Field coordinators will divide areas and assign 
households to each selected enumerator based on the following formula:
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Enumerator # Interviews Required # Potential Households Assigned
1 3 5
2 6 10
3 6 10
4 8 15
enumerators will visit each of the assigned households until they have completed the requisite 
number of interviews. If they have visited all of their households but have not completed their 
interviews, they should revisit the houses to check if a household member has returned. once 
an enumerator has completed his/her interviews, he can return to a site designated by the 
field coordinator and begin checking surveys. If an enumerator cannot locate the requisite 
number of interviewees in his/her area, the field coordinator can instruct him to assist another 
enumerator.
option 2: list of households unavailable, detailed map of village available
Once the field coordinator has produced a detailed sketch map identifying the main 
water pipeline, residential concentrations, and spatial areas of wealth in the village, the 
field coordinator will attempt to divide the village into clusters. These clusters will roughly 
typify the following categories: (1) higher-wealth area, near the main pipeline; (2) higher-wealth 
area, further from main pipeline; (3) lower-wealth area, near the main pipeline; (4) lower-wealth 
area, further from main pipeline.
It may be difficult to define these clusters. Some villages may feature little difference in wealth 
or distance from the main pipeline. Households in other villages may be more dispersed. The 
objective, however, is to sample households from areas of relatively higher and lower wealth and 
areas that are closer to and farther away from the main distribution line. If field coordinators 
determine, for instance, that the differences in wealth and distance from the main pipeline are 
small, then field coordinators should select clusters that represent the diversity of wealth and 
distance in the village.
once these clusters have been identified, the field coordinator will place the clusters into the 
following groups: group 1 will contain households in high-wealth, close-distance areas and low-
wealth, close distance areas. group 2 will contain households located in high-wealth, further-
distance areas and households located in low-wealth, further-distance areas.
Field coordinators will send enumerators #1 and #4 to work in the two groups near the main 
pipeline and send enumerators #2 and #3 to work in the two groups further from the main 
pipeline. enumerators will begin at an intersection in the group closest to the center of the village, 
then walk through the cluster and interview households encountered, based on the following 
formula with respect to village populations:
Populations 400–599: every 2•	 nd household
Populations 600–799: every 3•	 rd household
Populations 800–999: every 4•	 th household
Populations 1,000–1,199: every 5•	 th household
Populations 1,200–1,399: every 6•	 th household
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Populations 1,400-,1599: every 7•	 th household
Populations 1,600–1,799: every 8•	 th household
Populations 1,800–1,999: every 9•	 th household
enumerators who are working through the day who have completed their walks through the 
clusters but have not completed their requisite number of interviews should return to the beginning 
household. If no one was home at this household during the first round, the enumerator should 
check to see if someone has since arrived to interview. If no one is home yet, the enumerator 
should then go to the household next door (e.g. on the right). The enumerator will follow the same 
procedure for every nth household (i.e. the enumerator will go to the 5th household, check if they 
have been interviewed and knock if they have not, then proceed to the household next door). 
once an enumerator has completed his/her interviews, he can return to a site designated by the 
field coordinator and begin checking surveys.
If an enumerator cannot locate interviewees in his/her area, the field coordinator can advise him 
to assist another enumerator. enumerators who assist another enumerator in a different cluster 
must check with that person to determine where they are in the rotation, and operate using the 
same formula described above.
option 3: list of households unavailable, detailed Social map unavailable
If field coordinators are unable to obtain a list of households or sketch a detailed social map, field 
coordinators must resort to what is called systematic cluster sampling with random starting points. 
In this method, field coordinators will divide the village into four geographic areas (these are not 
based on wealth or distance since these measures are presumably unavailable), based on a walk 
through the village. Field coordinators will guess how many people live in each area, and then 
send enumerators to each geographic area in proportion to the assigned number of interviews 
they need to complete.
From the household closest to the village center, the enumerator will then proceed to count 
all of the houses in his/her geographic area and number them on a map that they will sketch. 
Afterwards, the enumerator will select one number at random from the list and begin interviews 
at that household. Field coordinators will instruct enumerators to use the same strategies for 
interviewing subsequent numbered households as that described in option 2.
Sampling female and male respondents
enumerators should try to achieve some balance of female and male respondents. It is likely 
that, in early interviews during the day, there will be more female respondents at home. 
enumerators who conduct interviews later in the day should make a concerted effort to find male 
subjects. At least two of the interviews conducted by each enumerator in the afternoon should 
be men (or women, if the morning’s enumerators find that they have a very high proportion of 
men in their sample). Field coordinators should work with enumerators to help ensure gender 
representation.
at the end of the day
Field coordinators will explain in detail the procedures they used for sampling households in each 
village and justify their reasons for doing so in the Field note. They will also report any difficulties 
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they or their enumerators encountered along the way, and discuss what measures they took in 
response. This information is extremely important for the study team because it allows us to cross-
check the collected household data with the protocols used by field coordinators and enumerators 
to determine the quality of the information obtained from households in each village.
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aPPendix 2.2: Gender differenCeS
To examine whether consumer satisfaction with water systems differed between women and men, 
we reviewed the raw responses (ungrouped by village) to twelve questions in the household survey. 
The table below details some of these responses. nearly half showed significant differences. 
overall, female respondents had a better impression of the systems than male respondents.
generally, women had not taken an active role in water committee administration. The 89 water 
committees responding to the survey had five members on average, with a minimum of one and 
maximum of ten. But among 85 of the committees, the mean number of women was only 0.55, 
with a minimum of zero and maximum of three.
Measure Male responses Female responses Chi-square dif.
Satisfaction with 
maintenance & repairs
67.8% satisfied 73.78% satisfied 0.006
System will function  
next 5 years
76.1% yes 75.3% yes 0.139
System will function  
next 10 years
50.4% yes 45.9% yes 0.007
quality of construction 65.7% good or excellent 72.2% good or excellent 0.004
Satisfaction with 
management & 
operations
59.5% satisfied 63.3% satisfied 0.008
Water pressure during  
dry season
45.8% good or excellent 46.2% good or excellent 0.982
Taste of water at tap 80% no flavor 81.5% no flavor 0.812
Color of water at tap 97.4% no color 97.5% no color 0.689
odor of water at tap 85.4% no smell 88.3% no smell 0.226
Water safe to drink 73.5% yes 71.3% yes 0.504
Water available when  
it’s supposed to be
68.6% yes 71.8% yes 0.266
Water meets  
household needs
70.4% yes 74.2% yes 0.046
Source: Author(s)
Note: overall, there were 1,360 male respondents and 1,089 female respondents (a 55/45 split) in the sample.
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Dep Var 
Type
Dep. 
Variable Indep. Type
Indep. 
Variable Cases Pearson Sign Expected
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
Pre-Construction Factor score 67 –0.654 0 no
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
Social Capital Factor score 68 –0.647 0 no
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
Pre-Construction Community 
Involvement
69 –0.55 0 no
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
Pre-Construction vWC index 67 –0.522 0 no
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
Social Capital HH index 69 –0.509 0 no
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
Pre-Construction Factor score 51 –0.491 0 no
Financial Total revenue 
sufficiency
economic status % poverty 72 –0.455 0 no
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
Construction % HHs 
contributing
69 –0.444 0 no
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
Construction HH amt 
contributed
69 –0.416 0 no
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
Construction HH labor 
contributed
51 –0.401 0.004 no
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
Pre-Construction Community 
discussions
69 –0.366 0.002 no
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
Pre-Construction Women’s 
participation
69 –0.343 0.004 no
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
economic status # animals 69 –0.339 0.004 no
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
village Distance-
road
58 –0.337 0.01 yes
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
Pre-Construction vWC index 95 –0.33 0.001 no
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
Pre-Construction Factor score 95 –0.321 0.002 no
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
Construction % HHs 
contributing
98 –0.318 0.001 no
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
Social Capital Factor score 97 –0.287 0.004 no
Financial Total revenue 
sufficiency
Pre-Construction Women’s 
participation
77 –0.286 0.009 no
aPPendix 2.3: SiGnifiCant Bivariate relationShiPS amonG 
individual variaBleS and faCtor SCoreS
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Dep Var 
Type
Dep. 
Variable Indep. Type
Indep. 
Variable Cases Pearson Sign Expected
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
Social Capital Leaders index 68 –0.273 0.024 no
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
economic status % poverty 98 –0.25 0.016 yes
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
Social Capital HH index 98 –0.248 0.014 no
Financial Total revenue 
sufficiency
Pre-Construction Community 
planning
77 –0.231 0.043 no
Financial % HHs paying 
for water
Management vWC # yrs. 80 –0.224 0.046 no
Financial Total revenue 
sufficiency
Social Capital Leaders index 76 0.004 0.323 yes
Financial Total revenue 
sufficiency
Social Capital HH index 77 0.037 0.238 yes
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
Social status Factor score 98 0.208 0.039 yes
Financial Total revenue 
sufficiency
Post-
Construction
HH visits 77 0.231 0.04 yes
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
economic status # assets 98 0.238 0.018 yes
Financial Total revenue 
sufficiency
Source # months 
rainy season
71 0.244 0.04 yes
Financial % HHs paying 
for water
Social Capital Leaders index 97 0.25 0.014 yes
Financial % HHs paying 
for water
Post-
Construction
HH visits 98 0.279 0.005 yes
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
Source # months 
rainy season
63 0.299 0.017 yes
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
economic status Average day 
wage
67 0.509 0 yes
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
economic status Factor score 66 0.516 0 yes
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
economic status # assets 69 0.526 0 yes
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
economic status Factor score 44 0.602 0 yes
Financial Monthly fee for 
water
Social status Factor score 69 0.65 0 yes
Future 
operation
Function in 5 
years
economic status Factor score 66 –0.344 0.005 no
(continued)
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Dep Var 
Type
Dep. 
Variable Indep. Type
Indep. 
Variable Cases Pearson Sign Expected
Future 
operation
Function in 5 
years
Pre-Construction HH index 97 –0.342 0.001 no
Future 
operation
Function in 5 
years
Social status Factor score 97 –0.28 0.006 no
Future 
operation
Function in 10 
years
economic status Factor score 55 –0.267 0.049 no
Future 
operation
Function in 10 
years
Management vWC # yrs. 66 –0.243 0.049 no
Future 
operation
Function in 10 
years
Pre-Construction HH index 80 –0.23 0.04 no
Future 
operation
Function in 5 
years
Social Capital Factor score 97 0.253 0.012 yes
Future 
operation
Function in 5 
years
Post-
Construction
vWC support 97 0.26 0.01 yes
Future 
operation
Function in 10 
years
village Distance 
–river
80 0.261 0.02 yes
Future 
operation
Function in 10 
years
Construction Factor score 64 0.271 0.03 yes
Future 
operation
Function in 10 
years
Construction Household 
contribution 
amount
64 0.286 0.022 yes
Future 
operation
Function in 5 
years
Social Capital Leaders index 97 0.335 0.001 yes
Future 
operation
Function in 10 
years
Post-
Construction
HH visits 80 0.345 0.002 yes
Future 
operation
Function in 10 
years
Post-
Construction
Factor score 76 0.366 0.01 yes
Future 
operation
Function in 10 
years
Post-
Construction
vWC support 80 0.395 0 yes
Physical # breakdowns 
last 6 months
economic status Avg. day 
wage
95 –0.337 0.001 yes
Physical # dist. Line 
breaks last 6 
months
village Households 91 –0.277 0.008 yes
Physical # main Line 
breaks last 6 
months
Construction Household 
contribution 
amount
95 –0.269 0.008 yes
Physical # main line 
breaks last 6 
months
economic status Avg. day 
wage
92 –0.266 0.01 yes
(continued)
49
Dep Var 
Type
Dep. 
Variable Indep. Type
Indep. 
Variable Cases Pearson Sign Expected
Physical # main line 
breaks last 6 
months
Source Factor score 78 –0.251 0.027 yes
Physical # breakdowns 
last 6 months
Management op # yrs exp 97 –0.248 0.014 yes
Physical # dist. Line 
breaks last 6 
months
Construction Household 
contribution 
amount
97 –0.228 0.025 yes
Physical # project taps 
working
economic status # animals 92 –0.225 0.031 no
Physical # breakdowns 
last 6 months
Source Factor score 78 –0.221 0.048 yes
Physical # times tap 
broke last 6 
months
Construction % HHs 
contributing
97 –0.201 0.049 yes
Physical # hours per day 
operational
Pre-Construction Leaders index 96 0.22 0.031 yes
Physical # dist. Line 
breaks last 6 
months
Post-
Construction
Factor score 90 0.228 0.031 no
Physical # dist. Line 
breaks last 6 
months
Post-
Construction
Factor score 90 0.228 0.031 no
Physical # main line 
breaks last 6 
months
village Distance 
-river
93 0.237 0.022 yes
Physical # main Line 
breaks last 6 
months
Construction % HHs contr. 95 0.245 0.017 no
Physical # dist. Line 
breaks last 6 
months
economic status % poverty 92 0.268 0.01 no
Physical # main line 
breaks last 6 
months
economic status # animals 95 0.276 0.007 no
Physical # main line 
breaks last 6 
months
village Distance 
-river
82 0.303 0.006 yes
Physical # hours per day 
operational
Pre-Construction # decisions 96 0.31 0 yes
(continued)
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Dep Var 
Type
Dep. 
Variable Indep. Type
Indep. 
Variable Cases Pearson Sign Expected
Physical # main line 
breaks last 6 
months
village Distance-
road
82 0.33 0.002 yes
Physical # hours per day 
operational
Post-
Construction
# HHs visited 96 0.357 0 yes
Physical # hours per day 
operational
Source Factor score 79 0.414 0 yes
Physical # hours per day 
operational
Source Factor score 79 0.414 0 yes
Physical # main line 
breaks last 6 
months
Pre-Construction HH index 95 0.488 0 no
Satisfaction Satisfaction 
from household
Management vWC # yrs. 79 –0.327 0.003 no
Satisfaction Satisfaction w/ 
water
village Density 74 –0.311 0.007 yes
Satisfaction Satisfaction w/ 
administration
economic status Factor score 66 –0.279 0.023 no
Satisfaction Satisfaction w/ 
water
village Households 76 –0.276 0.016 yes
Satisfaction Satisfaction 
from household
economic status Factor score 65 –0.252 0.043 no
Satisfaction Satisfaction w/ 
administration
village Density 91 –0.249 0.017 yes
Satisfaction Satisfaction 
from household
Social status Factor score 97 –0.23 0.024 no
Satisfaction Satisfaction w/ 
administration
Source Factor score 81 0.223 0.045 yes
Satisfaction Satisfaction w/ 
water
economic status # animals 80 0.228 0.042 yes
Satisfaction Satisfaction w/ 
administration
Pre-Construction Women’s 
participation
94 0.23 0.023 yes
Satisfaction Satisfaction w/ 
administration
Social Capital Factor score 97 0.232 0.022 yes
Satisfaction Satisfaction 
from household
economic status # animals 97 0.2323 0.022 yes
Satisfaction Satisfaction 
from household
Construction Household 
contribution 
amount
73 0.236 0.044 yes
(continued)
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Dep Var 
Type
Dep. 
Variable Indep. Type
Indep. 
Variable Cases Pearson Sign Expected
Satisfaction Satisfaction 
from household
Social Capital HH index 97 0.257 0.011 yes
Satisfaction Satisfaction w/ 
administration
Social Capital HH index 97 0.257 0.011 yes
Satisfaction Satisfaction 
from household
Social Capital Factor score 96 0.271 0.008 yes
Satisfaction Satisfaction w/ 
administration
Pre-Construction Community 
planning
94 0.282 0.006 yes
Satisfaction Satisfaction 
from household
Post-
Construction
# HHs visited 97 0.299 0.003 yes
Satisfaction Satisfaction w/ 
administration
Pre-Construction Community 
Involvement
97 0.321 0.001 yes
Satisfaction Satisfaction w/ 
administration
Pre-Construction # decisions 97 0.344 0.001 yes
Satisfaction Satisfaction w/ 
water
Pre-Construction Factor score 78 0.346 0.002 yes
Satisfaction Satisfaction w/ 
administration
Pre-Construction Factor score 94 0.358 0 yes
Satisfaction Satisfaction w/ 
administration
Pre-Construction Factor score 94 0.358 0 yes
Satisfaction Satisfaction w/ 
water
Source Factor score 66 0.361 0.003 yes
Satisfaction Satisfaction w/ 
water
Pre-Construction Community 
Planning
78 0.369 0.001 yes
Satisfaction Satisfaction w/ 
administration
Source Source index 84 0.38 0 yes
Satisfaction Satisfaction w/ 
water
Source Source index 69 0.453 0 yes
Source: Author(s)
(continued)
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World Health organization (WHo) and united nations children’s Fund (uniceF) 18 Joint Monitoring Program (JMP) for Water Supply 
and Sanitation database. available at JMP website <http://www.wssinfo.org/en/welcome.html>.
ChaPter 3:  
SuStaininG the BenefitS of rural Water SuPPly inveStmentS: 
exPerienCe in CoChaBamBa and ChuquiSaCa, Bolivia17
Summary
This study explores the contribution of post-construction support (PCS) to the sustainability of rural 
water supply systems in two departments of Bolivia’s Central Highlands. All the 99 communities 
studied had taken part in PRoSABAR (Proyecto de Saneamiento Básico Rural), a rural water supply 
project that took a demand-responsive, community-management approach. using regression 
and matched-pair statistical analyses, we assess the extent to which post-construction support is 
positively associated with system functioning and user satisfaction, after controlling for observed 
community and technology characteristics and for features of the project planning process. overall, 
the research shows that water systems in the 99 communities studied were performing unexpectedly 
well. Communities that received management-oriented PCS visits from external agencies, as well 
as those whose system operators attended training workshops in the post-construction period, had 
better performing systems than communities that received no such support. engineering-oriented 
PCS had no measurable impact on system functioning or user satisfaction.
3.1 introduction
By 2002, two thirds of Bolivia’s rural population had access to improved water supply services, 
according to the joint Monitoring Program of the World Health organization and unICeF.18 This 
rate of access was considerably better than a decade earlier, when the Bolivian national census 
had found that only 24 percent of rural households had access to safe water (Sara et al. 1996). 
one of the rural water projects that the Bolivian government implemented during the 1990s was 
PRoSABAR (Proyecto de Saneamiento Básico Rural), an outgrowth of a World Bank-supported 
pilot project implemented in the department of Potosi. This study is based on follow-up visits to 
communities in two departments of Bolivia’s central highlands, Chuquisaca and Cochabamba, 
who participated in this project. The communities featured are located in 18 rural municipalities 
that lie in the tierra fria climate zone (1,800 to 3,000 meters). This region has distinct rainy and 
dry seasons, with most of the annual precipitation falling between november and March; annual 
rainfall varies from 30–69 centimeters.
ProSaBar
PRoSABAR was launched in 1993, and provided improved water supplies to more than 330,000 
citizens in 762 communities before it closed in 2001. The project emphasized a “demand-
responsive” approach to technology selection and implementation, in which community members 
would have primary control over key project decisions and would also assume primary responsibility 
for the long-term operation and maintenance of the installed water systems (Sara et al. 1997).
Many elements of PRoSABAR were shaped by concerns for sustainability. The project used lower-
cost technologies than its predecessors in Bolivia, and required community members to make cash 
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under the Yacupaj pilot project, communities contributed more than half the value of the initial costs in cash and kind. this percentage 19 
was lower in the national ProSaBar project, at between 20–25 percent.
indeed, a 2002 evaluation of ProSaBar concluded: “the end of construction [typically] coincides with the end of government 20 
involvement in rural water supply and sanitation… there is little evidence of functioning municipal utiMs (unidades tecnicas internas 
municipales) that could provide technical and operational assistance to the local communities in the operations and maintenance of 
their water supply and sanitation systems” (oed 2002).
and non-cash contributions toward the up-front costs of the new systems.19 Communities were 
also allowed to select the technology and level of service that best matched their preferences, 
willingness and ability to pay for ongoing maintenance, as well as water source quality and yield.
community management approach
PRoSABAR largely embraced the notion of community management of water supply infrastructure 
and of capacity building for this purpose within participating communities. each community 
participating in the project was required to form a water and sanitation committee (Comité de 
Agua y Saneamiento, or CAPyS) that would be responsible for managing the installed system. 
each committee was required to identify at least one local person who would undergo training 
and assume responsibility for operation and maintenance (Sara et al. 1997).
Post-construction support
In 1999, roughly five years into the implementation of PRoSABAR, efforts were made to 
establish a support system for the post-construction phase. The original intent was that municipal 
government would provide PCS or organize its provision through third party. As designed, the 
system had two elements: a network for sharing information and a set of technical units that 
were established at the municipal level. The Water and Sanitation network (Red de Saneamiento 
Básico) was established to encourage the exchange of information and experiences among 
the CAPyS, municipalities, departmental administrations (prefecturas), and the vice Ministry for 
Basic Services; within each of Bolivia’s nine departments, a water and sanitation unit (Unidad 
de Saneamiento Básico y Vivienda, or unASBvIS) was expected to serve as the focal point for 
information collection and dissemination. In each municipal capital, a municipal technical unit 
(Unidad Técnica Municipal, or uTIM) was established and given responsibility to assess the need 
for—and organize—capacity building in PRoSABAR communities, as well as to provide regular 
technical backstopping to CAPyS and system operators. The técnicos in the uTIMs were provided 
with training by the departmental-level unASBvIS and with motorcycles so they could periodically 
visit the communities within their jurisdiction.
The network and the uTIMs operated in five departments for roughly two years. In 2001, the 
vice Ministry of Basic Services provided funding that amounted to 70 percent of the total cost of 
PCS support, with the expectation that municipalities would subsequently assume responsibility 
for financing PCS. In practice, however, since 2001 PCS has been provided on an ad hoc basis, 
inconsistently across municipalities and communities.20 At the same time, several non-governmental 
organizations (ngos) such as Plan International and CARe also began to offer post-construction 
support within the PRoSABAR communities located in their operational jurisdictions. Circuit riders 
visiting communities focused their attention on the water committees (CAPyS), providing support 
and guidance related to tariff design, accounting and other administrative issues.
Outline of study
Section 3.2 of this chapter describes the sample selection and data gathering. Descriptive findings 
on the sustainability of water systems in the sampled communities are presented in Section 
3.3. Discussing the reasons for variations in sustainability, Section 3.4 reports on the findings 
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of regression analysis, and Section 3.5 reports on the results of matched-pair analysis, which 
investigates how sustainability is affected by various types of post-construction support. Section 3.6 
concludes.
3.2 Sample selection and data gathering
During September and october 2005, six field teams visited 99 communities in the departamentos 
of Cochabamba and Chuquisaca that had received piped water systems through PRoSABAR 
before the year 2000. In each community, the teams interviewed system operators and held 
focus group discussions with water committee members and with female community members. In 
addition, more than 2,000 household interviews were completed across the 99 communities. Data 
were collected in participants’ preferred language—either Castellano or quechua.
Within each community, all water committee members, as well as the water system operator(s), 
were sought out for interviews. Participants in each women’s focus group were selected 
purposively, with the help of a local intermediary, with the goal of representing the range of 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics extant within a given community. Respondents in 
the household sample were selected using a stratified sampling of housing units from a community 
map that was drawn by the field supervisor with assistance from community leaders. The map 
was divided into geographic strata based upon the water distribution network, elevation, and 
housing density, and 25 households were then selected by random sampling, with the fraction 
of households drawn from each stratum being roughly proportional to the community as a 
whole. Although the field teams did not intentionally stratify respondents by gender, across the 
entire sample of 2,365 households 50 percent of the individuals interviewed were male and 48 
percent were female (both male and female heads of household participated in 2 percent of the 
interviews).
In addition, in each community a licensed engineer, accompanied by the water system operator, 
carried out visual inspection of the distribution network, water storage tanks, and, where 
possible, the water source and transmission lines. In each community the engineer completed 
a standardized evaluation form that recorded information about the physical condition of these 
water system assets. no water quality sampling was undertaken as part of this assessment.
The communities included in the study sample were selected using both secondary data and 
in-person visits to the municipal capitals of Cochabamba and Chuquisaca. All the sample 
communities had participated in PRoSABAR and received improved water supply services at 
some point during the period 1993–2000. each had a population between 100 and 2,000 
residents. Within each of the two departments, we initially tried to cover about 25 communities 
that had received some form of systematic post-construction support (PCS) and another 25 that 
had not. In practice we found it difficult to distinguish “treatment” from “control” communities, 
however, because many of the municipal records regarding the provision of PCS turned out to be 
incorrect. When this was discovered, the field teams reclassified communities into members of the 
“treatment” or “control” group based on interviews, reports, and records related to PCS in each 
community.
Another challenge for our analysis stems from the fact that some communities in our sample 
received PCS in an unsolicited manner (i.e., at the decision of the provider), while others solicited 
it (Table 3.1), typically through personal visits to municipal or ngo offices. From an analytical 
perspective, investigating the effects of unsolicited PCS is preferable because it allows for test 
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of effect by a relatively independently assigned ‘‘treatment’’ on the outcome variable of interest 
(sustainability). By contrast, among communities that sought out support when they experienced 
problems with their water supply systems PCS provision can arguably be viewed as a function 
of sustainability, instead of the inverse. We have limited our investigation to tests of association 
between unsolicited PCS and various measures of sustainability; the 19 communities who received 
solicited support were not considered in our analyses.
3.3 Profile of the villages and the sustainability of their water supply 
systems
Village characteristics
A typical community comprised 63 households and 363 people. Most households in both 
departments have a dirt floor, adobe walls, and a brick roof. As in Peru and ghana, however, 
there are some important differences between the communities in different departments, and also 
in the control and treatment groups. Households in Cochabamba villages seem to have a higher 
living standard than those in Chuquisaca. For example, while 63 percent of those we interviewed 
in Cochabamba have electricity service in the home, only 20 percent of those in Chuquisaca have 
electricity service, and only two out of ten households in Cochabamba reported annual incomes of 
less than uS$400, as compared to four out of ten in Chuquisaca (Table 3.2).
Respondents in the household survey reported attending primary school (typically located within 
the community) for an average of 3 (Chuquisaca) or 4.5 (Cochabamba) years. Means of contact 
and travel to other communities are often restricted to radios and public or shared transport. The 
Table 3.1: Type and frequency of post-construction support reported by CAPYS membersa
% of communities 
that received 
indicated type  
of PCS
Among communities 
receiving PCS, % that 
solicited it
Among communities 
receiving PCS, median, 
mean number of times 
support was provided since 
construction
visits from external 
organization(s) to assist 
with maintenance or 
repairs
22% 29% Median: 2
Mean: 5
SD: 8.1
visits from external 
organization(s) to assist 
with accounting, tariffs, 
etc.
13% 38% Median: 2
Mean: 2
SD: 0.9
Provision of technical 
training to system operator
41% 10% Median: 2
Mean: 3
SD: 2.9
Source: Author(s)
a Data from 99 water and sanitation committees (CAPyS).
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vast majority of people interviewed work in agriculture (62 percent) or are spouses of people who 
do (18 percent). The median age of household survey respondents was 45 years.
Most of the communities participating in PRoSABAR received household-level facilities. Among the 
99 communities included in this study, 94 percent received piped water systems with household 
connections or yard taps. Public taps were installed in 27% of the communities. In 8 percent of 
the communities, some households—typically those who lived too far away to be served by piped 
networks—received private wells. The median per capita capital cost of the piped water supply 
infrastructure installed through the project was uS$82. Most participating communities installed 
simple gravity systems; only 11 percent of the sampled communities had pumps on any part of 
their piped systems.
For most of the communities included in the study, the services provided by PRoSABAR 
represent a considerable improvement over their previous water supply. Three quarters of the 
Table 3.2: Village characteristics: Chuquisaca and Cochabamba
Chuquisaca (n=50) Cochabamba (n=49) Entire sample (n=99)
Mean (SD) household 
size
5.2 (2.2) 5.4 (2.5) 5.3 (2.4)
% with access to 
improved sanitation 
facilities 
51.1 42.1 46.6
% with fixed line and/
or cellular phone in 
the home
1.2 14.8 8.0
% with access to 
public phone in 
community
45.7 21.9 33.8
% with electricity 
service in the home
20.0 63.4 41.7
% of households with 
a motorcycle, car, 
and/or tractor
2.2 7.7 4.9
Mean (SD) years of 
education completed 
by survey respondent
3.0 (1.3) 4.3 (2.0) 3.8 (1.7)
% of HHs reporting 
annual income of 
<uS$100
40 17 28
% of HHs reporting 
annual income of 
>uS$400
13 17 15
Source: Author(s)
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households interviewed in Chuquisaca, and 62 percent in Cochabamba, reported that they 
had relied on surface water sources or unprotected springs as their primary source of drinking 
water prior to installation of improved water supply through PRoSABAR. Similarly, women who 
took part in our focus group discussions in each community indicated that water supply was 
the most pressing development issue for virtually every community at the time that PRoSABAR 
began.
Water System Management and PCS
Almost all of the CAPyS interviewed for this study reported that their members were directly 
elected by the community. In one quarter of the CAPyS interviewed, committee members 
received regular pay for their services; in others, members were not paid. Three quarters of the 
communities in the study sample had a single system operator and one quarter had at least two. 
All the operators were male, and most had lived in their communities for 35 years. Almost 90 
percent of the operators interviewed had held their post for more than one year, and 53 percent 
had been operators for five years or more. Roughly half the operators received a regular salary; 
one fifth were paid on a contract basis only (i.e., receiving funds when they carried out repairs 
or other non-routine activities); and 30 percent received no compensation. operators were 
typically responsible for basic daily operation and minor repairs. The CAPyS and system operators 
shared responsibility for major repairs and for maintaining their community’s water source. The 
CAPyS tended to be solely responsible for financial matters, including billing, collections, and the 
purchase of spare parts.
We define postconstruction support (PCS) as assistance provided to the water system operator 
and/or the CAPyS which, in turn, is expected to benefit the entire community, i.e., PCS is a 
community-level intervention. Within the study sample, the characteristics of communities that 
received solicited postconstruction support differ from those who received unsolicited or no PCS 
along several dimensions (Table ‎3.3). Households in such communities have higher rates of 
television ownership: 18–20 percentage points higher than those in no PCS and unsolicited PCS 
communities, respectively. In addition, 55 percent of households in communities with solicited PCS 
have in-home electricity service, compared to 40% in both unsolicited and no PCS communities. A 
typical respondent in a solicited PCS community has completed 0.7 year more of formal education 
as compared to those in communities receiving no support, and 1.2 years more education than 
the typical respondent in a community receiving unsolicited PCS. Taken together, these data 
suggest that communities whose households have comparatively more education and assets were 
more likely to seek out postconstruction assistance for their water systems. At the same time, none 
of these differences is statistically significant (all p values for tests of means and proportions are 
>0.10).
Communities that received unsolicited support have reported annual incomes that are 17 
percent lower, on average, than those with either solicited or no PCS. This observation is 
consistent with the idea that organizations providing support might target communities where 
internal resources are expected to be relatively scarce. At the same time, communities that 
received unsolicited PCS appear quite similar to those that received no support with respect to 
most other characteristics summarized in Table 2. no significant differences were observed in 
the two groups’ rate of ownership of radios, televisions, or vehicles, educational attainment, 
nor in the percentage of households with access to telephone or electricity services. Thus, 
whereas unsolicited PCS may have been targeted at particular types of communities by support 
organizations, we have no information on what criteria (if any) were used to select communities, 
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nor any statistically significant associations between receipt of unsolicited PCS and community 
characteristics.
Sustainability
The water systems installed by PRoSABAR in the sampled communities were found to be 
performing remarkably well with respect to several different indicators of sustainability:
Recent system functioning•	 , as measured by: (1) within each community’s sample of households, 
the percentage of water connections that were working at the time of the field visit, and (2) the 
number and duration of reported breakdowns during the six months prior to the field visit.
User satisfaction•	 , measured on an ordinal scale that represents water system operation and 
maintenance; the performance of the water and sanitation committee (CAPyS); and the taste, 
color, odor, and perceived safety of the water supply.
Perceived likelihood of future system functioning•	 , measured by (1) a composite variable of 
subjective judgments of future sustainability made by the system operator and CAPyS members, 
and (2) leaks observed in tanks and distribution pipes in the system.
Table 3.3: Characteristics of communities receiving solicited versus unsolicited post-
construction supporta
Solicited PCS
(n=16)
Unsolicited PCS
(n=22)
No PCS
(n=58)
Mean (SD) number of households in 
community
126 (78) 138 (125) 87 (71)
Mean (SD) household income  
(annual, Bs.)b
1740 (1160) 1440 (1160) 1755 (1110)
% owning a radio 94 92 90
% owning a television 38 18 20
% owning an automobile or tractor 8 2 5
% with access to telephone service 40 45 43
% with electricity service in home 55 40 40
% using improved sanitation facilities 44 58 44
Mean (SD) years’ education of 
respondent
4.4 (4.2) 3.2 (3.3) 3.5 (3.2)
Mean (SD) distance to municipality (km) 42 (57) 35 (41) 44 (56)
Mean (SD) per capita cost of water 
system ($)
82 (51) 80 (63) 87 (97)
Mean (SD) age of water system (yrs) 7.1 (0.9) 7.2 (1.3) 6.9 (1.2)
Source: Author(s)
a Data from 2365 households.
b Households assigned value of midpoint of one of seven ordinal categories
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Given that 96 percent of the respondents interviewed had private connections to piped water systems, the findings in this section focus 21 
exclusively on this level of service; data from respondents who were served exclusively by public taps or wells have been omitted.
System functioning21
The accounts of residents, system operators, and water committee members suggest that the 
systems installed by PRoSABAR within the sampled communities were faring much better than the 
literature on rural water supply in developing countries would predict. For example, of the 2,279 
households interviewed who had private connections to piped systems, 95 percent reported that 
their connections were functioning.
This is not to say that PRoSABAR communities faced no challenges with the functioning of 
their water supply systems. In roughly half (54 percent) of the 99 communities included in the 
study, operators had reported at least one system breakdown during the six months prior to the 
field team’s visit (Table 3.4). Household members and participants in the women’s focus group 
discussions reported breakdowns more often than this, apparently because residents classified as 
“breakdowns” events of low pressure that resulted in their families’ receiving limited or no supply. 
This classification is probably also the source of the discrepancies observed in responses about the 
typical duration of individual breakdown events.
User satisfaction
Respondents to the household survey reported general satisfaction with the operation and 
maintenance of their systems installed through PRoSABAR. Across all communities, 82 percent 
reported they were “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with their system’s operation and maintenance 
(o&M) regime, and 78 percent reported they were “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with the 
performance of their water and sanitation committees. user-reported satisfaction was similarly 
strong with respect to the quality of water provided through PRoSABAR systems. More than 95 
percent of households expressed satisfaction with the color, odor, taste, and safety of their water 
Table 3.4: Number and typical duration of system breakdowns during six months prior to 
interview, as reported by operators and residents in study communities
Number of 
breakdowns
Typical duration of  
breakdown (days)
System operators (n=96) Median: 1
Mean: 2.1
SD: 3.2
Median: 1
Mean: 4.2
SD: 12.2
Household members (n=2,365)a Median: 2
Mean: 3.0
SD: 6.4
Median: 2
Mean: 9.8
SD: 36.7
Women’s focus group participants 
(n=776) a
Median: 2
Mean: 2.9
SD: 4.3
Median: 2
Mean: 15.8
SD: 35.1
Source: Author(s)
a values are weighted by community.
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supply during the dry season. Satisfaction levels were somewhat lower for service during the rainy 
season, but still exceeded 75 percent.
The quantity of water supplied through PRoSABAR systems, however, was a source of 
dissatisfaction for many community members. Indeed, two thirds of the women who participated in 
focus group discussions in both departments felt that the quantity of water provided by PRoSABAR 
systems was insufficient or “just enough to meet community needs.” In addition, almost one 
fifth of the women’s groups concluded that they were “unsatisfied” or “greatly unsatisfied” with 
their water service overall. given the generally positive attitudes toward water quality and system 
maintenance, this overall view is likely to reflect concerns over limited supplies.
Household survey data indicate that 25 percent of the respondents with private piped connections in 
their homes also used a secondary source of water such as a river or lake. As discussed later in this 
chapter, virtually all communities charged users a flat monthly fee, rather than a volumetric charge, for 
water supply service. Household dissatisfaction with the quantity of water available from the PRoSABAR 
systems thus seems to have reflected a pure shortage of supply rather than an affordability issue.
Prospects for future system functioning
It thus appears that a substantial proportion of communities have already reached the full capacity 
of the water systems installed through PRoSABAR. Twenty-four percent of the CAPyS interviewed 
in Chuquisaca, and 30 percent in Cochabamba, reported that they did not currently allow new 
connections to their piped water systems. Among these committees, 40 percent said that the main 
constraint they faced was a shortage of water to meet increased demand, while 30 percent said that 
their main constraint was a shortage of financial resources to expand the distribution network. These 
data are consistent with reports that roughly half the communities in Chuquisaca, and 36 percent in 
Cochabamba, experience regular conflicts over water use rights among the families living there.
operators in 18 percent of the communities said that they had experienced changes in the 
quantity of water supplied per day during the dry season since their systems were constructed. 
Comparing these with the 82 percent of communities whose operators report no decline in water 
supply, no significant differences are apparent in terms of maintenance indicators (percent of 
systems with leaking pipes or storage tanks), increased demand on the system (percent that have 
extended the system since construction), or postconstruction support received. It is thus unclear 
whether such challenges are the result of leaky pipes, poor maintenance, or a diminishing water 
source. Meanwhile, eight communities reported an increase in water supplied by their piped 
systems since installation, suggesting that improvements or extensions (e.g., the addition of a new 
water source) may have been made to the original design.
Consistent with their high degree of satisfaction with operation and maintenance, most of the 
households interviewed were sanguine about the sustainability of their water systems in the short 
term (Table 3.5). Members of the water committees, too, were generally positive about short-term 
sustainability, but they expressed greater doubt about the community’s ability to maintain their 
water infrastructure beyond five years.
Finances
The relative pessimism of committee members may partly reflect their greater awareness of 
the precarious financial position of many of the water systems installed through PRoSABAR. In 
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principle, every community was required to accept financial responsibility for the upkeep of its water 
supply system. Across both departments, we found that a majority of CAPyS were collecting regular 
payments from users, but that the amounts charged for water supply were nominal and almost 
certainly below the cost of service provision, once depreciation is taken into account (Table ‎3.6). 
given median per-capita capital costs of uS$82 for PRoSABAR systems, and assuming a capital 
recovery factor of 0.12, per-household monthly costs of operations, maintenance, and depreciation 
would be on the order of uS$6 per month. To cover operation, maintenance, and minor repairs 
only, monthly household payments of uS$1–1.80 would be required, or 2.6–7 times more than the 
CAPyS are collecting. Moreover, despite the fact that Bolivia experienced 5 percent inflation during 
2005, only 13 percent of CAPyS had increased their tariffs during the year; 60 percent reported 
that their usage fees had not changed, and 27 percent had actually lowered their tariffs.
Table 3.5: Perceived future sustainability of piped water systems as per household survey 
respondents, CAPYS membersa
“Do you think the water system installed by PROSABAR will still 
be functioning after…” (% of responses)
…one year? …five years? …ten years?
Household members 
(n=2,365)a
yes: 95
no: 2
not sure: 2
yes: 77
no: 11
not sure: 13
yes: 50
no: 18
not sure: 31
CAPyS members (n=776)a yes: 86
no: 11
not sure: 3
yes: 63
no: 28
not sure: 8
yes: 28
no: 54
not sure: 18
Source: Author(s)
a values are weighted by community.
Table 3.6: Tariff structure for households with private water connections
Chuquisaca
(n=49)
Cochabamba
(n=50)
Entire sample
(n=99)
% of communities levying volumetric charges 0% 3% 2%
% of communities levying flat monthly or bimonthly 
charges
93% 86% 89%
% of communities not charging regularly/at all for 
water supply
7% 11% 9%
Mean, median monthly household fee, among 
communities using flat chargesa
uS$0.39
uS$0.25
uS$0.33
uS$0.25
uS$0.36
uS$0.25
Source: Author(s)
a In Chuquisaca, 5 of the 50 communities (10%) included in the sample have installed meters on their piped water systems; in 
Cochabamba, this number was 17 of 49 (35 percent). even among these communities, however, it appears that most households pay a 
flat monthly fee per household.
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a number of other dependent and independent variables were explored in the regression analysis but were ultimately eliminated 22 
because of poor model fit.
3.4 explaining variation in sustainability: regression analysis
As described above, overall it appears that measures of current system performance within 
PRoSABAR communities are quite favorable. only five percent of communities visited by the 
study field teams had systems that were entirely out of operation. Levels of satisfaction with current 
water supply services are generally high, and most community members and water committees 
believe that their water systems will continue to function for the next several years. In short, limited 
variation in the values of the sustainability indicators exists, which makes it difficult to identify 
statistically significant associations between sustainability and various independent variables, 
including those related to post-construction support.
We explored a range of permutations relating independent variables to measures of sustainability, 
using multivariate regression techniques. The variables included in our final models are listed in 
Table 3.7.22
Table 3.7: Variables used in regression analysis
Variable name Data source Description
System functioning operator/HH survey, 
observation
1=100% working; 2 = 90–99%; 3 = 0–89%
Distribution system 
leaks
engineering inspection 1=Leaks observed in distribution system
0=no leaks observed in distribution system
Revenue sufficiency CAPyS interviews 1=Revenues cover o&M, 0=otherwise
HH satisfaction 1 HH survey Percentage of households saying that they are ‘very satisfied’ 
with the performance of their community water committee 
(CAPyS)
HH satisfaction 2 HH survey Percentage of households saying that they are ‘very satisfied’ 
with the operation & maintenance of their water system
Distance HH, operator interviews Travel time to municipal capital (hours)
Income HH survey Monthly household income in $uS10s (midpoint of 7 ordinal 
categories)
engineering PCS CAPyS and operator 
interviews
1=Community received unsolicited technical PCS visits; 
0=otherwisea
Administrative PCS CAPyS and operator 
interviews
1=Community received unsolicited nontechnical PCS visits; 
0=otherwisea
operator workshops 
PCS
operator interview 1=operator received unsolicited PCS training workshops, 
0=otherwise*
Pump on system operator, CAPyS 
interviews
1=Water system includes pump, 0=otherwise
(continued on next page)
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As noted above, another important shortcoming exists with respect to statistical analyses of 
our data. We do not know whether postconstruction support was allocated randomly by public 
agencies and civic organizations to communities within their jurisdiction; nor do we know of any 
specific criteria used to target communities for receipt of unsolicited PCS (other than geographical 
location). As shown in Table 3.3, some evidence of targeting exists with respect to mean 
income values within each community. nevertheless, geography (at the Department level) is the 
only criterion that consistently appears in a first-stage regression equation designed to explain 
‘‘exposure’’ to unsolicited PCS; no other selection process is in evidence. As such, we include 
Department, along with a number of other factors that we suspect might influence the treatment 
effect, as covariates in the regression analyses presented below. We emphasize the importance 
of considering these results along with those of the matched pairs analyses presented below in 
drawing substantive conclusions from our study findings.
We modeled a variety of sustainability-related indicators using multivariate regression techniques. 
The reduced model results of these analyses are presented in Table 3.8 and Table 3.9. With 
respect to water system operation and maintenance, models 1 and 2 suggest that, all else held 
constant, older systems were significantly more likely to have taps out of order (model 1), whereas 
communities located at greater distance from municipal capitals were more likely to have leaking 
distribution systems (model 2). All forms of PCS are positively associated with system functioning, 
with one significant association at the 0.10 level. All else held constant, communities that 
received administrative post-construction visits were more likely to have a higher fraction of taps 
operational at the time of the field visit (model 1). Models explaining frequency and duration of 
system breakdown (our other technical performance variables), as well as household and CAPyS 
perceptions of future system sustainability, had very little explanatory power. Interaction terms 
designed to test for effects of PCS in the nine communities that received multiple types of support 
were not significant in any of the models.
Model 3 examines revenue sufficiency across the communities. each CAPyS was asked to share 
records regarding expenditures incurred and revenues collected by the committee in the year prior 
Table 3.7: Variables used in regression analysis
Variable name Data source Description
Community 
contribution
HH, CAPyS, and 
operator interviews
Mean value of per-HH capital cost paid (Bs.)
System age CAPyS and operator 
interviews
Age of system (yrs)
Service Interruptions HH survey number of system interruptions in past 6 months
Social capital HH survey % of HHs that report that “many people in the community will 
help you if you need”
Alternative source Women’s focus group % of households using a secondary water source
Department Secondary data 0=Cochabamba
1=Chuquisaca
Source: Author(s)
a Most communities who received unsolicited PCS reported receiving such support once every two to three years, i.e., on two or three 
occasions since the construction of their water systems was completed. quantity effects were not significant for any PCS variable.
(continued)
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to the field visit. only 40% of the CAPyS had records available for review; for the other 60%, 
interviewers worked with committee members to estimate these values. given the heavy reliance 
on recall data, the interviewers felt that only a qualitative assessment of each CAPyS could be 
established (rather than an estimated working ratio). Communities were thus grouped into two 
categories, those in which revenues were perceived to fully or almost fully cover operating costs 
(1) and those in which the gap between costs and revenues was thought to be at least 10% (0). 
The logit model results suggest that communities with older systems, and the 8% using pumps, are 
facing greater challenges in covering their operation and maintenance costs through user fees. 
All forms of PCS are positively associated with financial sustainability. Although not statistically 
significant, the magnitude of the average effect for administrative ‘‘circuit rider’’ visits is large; a 
community that received this type of support was 4.8 times more likely to be classified as covering 
its operating costs as compared to one that had not.
Models 4 and 5 explore household satisfaction with the operation and maintenance (o&M) of water 
systems installed through PRoSABAR and the performance of the community water and sanitation 
committee, respectively. After being questioned about the features of their water supply situation (e.g., 
hours of service, pricing and payment) respondents in the household survey were asked whether they 
were generally “very satisfied,” “satisfied,” “somewhat dissatisfied,” or “very dissatisfied” with each 
Table 3.8: Regression analysis results: system functioninga
(1) % HH Taps 
functioning
(1=100% working, 2 
= 90–99%, 3 = 0–89%)
(2) Leaks in 
distribution system 
(1=leaks observed, 
0=otherwise)
(3) Revenue 
sufficiency 
(1=Revenues 
cover O&M, 
0=otherwise)
Model form Ordinal logit Binary logit Binary logit
Intercept  –8.36 (2.77),
 –6.44 (2.67)
 –1.90 (2.22)  4.95 (2.16)
Distance to municipality (hours)  0.32  (0.29)  0.63*** (0.23)  –0.15 (0.18)
Median HH Income  –0.07* (0.04)  –0.02 (0.03)  –0.03 (0.03)
System age  0.45* (0.27)  0.11 (0.27)  0.42* (0.23)
Pump on the system  –1.83 (0.96)
Mean capital cost paid per HH (Bs.)  –0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)
engineering PCS  –1.76 (1.13)  –1.46 (0.95)  0.94 (0.76)
Administrative PCS  –2.34* (1.34)  –0.80 (1.27)  1.57 (1.23)
operator workshop  –1.13 (0.83)  –1.77* (0.99)  0.16 (0.66)
Department  –1.88** (0.71)  0.41 (0.75)  0.79 (0.64)
Quasi R2 value 0.29 0.22 0.17
Number of observations 78 78 78
Source: Author(s)
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. Most communities who received unsolicited PCS reported having such support once every 2 to 3 
years, i.e. on two or three occasions in the period since construction of their water systems was complete. quantity effects were not significant 
for any PCS variable. Asterisks denote 0.05 < p ≤ 0.1. Double asterisks denote 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05. Triple asterisks denote p ≤ 0.01.
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aspect of their water supply service. (A “don’t know” option was not read out to the respondent but 
could be selected by the enumerator if the respondent was unable to provide an answer.)
Both models suggest a statistically significant association between household satisfaction and 
relevant water service characteristics, such as whether all taps on the piped system were working 
order, the extent of reliance on secondary (nonpiped) sources of water, and the number of service 
interruptions reported in the 6 months prior to data collection.
All else held constant, communities with higher levels of assessed mutual trust also have higher rates 
of satisfaction with both o&M and CAPyS. In addition, there is some evidence of an “ownership” 
effect in water service delivery. All else held constant, the percentage of households expressing 
satisfaction with o&M and CAPyS performance increases with the amount of the average household 
contribution toward the initial capital costs of the water systems (although the magnitude of this effect 
is small). This observation stands in contrast to the results in model 3, which is not consistent with the 
idea that a community’s ability to mobilize capital cost contributions at the time of construction is a 
good predictor of financial sustainability during the operation and maintenance period.
The provision of engineering-oriented postconstruction visits and operator workshops has no 
statistically significant association with household satisfaction. Communities that have received 
administratively oriented postconstruction visits, however, do have a higher level of satisfaction with 
Table 3.9: Regression analysis results: household satisfactiona
(4) % HHs “Very 
Satisfied” w/  
System O&M
(5) % HHs “Very 
Satisfied” w/CAPYS
Model form OLS OLS
Intercept  34.7 (9.6)  20.8 (12.8)
engineering PCS  2.2 (4.4)  4.3 (5.8)
Administrative PCS  11.5* (6.3)  13.3* (8.1)
operator workshop  –2.9 (4.9)  1.0 (5.4)
number of system interruptions in past 6 months  –2.2*** (0.7)  –1.0 (0.9)
All taps functioning (dummy)  10.5*** (3.7)  10.5** (4.9)
% of households using secondary water source  –0.2** (0.8)  –0.03 (0.1)
Community trust (% saying “many people will help you if 
you need it”)
 0.6*** (0.12)  0.61*** (0.16)
Mean value of per-HH capital cost paid (Bs.)  0.04*** (0.01)  0.05*** (0.02)
Department  –6.7 (4.6)  –8.22 (6.07)
Adjusted R2 value 0.43 0.28
Number of observations 83 83
Source: Author(s)
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote 0.05 < p ≤ 0.1. Double asterisks denote 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05. Triple asterisks 
denote p ≤ 0.01.
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o&M and with the performance of their CAPyS. All else held constant, receipt of administrative 
PCS visits is associated with an average 12 to 13 percentage point increase in the share of 
households expressing satisfaction with system o&M and CAPyS performance (p = 0.08).
3.5 testing for the effects of post-construction support:  
matched pair analysis
Another approach to assessing the impact of PCS on system performance is to create sets of 
“treatment” and “control” communities that are similar with respect to the socioeconomic, 
demographic, and geographic characteristics that are suspected to influence water system 
sustainability. Matching is a technique enjoying renewed popularity in quasi-experimental research, 
i.e., situations in which random assignment of treatments to observations is not possible (Heckman, 
Ichimura, and Todd 1997). By creating pairs of treatment and control communities that are matched 
on a set of observed covariates that are believed to have relevance to the outcome variables of 
interest, systematic differences between the full treatment and control groups can be addressed.
As noted above, we have no information regarding the criteria used to select communities for 
PCS intervention (other than geographic location). our matching algorithm was thus based on 
a conceptual model of selection whose covariates included: number of households within the 
community; median reported annual household income; distance from the community to the 
municipal capital (measured in hours); age of the piped water system (< 6 years, 6–8 years, 
or >8 years); per capita cost of the piped water system installed through PRoSABAR; value 
of per-household cash contribution made toward system construction; percent of households 
with access to telephone services; percent of households who expressed trust in their fellow 
community members (a social capital measure); and department (Cochabamba or Chuquisaca). 
Whereas matching would ideally have been carried out before the PCS intervention, the only data 
available for the analysis were those describing the communities at the time of the field activities. 
In addition, it is important to note that matching cannot control for differences in unobservable 
characteristics of the communities or water systems that may affect the impact of postconstruction 
support on the dependent variables of interest.
A variety of approaches to matching treatment and control observations are found in the literature, 
but most are of the “propensity score” or “nearest neighbor” types (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). 
Propensity score matching is not particularly appropriate in our study; no information regarding 
the criteria used to target communities for the PCS programs was identified. Moreover, initial 
analyses identified no systematic selection process other than geography (i.e., location in an area 
served by the supplying municipality or ngo) at work among the communities selected to receive 
support. Instead, a variant of nearest-neighbor matching in which the difference (or “distance”) 
between values of each covariate among all the communities in the dataset was computed. Ranks 
were then assigned to the absolute distances for each covariate. Finally, the sum of these ranks 
across the whole set of matching characteristics was minimized. A more detailed description of the 
matching algorithm employed and a comparison with an alternative nearest-neighbor matching 
technique is provided in Appendix 3.1.
In creating our treatment and control groups, we attempted to isolate the impact attributable 
to each type of postconstruction support (engineering visits, administrative visits, and operator 
training workshops) by comparing communities that received only that type of PCS with 
communities that received no support. nine communities that received more than one type of 
PCS were eliminated from the sample. The matched pair analysis thus responds to a somewhat 
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different question than that posed in the regression analyses in Section 3.4. The regression 
models assess the extent to which communities that received a particular type of unsolicited 
PCS (engineering visits, administrative visits, or operator training workshops) have better water 
system performance as compared both to communities that received no support, as well as to 
communities that received different kinds of PCS. each matched pair analysis assesses the extent to 
which communities that received a particular type of PCS have better water system performance as 
compared only to communities that received none of the PCS interventions explored in our study.
Assuming that the covariates used for matching account for the majority of variation in water 
system performance other than that attributable to postconstruction support, this procedure allows 
for the direct comparison of performance measures among communities that received some 
versus no PCS. Such comparisons take the form of nonparametric statistical tests, in particular 
one-way AnovA and the kruskal-Wallis test. The results in Table 3.10 pertain to five performance 
measures and three types of unsolicited postconstruction support.
As with the regression analyses, no effect of engineering-oriented visits is found on the comparison 
of treatment versus control villages. Also consistent with the regression analyses, household 
satisfaction with both system operations and maintenance and the functioning of the water 
committee CAPyS is significantly higher among communities that received administrative PCS 
visits. With respect to operator workshops, the significant (negative) association with system leaks 
observed in the regression analysis does not emerge in the matched pair analysis, but operator 
workshop training is significantly associated with rate of tap functioning.
Impacts of PCS on water committee functioning
Both the regression and the matched-pair analysis results suggest that administrative visits and 
operator training have enhanced user satisfaction with o&M and water committee performance, 
Table 3.10: Results of matched-pair analyses for unsolicited PCS interventionsa
Dependent variable test of significance
Engineering
visits
Administrative 
visits
System 
Operator 
Training
Tap functioning (1=100%, 2=90–
99% 3=0–89%)
Anova (F)
kruskal-Wallis (x2)
0.3
0.2
1.0
1.1
6.5*
6.3**
# of breakdowns in past 6 months 
(1=zero, 2=1–2, 3=3+)
Anova (F)
kruskal-Wallis (x2)
0.1
0.1
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.5
Presence of leaks in distribution 
system and/or water tank
Anova (F)
kruskal-Wallis (x2)
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
1.2
0.1
% of households “very satisfied” with 
system o&M
Anova (F)
kruskal-Wallis (x2)
0.3
0.9
6.7***
7.8***
0.0
1.4
% of households “very satisfied” with 
CAPyS
Anova (F)
kruskal-Wallis (x2)
2.0
2.6
6.1***
8.9***
1.0
1.7
Source: Author(s)
a Asterisks denote 0.05 < p ≤ 0.1. Double asterisks denote 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05. Triple asterisks denote p ≤ 0.01. Degrees of freedom 
range between 46 and 50 for one-way Anova tests (degrees of freedom for all kruskal-Wallis tests equal one).
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ostensibly by affecting the way that water systems are managed. We thus examine the links 
between post-construction support and several management-related indicators (Table 3.11), with 
the assumption that these can be viewed as proximal indicators of sustainability.
This analysis suggests a potential link between PCS and management practices that are generally 
believed to promote water system sustainability. evidence for these associations must be interpreted 
carefully, given our very small sample sizes and the limited variation in both the dependent and 
independent variables of interest. It is also important to remember that PCS has been supplied to 
communities in these departments by several different government and ngo groups, with likely 
variations in quality of support that could not be captured by our analysis. With these caveats, 
the evidence suggests that those who have received periodic “injections” of capacity building—
particularly related to administrative and financial functions of the CAPyS—may have been 
performing better than those that had not benefited from such support.
All CAPyS that had received unsolicited visits providing non-technical support reported (and could 
provide documentation of) regular monthly meetings with households; only 64 percent of the 
control communities reported such meetings. Almost half of the CAPyS in treatment communities 
were paid for their services, as compared with only 9 percent of those in control communities. In 
addition, CAPyS that had received unsolicited PCS appear to have been on a somewhat more 
solid financial footing—as evidenced by their higher rates of regular bill collection (33 percent 
Table 3.11: Comparison of performance indicators between CAPYS receiving unsolicited 
administrative PCS (“treatment”) and CAPYS receiving no PCS (“control”)a
Treatment 
communities
Control 
communities Tests of significance
% holding regular monthly meetings with 
community members
100% 64% Anova (F): 4.8**
kruskal-Wallis (x2): 4.3**
% of committees in which members are paid 
for service
44% 9% Anova (F): 5.7**
kruskal-Wallis (x2): 4.9**
% of committees that collect tariffs from users 
>4 times per year
33% 4% Anova (F): 5.5**
kruskal-Wallis (x2): 4.8**
% that increased tariffs in year prior to 
interview
38% 5% Anova (F): 3.3*
kruskal-Wallis (x2): 2.5
Mean, median % of households in arrears at 
time of interview
Mean: 1.8
Median: 0.0
Mean: 29.5
Median: 13.0
Anova (F): 2.8*
kruskal-Wallis (x2): 2.4
Mean, median % of connected households 
who received a fine for late payment in year 
prior to interview
Mean: 1.7
Median: 0.0
Mean: 1.4
Median: 0.0
Anova (F): 0.0
kruskal-Wallis (x2): 0.2
Mean, median % of connected households 
who were disconnected for non-payment in 
year prior to interview
Mean: 0.0
Median: 0.0
Mean: 3.2
Median: 0.0
Anova (F): 2.1
kruskal-Wallis (x2): 2.6*
Source: Author(s)
a Asterisks denote 0.05 < p ≤ 0.1. Double asterisks denote 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05. Triple asterisks denote p ≤ 0.01. Degrees of freedom 
range between 46 and 50 for one-way Anova tests (degrees of freedom for all kruskal-Wallis tests equal one).
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versus 4 percent) and tariff increases in the year prior to our field study (38 percent versus 5 
percent).
There is no evidence that CAPyS that received administrative PCS visits were more likely than 
committees in control communities to levy fines on nonpaying households (although average 
disconnection rate in control communities are comparatively higher). nevertheless, the median 
percentage of households reported to be in arrears on their water bills at the time of our fieldwork 
was substantially lower than that of control communities. In short, it appears that CAPyS that 
had received administrative PCS visits were operating with more of a small-business approach—
providing salaries to their “employees,” maintaining regular communication with “customers,” 
and paying greater attention to financial sustainability issues—than the committees that had not 
received this type of support.
3.6 discussion and Conclusions
A principal finding of our research is that the vast majority of rural water systems installed under 
PRoSABAR that were included in the study sample were functioning quite well. Five or more 
years after system construction, only five percent of the communities studied had systems that 
were not operating. Households in the sample communities reported substantial improvements 
in their water supply as a result of the project and were largely satisfied with the services they 
were receiving. Most community members and water committees were confident that their water 
systems would continue to function for the next several years. Water committees appeared to 
be generally functional, and system operators were continuing in their posts for several years. It 
appears that the strong emphasis on community participation, “demand filters” such as cash and 
in-kind contributions, and the technologies employed in PRoSABAR have indeed yielded more 
sustainable outcomes than those typically portrayed in the literature on rural water supply services 
in developing countries.
These findings are particularly heartening given that the post-construction support system that was 
developed by the architects of PRoSABAR’s Red de Saneamiento Básico was not sustained beyond 
the network’s pilot phase. Indeed, a second important insight from this study is that municipal 
governments in Cochabamba and Chuquisaca have been unable to sustain the provision of PCS 
that was envisaged in the design of PRoSABAR. This experience is consistent with the conventional 
wisdom in the rural water sector that marshalling public finance to build new systems is easier than 
sustaining investment to maintain existing assets.
In some areas, the void in post-construction support for rural water supply that was left by 
municipal governments upon termination of the Red de Saneamiento Básico has been filled 
by ngos such as Plan International and CARe. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in several 
developing countries, ngos are important actors in PCS programs in rural water supply (komives 
et al. 2007; Prokopy et al. 2007; and the other case studies in this volume). To the extent that 
PCS is generally found to be important for the sustainability of rural water investments, it seems 
necessary to understand the strengths and weaknesses of, and policy supports needed for, effective 
ngo-mediated PCS programs.
The uniformly good performance of the water systems studied, combined with the various data 
quality problems noted above, provide a challenging context in which to examine the potential 
impacts of post-construction support on system performance. In addition, our study is limited 
to the evaluation of post-intervention measures across the treatment and matched comparison 
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it is of course possible that other benefits of circuit rider programs (such as the opportunity for technical staff to exchange information 23 
directly with community and water committee members) exist but were not captured in our analysis.
communities. Whereas some efforts were made to collect information about the communities prior 
to the installation of the improved water systems, some of these data are likely to be vulnerable 
to recall bias. Future research in this area would be greatly strengthened if designed with a set 
of baseline measures, random assignment of the PCS ‘‘treatment,’’ and follow-up measures of 
system functioning.
nevertheless, the data are consistent with the hypothesis that, at the margin, certain types of post-
construction support have positively affected rural water systems in Cochabamba and Chuquisaca. 
In particular, periodic visits from management specialists were associated with a higher rate of 
household tap functioning, as well as greater user satisfaction. Though the precise mechanisms by 
which non-technical PCS influences user satisfaction are unknown, matched-pair analysis suggests 
that the water committees that received this support tended to use administrative practices that are 
conceptually linked to more sustainable outcomes (e.g., periodic price increases, regular meetings 
with community members). notably, such practices are also often perceived as being particularly 
difficult to implement in low-income communities.
We found no evidence that system performance was affected by visits from engineering-oriented 
specialists. However, matched-pair analysis indicates significant differences in outcome measures 
between communities whose operators were invited to attend postconstruction training workshops 
and those who received no postconstruction support. In the communities whose operators had 
attended workshops, a significantly higher percentage of household taps were functioning at the 
time of our field visit. To the extent that the costs and logistical requirements of organizing periodic 
operator workshops are probably much lower than those of establishing and maintaining a “circuit 
rider” program of technical visits, these findings could be viewed as good news for practitioners 
charged with designing PCS systems.23
An interesting question arises about the different inferences about operator workshops emanating 
from the regression versus matched pair analyses. As noted above, the two approaches answer 
different questions. Matched pair analysis is used to control for characteristics extant in the sample 
communities at the time of the PRoSABAR project implementation such that the ‘‘treatment’’ of 
postconstruction support more closely resembles a randomized trial. our analyses isolate the 
effects of particular kinds of postconstruction support as compared to receiving no PCS at all. By 
contrast, our regression analyses include some variables related to the postconstruction situation 
(e.g., system age, current measures of social capital). It compares the performance in communities 
that received a particular type of PCS to those who received either another type of PCS, or no 
support at all.
given these differences in analytical strategy, it is not surprising that the results of the two 
approaches differ to some extent. Taken together, they raise a set of interesting hypotheses that 
cannot be tested with our data but which warrant further investigation. For example, it could be 
that the majority of ‘‘technical’’ problems with water system performance in most communities 
are actually a function of insufficient revenues for operation and maintenance. If true, one would 
expect that, among the PCS programs investigated, administrative visits would have the greatest 
contribution toward system performance. operator workshops might thus have a significant 
impact on performance as compared to no PCS at all, as found in the matched pair analyses, 
because some discussion of financial sustainability during the workshops was translated into 
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improved revenue collection practices at the community level. Compared to administrative visits 
that (1) focus explicitly on financial and administrative matters and (2) involve multiple members 
of the water committee rather than just a single operator, however, workshops may have a much 
less pronounced effect on performance (consistent with the regression analysis findings presented 
in Section 3.4).
overall, of course, the data suggest a very high level of functioning among systems in sampled 
communities—which, one could argue, draws into question the value of any supply-driven 
spending on post-construction support at all. At the same time, it is important to note that the 
systems we evaluated range between five and eight years in age, which could be viewed as too 
short a period over which to evaluate their sustainability. We found a number of troubling trends 
in the sample communities (e.g., limited cost recovery, declining water supplies) that may portend 
real challenges for water system management in the near future. To the extent that variability in 
performance increases over time, so too may the value of post-construction support efforts.
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aPPendix 3.1: matChinG ProtoCol
In analysis of results from quasi-experimental research designs, matching of observations on 
similar characteristics is now widespread. Matching is an attractive option on two levels: 1) it 
has intuitive appeal because it allows comparison of similar communities, groups, or individuals, 
and 2) it offers the possibility of control over specific characteristics thought to influence 
program effectiveness. When random assignment of treatments to observations is not possible, 
matching holds promise for interpreting outcomes, especially when two clearly distinct groups of 
observations exist.
In Bolivia, villages receiving rural water supply development projects can be separated into 
several different groups corresponding to the type of PCS they received: villages that received 
1) unsolicited technical PCS visits, 2) unsolicited non-technical PCS visits, 3) operator training 
workshops, 4) some combination of these forms of PCS, or 5) no unsolicited PCS. As a result, 
matching holds promise for comparing the effect of these various PCS “treatments” on the 
sustainability of the water systems both physical (breakdowns and leaks) and perceived (household 
satisfaction).
As a consequence of important theoretical contributions from the field of econometrics, use of 
matching techniques now typically focuses on different variations of nearest-neighbor matching or 
propensity score matching. Applied to our sample, the latter technique would produce a univariate 
score (using logistic regression methods) for communities that would reflect the probability that a 
community received a particular form of post-construction technical assistance, based on village, 
regional, and project characteristics. Because communities in the sample were chosen to receive 
treatments based primarily upon their geographic remoteness, propensity score matching is not 
really justified.
nearest-neighbor matching methods include caliper matching, distance (absolute or squared 
differences) matching, cluster analysis, benchmark matching, and optimal matching. Caliper 
matching pairs observations within a specified range of variation, so statistical power can be 
reduced if the observation set shrinks too much. Benchmark group matching selects control units 
falling close to the treatment unit on some multivariate distance (index) measure. no definitive 
review has been done that compares the strengths and weaknesses of each of these matching 
methods.
To evaluate the effects of the various PCS programs, we develop an optimization algorithm for 
creating “nearest-neighbor” matches. Instead of minimizing the absolute or squared differences 
over a set of characteristics, as could be done with more traditional matching techniques, we 
assign ranks to the absolute differences and then minimize the sum of these ranks across the 
whole set of matching characteristics. For example, if we are trying to match the number α = 3 
with one of those in the set of five numbers below:
β = {1,3,4,4,7},
we first calculate absolute differences: δα1 = |1 – 3| = 2, δα2 = |3 – 3| = 0,…, δα5 = |7 – 3| 
= 4. From the vector of differences [2, 0, 1, 1, 4], we generate difference ranks:
[4,1,2,2,5].
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our objective is to minimize rank differences, so we match α and β2. This procedure is extended 
to matches on all chosen variables, where the individual variable ranks are summed. The match is 
then made between the two observations with the smallest rank sum.
use of this method reduces the probability of creating matches between villages that are quite 
different on one particular characteristic but similar on all others (thus having relatively small 
absolute differences). In addition, this nearness weighting removes the problems of scaling that 
can occur when the matching characteristics are measured by vastly different metrics. (Alternatively, 
as discussed later, one could employ z-score matching, which adjusts for these scaling differences 
based on the standard deviation of the variable in question.)
We formulate this as a simple assignment-with-replacement optimization problem:
MinZ rank x
ik jk
k
K
ij
j
= −
==
∑ ( ) *α β
111
m
i
n
∑∑
=
s.t. xij
j
n
=
∑ =
1
1 for all i = 1,…,n (each treatment observation used once), where
xij = 1 if treatment village i assigns to control village j, 0 otherwise;
αik = value of variable k for treatment observation i;
βjk = value of variable k for control observation j;
rank(|αik – βjk|) = rank of absolute difference between observation i and observation j on 
matching variable k.
It is also possible to relax the restriction that each treatment unit receive only one control match 
(1-n matching) by changing the constraint listed above to the following:
x p
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j
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 for all i = 1,…,m (each control village used at most once),
where p is the number of control units to match to each treatment unit.
We use the following k variables in our matching algorithm, since they are thought to be relevant 
to the sustainability of the systems:
number of households in community•	
Age of piped water system (three-level categorical variable for <6 years, 6–8 years, or >8 •	
years)
Per capita cost of piped water system•	
value of per household cash contribution for construction•	
Percent of households with access to telephone service•	
Percent of households expressing trust in fellow community members•	
Department (Cochabamba or Chuquisaca)•	
Distance from community to the municipal capital (hours)•	
Median reported annual household income•	
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once the matching sets are created, we calculate an average treatment effect by comparing the 
mean or median sustainability scores of the two groups. Anova and kruskal-Wallis tests can be 
applied to determine the statistical significance of this difference.
Z-score matching
Instead of simply relying on optimal matching between units on the basis of rank differences, one 
might also use some other “distance” measure, such as the z-score. Mathematically, the problem 
becomes:
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1 for all i = 1,…,n (each treatment observation used once), where
xij = 1 if treatment village i assigns to control village j, and 0 otherwise;
αik = value of variable k for treatment observation i;
βjk = value of variable k for control observation j;
|(zik – zjk|) = z-score difference between observation i and observation j on matching variable 
k.
The z-score of the unit on variable k is calculated according to the following formula:
z
x x
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−
, where xi is the value of variable k for unit i, x  is the sample mean of variable 
k and sx is its standard deviation.
Because of the limited number of “treatment” communities as compared to “control” communities, 
we employed 1-to-n matching in which each community that received unsolicited post-construction 
support was paired with up to five control communities that received no support. We carried 
out several variations of the matched-pair analysis (e.g., z-score matching), and none of these 
alternative formulations produced substantively different findings. The matching and statistical 
analysis strategies presented here were ultimately selected because they generated fewer problems 
(e.g., vulnerability to outliers) and took the greatest advantage of the available data. Following 
each round of preliminary matching, the data were “trimmed” in order to eliminate relatively 
poor matches (in this case, those with a cumulative distance measure above the 90th percentile 
of all distance measures in the matched pairs). Trimming increases the efficiency of the matching 
protocol.
Thus, as discussed above, use of z score or rank matching is not most efficient as measured by the 
sum of squared errors, a finding that generally applies to weighted matching techniques [Frölich, 
2004]. However, these techniques reduce the probability of one or a few matching variables 
measured on a very large scale dominating the matching procedure. In addition, trimming 
improves the efficiency of these approaches.
We carried out several variations of the matched pair analysis (e.g., z score matching), with none of 
these alternative formulations resulting in substantively different findings. The matching and statistical 
analysis strategies presented here were ultimately selected because they generated fewer problems 
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(e.g., vulnerability to outliers) and took the greatest advantage of the available data. The rank 
matching approaches we use in section 3.5 are compared with z score approaches in Table 3.12.
Table 3.12: Error comparison for weighted z-score matching and rank matching
Rank 
Error
Squared 
Error
Ratio of Squared Error 
to z-Score Squared 
Error (Untrimmed)
Ratio of 
Rank Error 
to z-Score 
Rank Error 
(Untrimmed)
z score matching: full set of 
matches
97672 20791312 n/A n/A
z score matching: trimmed set 
of matchesa
87054 13291904 64% 89%
Rank matching: full set of 
matches
92914 27268601 131% 95%
Rank matching: trimmed set of 
matchesa
81056 23484917 113% 83%
Source: Author(s)
a In this study, trimming was used to eliminate the worst 10% of matches.
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ChaPter 4:  
PoSt-ConStruCtion SuPPort and the SuStainaBility of rural Water 
ProjeCtS in Ghana24
Summary
This case study draws on data from 200 villages in ghana’s volta and Brong Ahafo regions 
to examine what kind of post-construction support services villages solicit and receive, and 
whether unsolicited (supply-driven) post-construction assistance is positively associated with the 
technical sustainability of non-mechanized handpump systems. In ghana, both “demand-driven” 
and “supply-driven” PCS systems exist, and both government and non-governmental actors are 
involved in support activities. In contrast to recent findings in the literature, but like the other two 
case studies in this volume, we find that most of the water systems we studied are in fact working. 
In the sample villages, borehole equipment breaks down often, but most water and sanitation 
committees in both volta and Brong Ahafo effectively mobilize the resources needed to make 
minor repairs in a matter of a few days. using regression analysis and nearest neighbor matching, 
we find that one form of post-construction support—additional technical training for village-based 
caretakers—is positively associated with technical sustainability.
4.1 introduction: the rural water supply sector and post-construction  
support in Ghana
By 2001, about 62 percent of ghana’s rural population had access to improved water services, 
according to the World Health organization-unICeF joint Monitoring Program for Water Supply 
and Sanitation.25 Since 1995, the ghanaian Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA) 
has been responsible for coordinating and facilitating activities in the sector (edig, van engel, 
and Laube 2002). As in many developing countries, various external donors provide much of the 
financing for capital investments in rural water supply projects.
CWSA’s national strategy promotes a demand-driven planning approach that emphasizes 
participatory project design and implementation. The rural water supply projects are expected to 
include discussions with communities about relevant technology and management choices, and 
women’s participation is valued and encouraged. Communities also make an upfront contribution 
to capital costs (5–10 percent).
Water and sanitation (“watsan”) committees are formed in each project community. Project 
implementation is expected to include initial training for these committees along with special 
training on repair and maintenance for two village-based “caretakers” who are generally members 
of the watsan committee. Though district assemblies hold the water systems in trust for the 
communities, the watsan committees are responsible for managing the systems and for raising 
revenue from the communities to pay for operation, maintenance, and repairs.
Post-construction support
The watsan committees and caretakers have access to a well-developed, multi-faceted system of 
post-construction support. A central actor in this system is the district water and sanitation team 
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nira, afridev, Ghana-modified indian Mark ii, and French Vergnet.26 
(DWST), which consists of an engineer, a hygiene expert, and a community mobilizer who are 
seconded to the district government. DWST members are not supposed to repair the handpumps 
themselves, but rather to help the village watsan committees to obtain the support and training 
they need to run and repair the systems, resolve any management and water use conflicts that 
arise, and plan new capital projects. The DWSTs visit watsan committees on request, and help 
communities to find spare parts if asked to do so. They also visit some communities on their own 
initiative to check on conditions and organize training sessions on topics they consider relevant. The 
financial resources available to the DWSTs to carry out these functions are limited and vary across 
districts. How much attention a village receives from a DWST depends both on how proactive the 
village is in requesting assistance and on the resources and priorities of the district-level team.
Another important resource for watsan committees is the area mechanic living in the district. Area 
mechanics are private individuals who were originally trained during project implementation to do 
routine maintenance or repair work on boreholes at communities’ request. They are often called 
upon to obtain and then install needed spare parts. Communities must pay for their services, and 
for spare parts, from revenues collected from households or money obtained in some other way. 
The DWSTs may help watsan committees link up with an area mechanic when major repairs are 
needed.
Area mechanics, caretakers, and watsan committee members obtain spare parts from a system 
that includes a central spare parts warehouse in Tema, ghana, and three subnational warehouse 
outlets in the northern, middle, and southern zones of the country. The warehouses and outlets are 
needed to ensure the availability of pump parts for the four standard models of handpump that 
are used in ghana.26 efforts are underway to have at least one spare parts outlet in each region.
The services provided by the area mechanics and the spare parts outlets are largely demand-
driven forms of PCS, in the sense that communities receive them if they request or seek assistance. 
The work of the DWSTs is also largely demand-driven (responses to community requests), though 
these teams also provide some unrequested support.
In some parts of the volta region, ghana has an official PCS program that is not linked to 
demand for PCS services: Monitoring of operations and Maintenance (MoM) is a program of 
quarterly visits to communities by district environmental health assistants (eHAs). During their 
visits, the eHAs do a technical assessment to determine how well the boreholes are functioning, 
review financial records, and check on payment practices. The records of their quarterly audits are 
compiled at the district level, in principle giving district-level officers a systematic picture of what 
is happening in the district. In 2002 and 2003, the Danish aid agency DAnIDA funded MoM 
in the volta region, but by 2004, after the responsibility for the program reverted to the district 
governments in volta, only four districts had continued the MoM audits on a quarterly basis; other 
districts had reduced the frequency due to resource constraints.
Alongside the government-provided PCS system, less systematic forms of post-construction support 
are supplied by a myriad of sources. Some villages receive grants to fund repairs or new boreholes 
through members of Parliament, ethnic organizations, or private companies active in the villages. 
others have enjoyed free handpump repairs provided by the Church of Latter Day Saints or other 
ngos. Also, though contrary to PCS protocol in ghana, DWST officials and area mechanics 
have sometimes repaired handpumps free of charge.
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To sum up, villages in Brong Ahafo and volta have access to an official “demand-driven” PCS 
infrastructure of area mechanics, district water and sanitation teams, and spare parts networks. To 
make a repair through this system, they must find a way to contact a service provider and pay for 
the parts or services they need. The MoM program’s primary purpose is to gather information, 
but it also provides volta villages an extra avenue for obtaining advice and contacting service 
providers (it does not relieve them of the responsibility to pay for parts and services). Some villages 
in each region manage to obtain free repair services or a grant to cover their repair costs; much 
of the “free” assistance comes from private, religious, or non-governmental organizations.
Outline of study
In this study, we examine the correlation between technical sustainability and four forms of 
unsolicited post-construction support: post-construction technical training, regular visits by 
DWST members, free and unsolicited repairs or grants, and the MoM program. Section 4.2 
describes the sample selection and data gathering, and Section 4.3 describes the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the sample villages, the performance of their water systems, and their experiences 
with post-construction support. Section 4.4 describes the analytical framework and methods used 
to investigate the relationship between PCS and water system sustainability; we use both logistic 
regression analysis and one-to-one matching to examine the relationship between unsolicited 
PCS and two dimensions of sustainability: technical performance and household satisfaction with 
the repair and maintenance of handpumps. Section 4.5 presents the results, and Section 4.6 
concludes.
4.2 Sampling frame and data gathering
We selected a sample of 200 villages that represent the range of PCS services currently available 
in ghana. In volta, we selected sample villages from all the four districts (Ho, jasikan, kadjebi, 
and nkwanta) that were receiving regular quarterly MoM audits and hence could be considered 
“treatment” villages. Brong Ahafo was chosen as the second region for the study because its 
conditions are similar to those in volta in terms of water resources and the design of rural water 
supply programs. villages in Brong Ahafo received systems through the World Bank-financed 
Community Water Supply Program I. This program used a demand-driven approach to project 
planning that was very similar to that of the Danida-funded program in volta, but it did not supply 
unsolicited PCS; hence the Brong Ahafo villages could be considered as a “control” group. As in 
volta, villages in Brong Ahafo did not have access to a spare parts warehouse within the region 
and showed variation in their distances from the urbanized regional capital. using data from 
the 2001 census, we selected villages from the five Brong Ahafo districts (Asunafo, Dormaa, 
kintampo, Tano, and Wenchi) whose district-level socioeconomic characteristics best matched 
those of the volta districts in our sample.
Within the districts selected in volta and Brong Ahafo, we restricted our sample frame to villages 
that had received no more than two deep boreholes with non-mechanized handpumps at least 
four years before our fieldwork began. These sample selection criteria yielded a potential sample 
frame of 97 villages in volta and 120 villages in Brong Ahafo. All 97 volta villages were selected, 
along with 103 of the 120 Brong Ahafo villages.
various data collection exercises were conducted in each village, including 25 interviews with 
households chosen at random in each village (yielding a total sample of 5,000 households); 
interviews with the village water supply committee in each village; focus group discussions; 
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the selected villages ranged in size from approximately 150 residents to 5,000 residents. the total population of the villages selected 27 
for the Brong ahafo sample is about 75,000, and that of the selected Volta villages just over 100,000.
technical assessments of the handpumps; and observations of water collection at the handpumps. 
Fieldwork ran from late March to early May 2005. The research team typically spent an entire day 
in a village collecting data.
4.3 Profile of the villages and their water supply systems
The average village in the sample has a population of about 600,27 has no electricity, and is 
located 11 km from a paved road and about 1.5 km. from a stream or river (Table 4.1). Most 
villagers report trusting their neighbors and leaders. Mean cash expenditure by households in 
the average village is uS$68 per month. A fifth of the villages have access to a hand-dug well, 
stream, or river within 1 km of the village that has water during the entire dry season.
Although the sample villages in Brong Ahafo and volta are similar in many respects, there are 
some differences between the two groups. Half the volta villages are located on a paved road, 
Table 4.1: Village characteristics: Brong Ahafo and Volta
Total sample Brong Ahafo Volta
Median village population 605 742 360
Median time it would take adult to walk across village  
(in minutes, as reported by village leaders)
10 7 13
Mean distance to nearest post office (km) 13.9 13.6 14.2
Mean distance to nearest paved road (km) 11.3 17.2 5.0
Mean distance to nearest public telephone (km) 13.4 14.9 11.9
Mean distance to river or stream (km) 1.4 1.5 1.2
Mean % of households in village who say they trust  
their neighbors
75 75 75
Mean % of households in village who say they trust  
their leaders
77 74 80
Mean % of households in village with electricity, in  
villages that have electricity
45 34 49
% of villages without electricity 69 82 54
Mean HH monthly cash expenditure in village (uS$) 68  81  54
Water system characteristics
% of villages with only one borehole installed by project 50 56 43
Median population per installed handpump 442 583 307
% of villages with reliable alternative water source  
in dry season within 1 km of village
19 18 20
Source: Author(s)
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We considered handpumps not to be working if they were completely broken down or unusable, if the handle was broken, if the 28 
handpump produced no water after 30 strokes, or if the borehole did not have water year-round.
as opposed to only 15 percent of the villages in Brong Ahafo. More of the villages in volta have 
electricity. on the other hand, villages in Brong Ahafo have a higher percentage of landowning 
households (62 percent versus 49 percent) and are richer, as measured by the mean reported 
monthly cash expenditure of households in the village.
Interviews confirmed that the project methodology used to install the water systems in both villages 
was similar on most counts. Households in almost all of the villages in both regions felt that they 
controlled decisions about the composition of the watsan committee and about the tariff adopted 
after construction. In a third of cases, participants in the women’s focus groups stated that women 
had been actively encouraged to participate in preconstruction meetings. villagers in Brong Ahafo, 
however, seem to have been more involved than villages in volta in decisions about where to site 
boreholes and what technology to apply (roughly two-thirds of Brong Ahafo villages versus one-
fifth of volta villages were so involved). on the other hand, many more watsan committees in 
volta recalled receiving instruction manuals for handpump operations and repair (60 percent in 
volta versus 12 percent in Brong Ahafo).
The non-mechanized handpump systems in the villages studied were installed between four and 
eight years before the study took place, with an average of six years. Half the villages received 
one borehole with handpump through the Danida or World Bank-financed rural water supply 
program; the others received two. There were more users per handpump in Brong Ahafo than in 
volta, and one day of observation at the most-used handpump in each village found an average 
of 328 users per day in Brong Ahafo and 162 per day in volta. At the time of construction, watsan 
committees were formed in the villages and two caretakers were trained in each. At the time of our 
fieldwork, 90 percent of villages still had active committees (komives et al. 2007), and 83 percent 
still had caretakers.
Technical sustainability and the functioning of water systems
Almost all of the study villages in both volta (96 percent) and Brong Ahafo (96 percent) 
had experienced borehole breakdowns since their system was constructed. This in itself does 
not indicate project failure or neglect—it is simply a feature of the technology. But most 
handpumps in the sample were working at the time of the survey; only 12 percent of villages 
in Brong Ahafo and 8 percent in volta were without a functional handpump or borehole.28 To 
repair the last breakdown, households reported, it took an average of 18 days in Brong Ahafo 
and 22 days in volta. on average, 87 percent of the households interviewed in each village 
reported being satisfied or very satisfied with the repair and maintenance of their handpumps 
(Table 4.2).
virtually all households relied on the project handpumps for at least part of their water use: 96 
percent of households in the average volta village and 98 percent in the average Brong Ahafo 
village reported collecting at least some of their water from the project borehole. Mean reported 
per capita water use during the dry season for those households collecting water from the 
boreholes was about 28 liters in Brong Ahafo and 33 liters in volta—figures that are very close 
to the average withdrawals we recorded by observing the use of the boreholes in each village. 
These levels of per capita water use are quite high for rural areas of Africa where people carry 
water from a source outside their home (katui-kafui 2002; Mu, Whittington, and Briscoe 1990; 
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White, g, Bradley and White, A. 1972), and show that the borehole projects have been supplying 
relatively large quantities of water for household use.
The borehole projects have not, however, eliminated all use of unprotected water sources for 
drinking and cooking. About half of the sample households in both regions reported using a river, 
stream, or other surface water source during the dry season, and a quarter reported that they used 
that water for drinking (20 percent in Brong Ahafo and 32 percent in volta). Rainwater collection 
was also very common (roughly 75 percent of households).
The rural water supply model in ghana expects watsan committees to collect money from 
households to fund repairs. However, the survey responses make clear that many watsan 
committees did not have a regular revenue collection system in place and that many households 
were not paying even where such a system existed. only 71 percent of the households who used 
borehole water reported paying for it. Thirteen percent of the watsan committees interviewed said 
Table 4.2: Water systems in the sample villages
Total sample Brong Ahafo Volta
Description of the system
Average years since project completion 6 6.2 5.8
% of villages with only one borehole installed by project 50 56 43
Median population per installed handpump 442 583 307
% of villages with reliable alternative water source in  
dry season within 1 km of village
19 18 20
Technical sustainability of the system
Percent of villages where all project handpumps  
are working
89 88 92
% of villages that had ever experienced a breakdown 96 96 96
% villages with working systems that had a breakdown  
in last 6 months
57 58 55
Median days to repair the system last time it broke 
(reported by hhs)
20 18 22
Mean % of HHs reporting satisfaction with repair  
and maintenance service
87 84 89
Management structure
% of villages where the committees regularly holds 
meetings with the community
72 75 70
% of villages where the committee members are elected 42 46 38
% of villages where the committee members are appointed 43 36 44
Mean % of watsan committee members who are women 41 41 41
% of villages with no caretaker 17 25 8
Source: Author(s)
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they were not collecting water revenues from households. Another 16 percent collected money 
only when needed to make a repair. In villages with pay-as-you-fetch systems (54 percent of 
volta villages and 24 percent in Brong Ahafo), the average price was about uS$0.01 per jerry 
can. Among households who were paying for water, the average reported monthly expenditure 
for water was uS$0.99 in volta and uS$0.89 in Brong Ahafo. Sixty-five percent of the watsan 
committees interviewed said that they collected enough money from households to pay for minor 
repairs, but only 30 percent said that they could pay for major repairs with this revenue.
Post-construction support
Roughly half the watsan committees in the sample indicated that it was “easy” or “very easy” to 
get technical assistance for a problem that they could not fix themselves. usually, this assistance 
came from area mechanics at villages’ request. Three quarters of the sample villages had called 
on an area mechanic at least once, and 15 percent had asked the area mechanic to help obtain 
a spare part. on average, area mechanics would come within four to five days after they were 
called, and 90 percent of the watsan committees felt that the mechanics were skilled enough to 
resolve the technical problems that the village could not resolve on its own. About 20 percent of 
the watsan committees said that it would be difficult or very difficult to get an area mechanic to 
visit their village.
Roughly 70 percent of villages (73 percent in Brong Ahafo and 65 percent in volta) reported 
receiving at least one visit from the DWST, and 20 percent of the watsan committees said that 
the DWST members visited regularly—at least once a year but in a few cases as often as once 
a month. There was no significant difference in the frequency of DWST visits in the two regions, 
and the watsan committees provided a similar assessment of the responsiveness of DWSTs to their 
requests (a third said the DWSTs always followed up). The DWSTs had been providing technical 
training, financial training, and/or management training during the post-construction period, each 
in 20 to 30 percent of villages.
In volta, other sources such as MoM’s environmental health assistants and ngos had also 
provided post-construction training, such that far fewer volta villages reported receiving no training 
in the post-construction period (17 percent of the volta watsan committees vs. 60 percent in Brong 
Ahafo). But very few watsan committees in volta mentioned help with repairs or technical aspects 
of borehole management as a benefit of the MoM program, indicating that MoM’s involvement 
in technical issues had been largely limited to gathering information for district officials about the 
technical status of each borehole.
on financial and administrative matters, villages in volta were much more likely than villagers in 
Brong Ahafo to report receiving assistance—as one would expect, given that only volta villages 
are in the MoM program. When asked what they found most useful about the MoM audits, 
watsan committees in volta pointed to help with general management, financial records and 
tariffs, hygiene education, and attention to borehole cleanliness.
Thirty percent of the villages in the sample (35 percent in volta and 25 percent in Brong Ahafo) 
had received some form of financial assistance (a grant or a free repair) to supplement revenues 
they had collected internally. Thirty-three percent of villages in volta and 13 percent in Brong 
Ahafo had received free repair or maintenance services on at least one occasion since 2001. 
In most of the cases, the village had not directly requested this assistance. ngos or religious 
organizations provided the free help in half of the volta cases. The Church of Latter Day Saints 
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has been very active in this region, and much of their support has involved major rehabilitation of 
handpumps. The rest of the volta cases and most of those in Brong Ahafo involved free repair or 
maintenance assistance from the DWST or, in a few cases, from area mechanics.
In short, most watsan committees had received multiple forms of demand-driven and supply-driven 
PCS services. Paid technical support from area mechanics was generally the result of watsan 
initiatives. unpaid technical support visits from the DWSTs were sometimes requested, but more 
often unsolicited. In Brong Ahafo, help with spare parts was usually in response to requests, but in 
volta it more often arrived unsolicited. Almost all the watsan committees reported that assistance 
with financial and administrative matters was supply-driven, and not requested by the villages, but 
this form of support was largely confined to volta and provided through the MoM program.
Table 4.3 looks at the packages of unsolicited, technically oriented PCS that villages received in 
the post-construction period. Forty percent of the villages in each region received no technically 
oriented unsolicited PCS; half of those villages are in volta, and participated in the MoM 
audit program. Roughly another 40 percent of the villages in each region received one form of 
unsolicited support—whether technical training (24 percent), visits from the DWSTs at least once 
a year (10 percent), or a free repair or grant for repairs to existing boreholes (8 percent). The 
remaining 20 percent received either two or three of these forms of support. The frequency of 
these different unsolicited PCS packages is very similar across the two regions.
This variety of arrangements for PCS makes it a challenge to isolate the effect of any one form of 
support.
Associations between post-construction support and technical performance
Across the whole sample, villages that received some form of unsolicited technically oriented PCS 
(technical training in the post-construction period, regular DWST visits, a free repair, or a grant to 
repair an existing borehole) were significantly more likely to have working borehole systems than 
were villages that received no such support. More households in the supported villages were also 
satisfied with the maintenance and repair service in the village (Table 4.4).
Table 4.3: Percent of villages receiving different packages of unsolicited PCS support in 
post-construction period
Package of unsolicited PCS Full sample Brong Ahafo Volta
none 41.2 42.2 40.2
just technical training 23.6 26.5 20.6
just regular DWST visits 10 8.8 11.3
just free repair or grant 8 3.9 12.4
Technical training + regular DWST visits 6.5 9.8 3.1
Technical training + free repair or grant 4.5 4.9 4.2
Regular DWST visits + free repair or grant 3 2 4.1
All three forms 3 2 4.1
Source: Author(s)
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When villages that received technical training or regular DWST visits (that is, support through 
the official PCS system) are compared to all other villages, it also appears that unsolicited post-
construction support improves technical sustainability and satisfaction. However, many other 
important differences between the villages could be masking the true effect of PCS packages on 
sustainability and satisfaction. To try to isolate the effects of different types of unsolicited PCS, we 
turn to the regression and matching techniques described below.
4.4 analytical framework and methods
We examine the relationship between unsolicited PCS and two dimensions of the technical 
sustainability of the water systems: (1) technical performance—whether the boreholes and 
handpumps were functioning at the time of our visit—and (2) household satisfaction with 
handpump repair and maintenance. our measure of technical performance is a dichotomous 
variable that measures whether or not all project handpumps were working when the research 
team visited the village. Household satisfaction is measured as the percent of interviewed 
households in the village who report being satisfied with handpump repair and maintenance. We 
use logistic regression analysis and one-to-one village matching to test for an association between 
various forms of PCS and these indicators of technical sustainability.
As the basis for the logistic regression analysis, we hypothesize that sustainability (S) at the village 
level is a function of project, village, and household-level variables:
Si = f (Projecti, PCSi, Systemi, Watsan i, villagei, HHi), where:
Si = Technical sustainability of the water system in the ith village;
Projecti = village level pre-construction factors (e.g. community involvement in project 
planning);
PCSi = Post-construction support;
Table 4.4: Technical sustainability and post-construction support packages
Villages that received… Compared to…
Are all project 
boreholes in village 
less likely to be 
working?
(Pearson chi2)
Is the % of hhs in village 
satisfied with repair and 
maintenance service 
significantly lower?
(One-tail t-test)
no technically-oriented PCS All others 4.37** 1.69**
no post-construction 
technical training or 
regular DWST visits
All others 2.85* 2.79***
Source: Author(s)
Note: Asterisks denote 0.05 < p ≤ 0.1. Double asterisks denote 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05. Triple asterisks denote p ≤ 0.01.
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Systemi = village-level water system characteristics (e.g. years since pump installation, 
number of project boreholes, availability of an alternative water source during the dry 
season);
Watsan i = Characteristics of the village-level management structure (percent of 
committee members who are women, presence of village-level caretakers);
villagei = village characteristics (population per handpump, ethnic homogeneity of the 
population, distance from area mechanic); and
HHi = aggregate measures of village household or resident characteristics (median 
household expenditure level, percent of households who say they trust their leaders, 
percent of households with electricity).
We also use selected variables from this model to implement nearest-neighbor matching, in which 
we pair villages with various PCS treatments to control villages that had received either (1) no 
unsolicited PCS or (2) villages that had not received the treatment variable of interest but may 
have received another type of PCS. Many of the newest matching techniques in the literature 
combine several aspects of distance matching, caliper matching, interval matching, trimming the 
support region, and difference-in-difference matching, and it is becoming increasingly difficult 
to choose the best approach (Smith and Todd 2005). We developed a linear programming (LP) 
model for creating “nearest-neighbor” matches that addresses some of the weaknesses of strict 
distance matching. The same approach was used in the Bolivia case study (see Chapter 3 and 
its appendix). Instead of minimizing the absolute or squared differences over a set of village 
characteristics, our model requires exact matches on a subset of key variables (region, number 
of boreholes in the village, and the availability of an alternative water source in the dry season). 
It then assigns ranks to the absolute differences on other variables between village pairs, and 
minimizes the sum of these ranks across the set of matching characteristics (see Appendix 3.1).
This assignment strategy reduces the probability of creating matches between villages that are 
quite different in one particular characteristic but similar in all others (thus having relatively low 
absolute differences). This “nearness” weighting also removes the problems of scaling that can 
occur when the matching characteristics are measured by very different metrics.
To test whether the number of variables used to create the matches would affect the results of 
the analysis, three different groups of matching variables are used to find the nearest-neighbor 
matches for different treatment groups (Table 4.5). once the matched pairs were created, a chi-
squared test and one-sided Fisher’s exact test were used to examine whether there is a significant 
difference between treatment and control villages.
4.5 results: influences on sustainability
Results from regression analysis
Table 4.6 reports the results of the logistics regression model and regression model that we used 
to examine the association between PCS and the two indicators of technical sustainability, as well 
as the summary statistics for variables used in the models. The signs of the non-PCS variables in 
the model are generally as expected. We tested reduced forms of the models, and they did not 
change the conclusions.
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Table 4.5: Variables used to produce matchings
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Region•	
number of handpumps•	
Alternative dry season water •	
source within 1k of village
Distance of area mechanic•	
Population in 2001•	
group 1 variables +•	
Measure of ethnic homogeneity•	
Percent of population with •	
electricity
Median household expenditure •	
in 2004
group 1 variables +•	
group 2 variables +•	
number of caretakers in village •	
in 2001
village had regular payment •	
system in place after 
construction
Source: Author(s)
Table 4.6: Regression results
Variable Variable definition
Mean
(s.d)
Logistic 
regression
β (odds ratio)
OLS
regression
β
Dependent 
variable
All project 
boreholes in the 
village are working
% of villagers satisfied with 
repair and maintenance 
service
number of 
handpumps
1=village received only one 
hand pump
0.49
(0.50)
1.531**
(4.62)
–0.003
System age number of years since 
handpumps were installed
6.01
(0.76)
–0.118
(0.89)
0.005
Population Log of village population 6.60
(0.95)
–1.115***
(0.33)
0.005
Reliable 
unprotected 
alternative 
source
village has unprotected 
source that always has water 
during the dry season within 
1 km of the village
0.19
(0.39)
–1.474*
(0.23)
–0.043
Remoteness Distance in km to area 
mechanic
19.55
(18.09)
0.024
(1.02)
–0.000
electricity 1= village has electricity 0.31
(0.46)
2.911**
(18.38)
0.012
ethnic 
homogeneity
Percent of the population 
in the village in the largest 
ethnic group
74.14
(22.51)
0.032**
(1.03)
0.000
Trust of leaders Percent of hhs interviewed 
who say they trust their 
village leaders
77.37
(15.58)
0.044*
(1.04)
0.002***
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.6: Regression results
Variable Variable definition
Mean
(s.d)
Logistic 
regression
β (odds ratio)
OLS
regression
β
Average cash 
expenditure
Log of median household 
cash expenditure in village
3.99
(0.32)
1.249
(3.48)
–0.074*
Caretakers number of caretakers in the 
village
1.26
(0.82)
0.477
(1.61)
0.033**
Women on watsan % of watsan members who 
are women
40.75
(15.13)
0.024
(1.02)
–0.000
Technical training 1= During the post-
construction period, village 
caretaker has received 
technical training
0.38
(0.49)
1.511*
(4.52)
0.047**
Regular DWST 
visits
1=Watsan receives regular 
visits from DWST, at least 
once a year
0.23
(0.42)
1.883**
(6.57)
0.062**
Free repair 1=village handpump 
has received at least one 
unsolicited free handpump 
repair
0.15
(0.39)
–0.171
(0.84)
–0.073**
grant 1= village received at least 
one unsolicited grant to help 
with handpump repair
0.06
(0.25)
3.234**
(25.37)
0.021
volta/MoM 1= village is in volta 0.49
(0.50)
0.068
(1.07)
0.020
Constant –3.587 0.834***
observations 199 199
(Pseudo) 
R-squared
0.38 0.25
Source: Author(s)
Note: Asterisks denote 0.05 < p ≤ 0.1. Double asterisks denote 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05. Triple asterisks denote p ≤ 0.01.
Looking at how village characteristics may affect technical sustainability, the results from the 
first model show, first, that, if a village has only one borehole, the borehole is more likely to be 
working. We interpret this to mean that the watsan committee makes more effort (and is under 
more community pressure) to keep a handpump system working when failure would leave the 
community without any improved water supply. Population size is negatively associated with 
technical sustainability. This could mean either that more intensive use of the handpumps leads to 
a need for more difficult or expensive repairs or that households value the handpumps less when 
they share them with more other households (and thus put less pressure on the watsan committees 
to fix them). villages that have a reliable unimproved water source within one kilometer of the 
village are less likely to have functioning handpumps. We understand this to mean that households 
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in the case of system age, the narrow range of variation in this variable (four to eight years) may also explain its insignificance in the 29 
model.
put less pressure on watsan committees to fix broken pumps when they have an alternative source 
nearby (World Bank Water Demand Research Team 1993).
The model results also show that trust in leaders, ethnic homogeneity, and electricity coverage (a 
measure of wealth) are all positively associated with technical sustainability. Interestingly, system age, 
distance from the nearest area mechanic, and having a caretaker in the village are not significant. 
This is noteworthy because it is consistent with the idea that the post-construction support system is 
working to neutralize what one would expect to be the negative effects on sustainability of system 
age, remoteness, and problems with the village-level management structure.29
Turning to the PCS variables in the model, post-construction technical training for village 
caretakers is positively associated with technical sustainability. Thus, it is not so much having a 
caretaker, but rather having a recently trained caretaker, that would seem to help keep systems 
running in these villages. Receiving regular visits from DWST members (at least once a year) is also 
positively associated with having functioning systems. grants, too, are positively associated with 
technical sustainability. Free repairs, on the other hand, though insignificant in the model, have a 
negative sign, suggesting that an unsolicited free repair works against technical sustainability in 
the long run. The MoM/volta variable has an insignificant effect on sustainability. Perhaps this is 
because this dummy variable picks up differences between volta and Brong Ahafo for which we 
have not been able to control in the model. nonetheless, this finding also raises questions about 
whether the MoM audit program has any positive effect on technical sustainability in a context 
like these volta communities, which have access to many other forms of PCS. In interviews, village 
watsan committees did not readily recognize that they received any help with technical issues 
through the MoM program. Assistance with financial, managerial, and hygiene matters may have 
some indirect effect on technical sustainability, but not one that shows up in this model.
The model of household satisfaction with repair and maintenance of the handpumps does not 
have strong explanatory power, but it yields conclusions about unsolicited PCS that are similar to 
those of the logistic regression model. In the household satisfaction model, the volta variable has 
no significant effect; technical training and regular DWST visits are both positively associated with 
satisfaction; and grants have a positive, but not significant, effect on sustainability. Receiving a free 
repair has a significant negative effect, possibly because villages that were in a position to receive 
unsolicited free repairs were those that could not maintain and repair their systems on their own. 
Turning to the other variables in the household satisfaction model, the number of caretakers and 
villagers’ trust in their leadership are both positively associated with household satisfaction. Cash 
expenditure has a significant and negative effect on satisfaction, suggesting that wealthier villages 
are less satisfied and possibly more demanding.
In sum, both models suggest that villages where caretakers have received repeat technical training 
in the post-construction period and/or where DWSTs made regular visits are likely to have better 
technical performance. grants are positively associated with having working boreholes, but not 
with household satisfaction with the repair and maintenance service, and free repairs appear to 
even have a negative effect on system performance.
The PCS variables in these regression models identify villages that have received each type of 
PCS, but many will have also received other types of support as well. next we use the matching 
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technique described earlier to compare the technical sustainability of villages that received 
particular packages of unsolicited PCS. We focus on examining technical training and DWST visits, 
as these are the variables that were significant and positive in both regression models.
Results from matching
Table 4.7 presents the results of our comparison of matched pairs of villages. The results for 
different sets of matched pairs are presented: villages matched on a basic set of five variables, 
and villages matched on an extended set of 10 variables. We also matched on eight variables, but 
as the results were consistent with those presented here, they are not included in the table.
We first compare villages that received only technical training or only regular DWST visits to 
villages that received no technically-oriented unsolicited PCS at all, or a PCS package that did not 
include the treatment of interest. next, we compare villages that received PCS packages including 
technical training or regular DWST visits to villages that did not receive those treatments.
Table 4.7: Post-construction support and technical sustainability: comparison of 
matched pairs
Unsolicited, technically-oriented PCS received by….
Match on basic set  
of variables
Match on 
extended set  
of variables
Treatment villages Control villages(1)
X2
(# of pairs)
X2
(# of pairs)
only technical training none 5.28**++
(35)
3.17*+
(36)
none, or package w/o technical 
training
6.13**++
(46)
4.04**++
(46)
only regular DWST visits none 1.04
(13)
2.15
(14)
none, or package w/o regular 
DWST visits
0.36
(20)
0.55
(20)
Technical training, or 
package including 
technical training
none 4.70**++
(54)
2.96*+
(53)
none, or package w/o technical 
training
2.96*+
(73)
1.66
(73)
Regular DWST visits, or 
package including  
regular DWST visits
none 3.15*
(31)
6.62***++
(32)
none, or package w/o regular 
DWST visits
0.55
(45)
1.11
(45)
Source: Author(s)
X2: *.05 < p < .10 **.01 < p < .05 ***p < .01
Fisher’s exact 1-sided: + .05 < p < .10 ++ .01 < p < .05 +++ p < .01
(1) If closest neighbor had received unsolicited PCS, and second closest neighbour was a high quality match but had not received 
unsolicited PCS, second closest neighbour was used as the control.
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The results present strong support for the idea that villages that received post-construction 
technical training (either alone or in combination with other forms of unsolicited PCS) are more 
likely to have working handpump systems than other villages. This is true regardless of whether 
the other villages received no technically-oriented PCS at all or received a package that did not 
include training.
unlike post-construction training, regular DWST visits on their own do not appear from the 
matching results to increase the likelihood of having working handpump systems: villages that 
received only regular DWST visits do not perform better than villages that received no technically-
oriented PCS at all or a package that did not include DWST visits.
4.6 discussion and Conclusions
From the cross-sectional analysis, it is clear that most rural water supply systems in our sample 
were working, whether or not they had received any form of unsolicited PCS. To be sure, 
handpumps were breaking down, but village watsan committees and caretakers were managing 
to fix problems or have them fixed with outside help. Watsan committees were taking advantage 
of the demand-driven PCS that is available in ghana to find parts and fix their systems. This is 
good news and provides evidence that communities can do a lot to keep systems running with 
the help of some basic forms of demand-driven PCS (such as area mechanics and spare parts 
warehouses).
nonetheless, our results also suggest that at least one type of unsolicited, supply-driven PCS 
increases the likelihood that systems will be working four to eight years after construction. 
Across the whole sample, villages were more likely to have working systems if they had received 
some form of unsolicited technically oriented PCS than if they had received no such assistance. 
Households in villages that had received this unsolicited assistance were also more likely to be 
satisfied with the handpump repair and maintenance in their villages.
The type of unsolicited PCS that appears most promising for improving technical sustainability is 
post-construction technical training. This form of assistance helps maintain the local capacity to 
make repairs and thus reinforces the community-based repair and maintenance model. There is 
also some evidence that regular (though not necessarily frequent) visits from DWST members help 
improve sustainability in combination with other kinds of PCS, but not on their own.
We have not attempted to determine whether the benefits of these PCS services exceed the costs 
of providing them. This is an important question for future research, because not all forms of 
post-construction support that improve sustainability will necessarily be cost effective. It should be 
kept in mind that performance was good even in villages that had not received unsolicited PCS: 
even in villages that had received no unsolicited PCS at all, 84 percent of the handpumps were 
working, and more than 80 percent of the households said they were satisfied with the repair and 
maintenance service.
This case study also raises important questions about the usefulness of the MoM quarterly 
audit program in promoting technical sustainability. The MoM program seeks to help watsan 
committees and DWSTs by collecting information about hygiene and cleanliness, financial 
and managerial issues, and technical sustainability in rural water supply systems. We did not 
investigate whether the MoM program improved hygiene, water use habits, or the cleanliness of 
the handpump sites, all of which would be expected benefits of regular visits by environmental 
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health assistants. on the financial, managerial, and technical fronts, we hypothesized that the 
regular contact with eHAs and attention to these issues would provide an incentive for watsan 
committees to make improvements in these areas. If financial and managerial improvements mean 
greater and more regular revenue collection, this could in turn improve the financial capacity of 
watsan committees to carry out repairs when needed. our regression results show no evidence 
that MoM (measured through a regional dummy variable) is positively associated with improved 
technical sustainability, but we are cautious about this finding, for two reasons. The first is that we 
had difficulties isolating the effect of MoM in our model from regional effects of being in volta, 
since every village in the volta region sample received this form of assistance. Second, evidence 
suggests that MoM may be carried out quite differently in different districts, by different eHAs. 
For example, only some of the watsan committees in the MoM program perceived that they had 
received assistance with financial or managerial issues. Still, given that we also failed to find that 
regular DWST visits on their own improve technical performance, this study raises doubts about 
whether unsolicited on-site visits by professionals is a necessary or cost-effective component of a 
PCS system, at least in a context like ghana where watsans can access other forms of PCS when 
needed. The less intensive approach of caretaker retraining shows more promise in this case.
In future research, it would be interesting to evaluate whether the effect of a MoM-like program 
would be more significant in settings outside ghana where fewer PCS resources are available. 
Another useful avenue of study would be to examine exactly how the environmental health 
assistants and district water and sanitation teams apply the information gathered through MoM. 
If this information is being used to decide which villages need retraining on technical matters or 
more frequent visits by DWST members, for example, it might be augmenting the impact of these 
other forms of unsolicited assistance. We found no conclusive evidence to suggest that training 
or DWST visits have a different effect on sustainability in the MoM or non-MoM regions, but it is 
interesting to note that all villages in volta that received regular DWST visits had working systems 
at the time of the study visit. More investigation of the relationship between MoM and other forms 
of PCS is warranted.
We found no evidence that relieving watsan committees of their responsibilities through the 
provision of free repairs is positively associated with technical sustainability. While free repairs may 
provide villages with welcome short-term fixes, they are not associated with improved sustainability 
over the medium term.
How one chooses to help villages where the community management model has broken down 
may make a difference. In contrast to free repairs, unsolicited grants to fix broken systems are 
positively associated with having working systems (though not with household satisfaction) in 
our models. Thus, helping with finances but leaving villages the responsibility to negotiate and 
manage repairs might be better than taking over responsibility for the repair itself. only 19 villages 
in our sample received grants (solicited or unsolicited), so this hypothesis deserves further study in 
future work. nonetheless, the findings on free repairs and grants suggest that ngos and other 
organizations that help villages to repair their systems outside the confines of the formal demand-
driven PCS system should think carefully about their choice of intervention strategy, and consider 
how their work fits into ghana’s PCS framework.
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Part 3: SyntheSiS
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ChaPter 5:  
ConCluSionS and leSSonS learned30
This final chapter summarizes our findings about the status of rural water projects and the factors 
associated with their success, as well as our principal conclusions about the effects of post-
construction support services on system performance and what they imply for decision-making 
about the maintenance and expansion of rural water supply systems.
5.1. overview of findings
Communities were involved in pre-construction planning and  
helped with capital costs
The results of all three country case studies show that several of the desired preconstruction 
elements of the demand-driven, community management model were implemented in villages 
both with and without post-construction support. As noted in Chapter 1, these elements are: 
(1) involving households in the choice of technology and of institutional and governance 
arrangements; (2) taking account of women’s views in decision-making; and (3) requiring 
households to pay all of the operation and maintenance costs of providing water services and at 
least some of the capital costs.
our interviews showed that community members in all three countries felt that they had been 
involved in the pre-construction planning of their water systems. In all three countries, more than 
90 percent of the focus groups that were held with village leaders and/or women reported that 
the community had been involved in tariff design. In about two-thirds of the villages in Bolivia and 
Peru (vs. 42 percent in ghana), people felt they had been involved in the choice of technology. In 
just under half the villages in all three countries, people felt they had contributed to the decision 
on the location of the proposed infrastructure (on the location of water distribution lines in Peru 
and Bolivia, and of handpumps in ghana).
In all three countries, communities contributed 5–10 percent of the capital costs of the project, but 
in many cases labor and/or land contributions were allowed to substitute for cash.
Community water supply projects are still working
Based on our reading of the literature (edig, van engle, and Laube 2002; engel, Iskandarani, 
and useche 2003) and discussions with sector professionals familiar with the situation in all three 
countries, we expected to find a substantial minority—or perhaps even a majority—of the water 
systems in the villages in our sample to be performing poorly or broken down. This was not the 
case. In all three countries, in villages both with and without post-construction support, the rural 
water supply projects were working.
As shown in Table 5.1, all the piped systems studied in Peru, and all but one of those studied in 
Bolivia, were functioning at the time of our field visit. Among the households in our sample in Peru 
and Bolivia, 93 percent or more had operational taps at the time of our field visit. In 55 percent 
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Table 5.1: Profile of village water systems and management practices
Bolivia Peru Ghana
description of the system
Average years since project completion 7 7 6
Percent of villages - private connections only 73 % 100 % 0 %
Percent of villages public taps only 4 % 0 % 100 %
Percent of villages private connections and public taps 23 % 0 % 0 %
Status of the system
Percent of households with functioning taps 95 % 95 % n/A
Percent of villages with all taps functioning 54 % 74 % n/A
Percent of villages where all project handpumps are workinga n/a n/a 89 %
Percent of villages with functioning systems that had reported a  
breakdown over last six months
55 % 55 % 57 %
Average days to repair the system (for villages that had experienced  
a breakdown)
1–2 5 18
management structure
Percent of villages where the committees regularly holds meetings  
with the community
86 % 81 % 72 %
Percent of villages where the committee members are elected 95 % 63 % 42 %
Percent of villages where the committee members are appointed 3 % 15 % 43 %
Median number of women in the committee 0 0 3
Percent of villages with no caretaker/operator 3 % 2 % 18 %
Percent of villages with paid caretaker/operator (in villages with a caretaker) 70 % 57 % 1 %
Cost recovery
Cost recovery mechanisms
Pay-by-the bucket or volumetric tariff 2 % 0 % 39 %
Fixed monthly fee 89 % 82 % 54 %
Fees vary by HH size 0 % 0 % 7 %
Irregular collections 0 % 7 % 16 %
no revenue collection 9 % 11 % 13 %
Percent of HHs in full sample who use the system that reported  
paying for water
87 % 77 % 71 %
Median monthly expenditure for water reported among HHs that pay  
for water (uS$)
$0.55 $0.30 $0.16
Percent of committees reporting that HH collections cover operating costs n/a 50 % 51 %
Percent of committees reporting that HH collections cover minor repairs n/a 80 % 65 %
Percent of committees reporting that HH collections cover major repairs n/a 12 % 30 %
Source: Author(s)
a 88 percent of the systems in Bolivia were gravity only; the others used pumps.
n/a: not applicable.
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this does not necessarily mean that the women were active committee members (see evidence from india in Prokopy 2004).31 
the main reason why repairs take longer in Ghana is that parts for boreholes must be obtained from outside the villages. in Bolivia and 32 
Peru, many repairs can be made with parts that communities have on hand.
of the communities in Bolivia and 76 percent in Peru, 100 percent of the household taps were 
operational. In 90 percent of the villages in ghana, all project boreholes were still working.
The fact that most systems were still functional an average of seven years after implementation 
is very good news for the rural water sector. The demand-driven, community management 
model seems to be working, at least in the medium term. not only were the rural water systems 
producing water (i.e., not broken down), but almost all the households in these communities were 
obtaining at least some of their water from the systems. In Bolivia, 100 percent of the households 
who were interviewed reported using water from the improved water system; in ghana, 97 
percent; and in Peru, 95 percent. In ghana, our estimates of the amount of water that households 
collected from boreholes ranged from 34 liters per day in volta to 24 liters per day in Brong 
Ahafo. These levels of per capita water use are quite high for rural areas of Africa where people 
carry water from a source outside their home (katui-kafui 2002; Mu, Whittington, and Briscoe 
1990; White, g, Bradley and White, A. 1972), and indicate that these borehole projects have 
succeeded in supplying relatively large quantities of water for household use.
In all three countries, the vast majority of village water committees (vWCs) were functioning as 
planned. They held regular meetings. Many of the vWC members were elected, and, in ghana, 
many of them were women (Table 5.1).31 In Bolivia and Peru, every community had a system 
operator who was responsible for operating and maintaining the water system. In ghana, 82 
percent of the communities still had a caretaker for the handpump(s). The systems in all three 
countries did occasionally break down, but in the majority of cases the vWCs had been able 
to arrange for repairs. Most of the sample villages in all three countries reported one or more 
breakdowns in the last six months, but in Bolivia, breakdowns were typically fixed in one to two 
days, in Peru in five days, and in ghana in 18 days.32
In ghana, most villages in the sample had functioning vWCs: only 3 percent of the committees 
in the study villages in volta and 7 percent in Brong Ahafo had been disbanded or relieved of 
their duties, and another 5 percent of the committees were inactive or dormant. In some cases the 
committee had stopped work due to conflicts with the community or village leaders (usually over 
revenue collection, the use of collected revenues, or unsuccessful repairs). In others, the committee 
was dormant because it had “no work to do” (the borehole had either not broken down or had 
not functioned in a long time). In a few villages, another village-level institution had assumed the 
responsibility for the water system.
villages use post-construction support
Despite the problems that many communities had in charging households for water services, most 
of the communities in all three countries were managing to keep their improved water systems 
functioning. even communities that were not collecting enough revenues to pay for operation and 
maintenance costs were finding the resources needed to fix their systems when they broke down. 
especially in ghana, many of these resources came from outside the community (Table 5.2).
Communities were making use of a wide variety of government- and ngo-provided PCS services 
to keep their systems working. Some of the services were provided at their own request (“solicited 
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PCS”) and others arrived on the initiative of government or ngo or church organizations 
(“supply-driven PCS”).
nearly half the communities in all three countries had received additional training for their 
water system operators or caretakers since construction. Some villages had received help with 
non-technical matters such as billing or disputes over water sources. When water systems broke 
down, system operators sought out spare parts and, if necessary, outside technical expertise to 
make repairs. Few vWCs kept sufficient cash on hand to pay for major repairs. nonetheless, they 
seemed able to find enough funds for repairs, whether through one-time levies on villagers, grants 
from outsiders, or receipts of free parts or repair services. In some cases, the caretakers or vWCs 
turned to intermediaries to help identify and obtain the needed resources. In ghana, for example, 
the district water and sanitation teams (DWSTs) and the environmental health assistants involved 
in the MoM program (an intensive supply-driven program of post-construction support that 
covers parts of the volta region) helped communities to find technical assistance and spare parts. 
But other actors helped as well. one of the striking findings from our field activities in all three 
countries was the pervasive presence of ngos and church organizations in post-construction 
support activities.
Many ngos were providing both supply-driven and demand-driven post-construction support. 
In Bolivia, ngos such as Plan International and CARe have taken on increasingly programmatic 
roles in the rural water sector in the sample villages as the role of government has diminished, and 
in recent years they have largely assumed responsibility for PCS. In Peru, the “prime contractor” 
ngo (SAnBASuR) helped communities fill the gap between the revenues raised and funds 
needed for repairs by putting such communities in touch with partner ngos or with municipal 
governments that could provide financial and other assistance. In ghana, fully 16 percent of the 
Table 5.2: Profile of post-construction support activities
Ghana Peru Bolivia
Percent of villages that received …. after completion of 
project construction …
visits from external organization(s) to assist with maintenance  
or repairs
52 14 22
visits from external organization(s) to assist with accounting,  
tariffs, etc.
33 6 13
Technical training for the system operator 34 49 41
Free repairs 21 n/a n/a
Written manuals or other materials 37 25 30
Help with finding or receiving spare parts 45 7 11
grants from outside sources for repairs, new construction, system 
rehabilitation, capacity expansion, or other assistance
16 3 8
Percent of households visited by external agencies to discuss  
use of water system, etc.
30 25 n/a
Source: Author(s)
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dissatisfaction in Ghana was primarily concentrated in villages where the handpumps were no longer working or had always had 33 
problems (e.g., with salty water or low pressure in the dry season).
sample villages had received grants for repairs and/or major rehabilitation from outside sources 
such as the Church of the Latter Day Saints (Table 5.2). The Mormons and perhaps other ngos 
appear to have worked with the DWSTs to identify villages that were experiencing problems and 
then to help finance the repairs. The DWSTs not only lack funds to proactively monitor conditions 
in villages, but also are instructed by policy guidelines not to make or fund repairs themselves.
Consumer satisfaction is high
given that the water systems were generally working and that communities were able to make 
repairs, levels of household satisfaction were very high in most villages in all three countries. on 
average, in Bolivia 83 percent of households in each village reported being “satisfied” or “very 
satisfied” with their system’s operation and maintenance regime, and 78 percent were “satisfied” 
or “very satisfied” with the performance of their vWC. In Peru, 61 percent of the households 
reported that they were satisfied overall with their improved water system. In ghana, 88 percent of 
the households reported they were satisfied with the repair and maintenance services of the water 
system, and more than 80 percent of the women’s focus groups said they were satisfied with the 
system.33
But households are still using unprotected water sources
There are also some troubling findings. Although almost all households reported using the new 
water system, for some households this was not their only water source. In ghana, 38 percent of 
households reported they were still using water from unprotected sources (e.g., springs, river, open 
wells) for drinking and/or cooking. The percentages were lower in Peru (21 percent) and Bolivia 
(23 percent), but still worrisome. We do not have information on the health consequences for the 
people in our sample villages who were still using traditional water sources, but we speculate that 
until households obtain their drinking and cooking water exclusively from improved sources, the 
health benefits of the investments in improved sources will not be fully realized, and any prospects 
for breaking out of a rural “poverty trap” in this way will be reduced.
Households pay little for improved services
Another worrisome finding is that the finances of many village water committees in the sample 
were in poor shape, because households were paying very little for the improved water services. 
These rural water supply programs were not designed for communities to recover the capital costs 
of construction or to provide for capital replacement or expansion. The cost-recovery objective 
was simply to collect enough revenues from users on an ongoing basis to pay operation and 
maintenance costs. However, a substantial minority of villages in our study were not achieving 
even this modest objective.
In both Bolivia and Peru, almost all villages were charging households a very modest fixed monthly 
fee for service. Most households reported paying for water (87 percent of households in Bolivia 
and 77 percent in Peru) but their median monthly expenditures were only uS$0.25 and uS$0.66 
respectively. In Bolivia, not only were the monthly charges low, but 27 percent of the communities 
had actually lowered their tariffs since operation began. In Peru, we estimate that slightly fewer 
than half of the communities were recovering their operating costs.
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a 1994 study of the afridev handpump in Ghana’s northern region found that the average annual cost to a community of fixing 34 
common problems, such as rod breakages, plus the cost of replacing fast-wearing parts like bobbins, u-seals, o-rings, and bearings, 
would be about $60. uneP’s international environmental technology center (1998) puts the expected operation and maintenance cost 
to the community at between $52 and $156 a year. VWcs in our sample reported spending about uS$100 annually on repairs. none 
of these estimates includes the real resource costs associated with the time invested by the Vdc, the caretakers, or borehole attendants.
In ghana, 13 percent of the vWCs interviewed said that they were not collecting any money from 
households. When we asked households (in contrast to vWC members), we found that in 23 
percent of the villages none of the interviewed households was paying for water. only 71 percent 
of the villages in ghana had any regular payment system in place for households (either pay-by-
the bucket or a fixed monthly charge, as contrasted with an irregular system like collecting money 
from households when funds are needed for repairs). In villages that used fixed monthly fees, the 
most common rates were uS$0.11 and uS$0.22 per month. In villages using pay-by-the-bucket, 
the most common charges per 20-liter container were uS$0.01 or less.
Among the vWCs in ghana that did collect revenue from households, those in volta reported 
collecting an average total of uS$169 annually (versus uS$173 in Brong Ahafo). Revenues of this 
magnitude should be sufficient to pay for routine operations and maintenance, but not for major 
repairs.34 However, the range of revenue collections reported by these vWCs was very wide, with 
some committees saying they collected less than uS$1 from all households during the entire year 
and others reporting household contributions greater than uS$2,000. of the vWCs in ghana 
that reported charging households for water (regular or irregular payment system), nearly three 
quarters said that they collected enough money to pay for the cost of operations; 89 percent said 
that the money they collected from households would cover minor repairs, but only 41 percent 
said that it would cover major repairs.
Certain factors are associated with sustainability and satisfaction
our cross-sectional research design and the nature of PCS in the three countries made it very 
difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the contribution of different forms of PCS to system 
sustainability. nonetheless, we used multivariate models to investigate the factors (including PCS) 
that were associated with technical sustainability and with whether households were satisfied with 
the service they were receiving.
To analyze technical sustainability, we explored a variety of definitions of this dependent 
variable. The one we chose to report for Bolivia and Peru is simply whether or not all of the 
household connections were functioning in the village at the time of our visit. For ghana, we 
defined technical sustainability as whether or not all the project handpumps and boreholes were 
operational (supplying water) at the time of our visit. Table 5.3 presents the means, medians, and 
standard deviations of our independent variables.
Table 5.4 reports the results of the model for each of the three countries. Some of the factors 
positively associated with good system performance are as expected. In Bolivia and ghana—
though not in Peru—electricity coverage is positively associated with good system performance; we 
think this is likely a wealth effect. In Peru, the age of the water system is negatively correlated with 
system performance (statistically significant at the 1 percent level), but this may be because the 
sample of communities in Peru included some water systems that were completed more recently 
than those in Bolivia or ghana. In Bolivia and ghana, there is no association between age and 
system performance; this we interpret as further evidence that the demand-driven, community 
management model is working as hoped in the medium term.
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Table 5.3: Summary statistics (mean and standard deviation) of variables used in the 
multivariate models
Variable name Variable definition
Bolivia
(n=77)
Peru
(n=99)
Ghana
(n=175)
Satisfaction Percent of households who report being 
satisfied with:
maintenance and operations of •	
piped water system (Bolivia)
maintenance and repair (Peru)•	
preventative maintenance and •	
repair service (ghana)
Mean: 83
Std. dev: 20
Median: 90
Mean: 70
Std. dev: 19
Median: 72
Mean: 0.87
Std dev: 0.15
Median: 0.92
System working 1=All sampled taps in the village are 
functioning (Bolivia and Peru)
1=All project handpumps in the village 
are functioning
Mean: 0.59
Std. dev.: 
0.50
Median: 1
Mean: 0.75
Std. dev: 
0.44
Median: 1
Mean: 0.90
St. dev: 0.30
Median: 1
System age number of years since system began 
operation (Bolivia and Peru)
number of years since handpumps 
were installed (ghana)
Mean: 7.0
Std. dev.: 1.2
Median: 7.0
Mean: 6.7
Std. dev: 2.3
Median: 7.0
Mean: 6.0
St. dev: 0.8
Median: 6
number of 
handpumps
1=village received only one handpump 
(ghana)
n/A n/A Mean: 0.51
St. dev: 0.50
Median: 1
Population per 
handpump
Population per handpump installed by 
project (100s of persons)
n/A n/A Mean: 6.43
St. dev: 6.38
Median: 4.32
electricity  
coverage
Percent of households interviewed with 
electricity
Mean: 39.0
Std. dev.: 
41.2
Median: 14.5
Mean: 60.5
Std. dev: 
39.5
Median: 80
Mean: 13.69
St. dev: 23.49
Median: 0
Remoteness Distance in kilometers to…
… municipality (Bolivia)
….paved road (Peru)
….area mechanic (ghana)
Mean: 44
Std. dev.: 57
Median: 24
Mean: 58
Std. dev: 85
Median: 15
Mean: 19
St. dev: 18
Median: 15
Trust of neighbors Percent of households interviewed who 
say they trust their neighbors
Mean: 83
Std. dev.: 18
Median: 88
Mean: 56
Std. dev: 18
Median: 56
Mean: 74
St. dev: 14
Median: 76
Reliable unprotected 
alternative 
source
village has unprotected source that 
always has water during the dry season 
within 1 km of the village
n/A n/A Mean: 0.21
St. dev: 0.41
Median: 0
Technical training 1= During the post-construction 
period, water system operator or 
village caretaker has received technical 
training
Mean: 0.28
Std. dev.: 
0.45
Median: 0
Mean: 0.36
Std. dev: 
0.48
Median: 0
Mean: 0.39
St. dev: 0.49
Median: 0
(continued on next page)
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Table 5.3: Summary statistics (mean and standard deviation) of variables used in the 
multivariate models
Variable name Variable definition
Bolivia
(n=77)
Peru
(n=99)
Ghana
(n=175)
Technical PCS visit 1= During the post-construction 
period…
… received >1 unsolicited technically-
oriented visit (Bolivia)
… received >1 unsolicited visit to assist 
with repairs (Peru)
 … received >1 unsolicited free repair 
(ghana)
Mean: 0.20
Std. dev.: 
0.40
Median: 0
Mean: 0.07
Std. dev: 
0.26
Median: 0
Mean: 0.19
Std dev: 0.36
Median: 0
Financial or 
managerial 
PCS visit
1= During the post-construction 
period…
… received >1 unsolicited non-
technically oriented visit (Bolivia)
… received >1visit to assist with 
financial or management matters 
(ghana)a
Mean: 0.10
Std. dev.: 
0.30
Median: 0
Mean: 0.04
Std. dev: 0.2
Median: 0
Mean: 0.29
St. dev: 0.46
Median: 0
Regional or project 
identifiers
Bolivia:
 1=Cochabamba Region
 0=Chuquisaca Region
Peru:
 1 = SAnBASuR program;
 0 = FonCoDeS program
ghana:
 1=volta Region;
 0 = Brong Ahafo Region
Mean: 0.50
Std. dev.: 
0.50
Median: 0.50
Mean: 0.45
Std. Dev: 0.5
Median: 0
Mean: 0.48
St. dev: 0.50
Median: 0
Source: Author(s)
a In principle all villages in volta should have received assistance with financial and managerial matters through the MoM program, 
but in practice not all vWCs perceived the MoM audits as assistance.
Table 5.4: Factors associated with technical sustainability
Bolivia Peru Ghana
HH taps functioning 
(1=100 percent working, 
0=otherwise)
HH taps functioning 
(1=100 percent working, 
0=otherwise)
All project boreholes in the 
village are working
Remoteness β: 0.01
(S.e: 0.01)
Odds ratio: 1.01
β: 0.00
(S.e: 0.003)
Odds ratio: 1.00
β: 0.01
(S.e: 0.016)
Odds ratio: 1.01
electricity coverage 0.03c
(0.01)
1.03
0.013
(0.009)
1.01
0.08b
(0.035)
1.09
(continued)
(continued on next page)
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Table 5.4: Factors associated with technical sustainability
Bolivia Peru Ghana
HH taps functioning 
(1=100 percent working, 
0=otherwise)
HH taps functioning 
(1=100 percent working, 
0=otherwise)
All project boreholes in the 
village are working
Technical PCS visit 0.17
(0.83)
1.19
1.172
(1.226)
3.23
–1.16
(0.82)
0.31
Financial or 
managerial 
PCS visit
0.43
(1.11)
1.54
–1.047
(1.661)
0.35
–0.04
(0.86)
0.96
Technical training 1.16a
(0.69)
3.19
–0.390
(0.595)
0.68
1.48b
(0.71)
4.43
System age –0.42
(0.27)
0.66
–0.346c
(0.147)
0.71
0.46
(0.49)
1.58
Trust of neighbors –0.04
(0.02)
0.96
1.368
(2.038)
3.93
0.04
(0.03)
1.03
Region or program 
dummy variable
–2.91b
(0.97)
0.05
1.38a
(0.78)
3.99
0.77
(0.79)
2.16
one borehole 1.99c
(0.75)
7.31
Population per 
borehole
–0.091b
(0.037)
0.91
Reliable alternative 
source
–1.98c
(0.70)
0.14
Intercept 7.88b
(3.23)
1.63
(2.11)
–4.04
(4.11)
Pseudo R2 value 0.23 0.14 0.30
number of 
observations
77 86 175
Source: Author(s)
a Significant at .10 level.
b Significant at .05 level.
c Significant at .01 level.
(continued)
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We chose to look at satisfaction with repair, maintenance, and operations because these are within the control of the community. 35 
Satisfaction with water quality or overall satisfaction with the system may depend on construction and water-resource related factors 
over which communities have little control once construction has been completed.
In none of the three countries did we find a statistically significant association between a village 
receiving a technical PCS visit (to help with repairs or maintenance) and having a working water 
system. But post-construction technical training of system operators or caretakers was positively 
associated with system performance in both ghana and Bolivia.
In Bolivia, water systems were more likely to be working in Chuquisaca than in Cochabamba. In 
Peru, projects in the SAnBASuR program, which provided unsolicited PCS, were more likely to be 
working than those in the FonCoDeS program, which did not. In ghana, system performance 
had no statistically significant association with region (Brong Ahafo, whose sample villages had 
no supply-driven PCS program, vs. volta, whose sample villages had the MoM program). This 
finding suggests that a labor-intensive supply-driven PCS program like MoM does not increase 
the technical sustainability of handpump systems in a setting like rural ghana where communities 
have access (on request) to many other forms of post-construction support.
The technology in ghana (handpumps) was different than in Bolivia and Peru (gravity-fed systems 
with household connections), and our ghana model has three independent variables that are not 
featured in the models for the other two countries: (1) whether the village had only one borehole, 
(2) population per borehole, and (3) whether the village had an unprotected source that could 
always provide water during the dry season within one km of the village. All three of these variables 
had statistically significant associations with system performance. If a village had only one borehole, 
it was more likely to be working. We interpret this to mean that the vWC makes more effort (and 
is under more community pressure) to keep the borehole working if there is only borehole in the 
village. We interpret population per borehole as a measure of the pressure on the resource and 
a measure of crowding. It is negatively associated with system performance—which might mean 
either that more intensive use of boreholes in these communities leads to a need for more difficult 
and expensive repairs, or that households value the handpump less when it must be shared with 
more households and thus put less pressure on the vWC to keep it working. our interpretation 
of the negative association between having a reliable alternative source and a functioning water 
system is similar: households have less need for the improved water source when there is a reliable 
alternative source nearby; they value the improved source less, and put less pressure on the vWC 
to keep the handpump working (World Bank Water Demand Research Team 1993).
We used similar multivariate models to investigate what factors were associated with household 
satisfaction with the improved water systems. Again, we explored a variety of definitions. For 
Bolivia and Peru, we defined satisfaction as the percentage of households in the village who 
reported they were satisfied with the operation and maintenance of the water system. In ghana, 
we used the percentage of households in the village who reported they were satisfied with the 
repairs and maintenance of the water system.35
Table ‎5.5 reports the results of this “satisfaction” model for each of the three countries. The 
striking result for Bolivia is that the share of households who are satisfied is, on average, 
15 percentage points higher if the village has received a PCS visit that provided financial or 
managerial (though not technical) assistance. This effect is large and statistically significant, and is 
robust to model specification and the definition of the dependent variable. In Peru, the percentage 
of households that is satisfied is smaller if the water system in the village is older. This is not the 
case in Bolivia and ghana.
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In the ghana model, the percentage of households in a village who report they are satisfied is 
influenced by several variables. First, consistent with the finding from Bolivia, if a village has received 
a PCS visit providing managerial or financial assistance, a higher percentage of households reports 
being satisfied. If a village has received a technical PCS visit, the percentage of households who 
say they are satisfied is smaller; we interpret this as evidence that the technical PCS visit was made 
because the equipment was already in trouble. However, technical training is positively associated 
with satisfaction. villages in which a higher percentage of households report that they trust their 
Table 5.5: Factors associated with household satisfaction with O&M repair services
Bolivia Peru Ghana
HH satisfaction with o&M 
(percent satisfied)
HH satisfaction with 
o&M (percent satisfied)
HH satisfaction with 
repair and maintenance 
(percent satisfied)
Remoteness β: –.01
(S.e.=.04)
β: 0.00
(S.e. = 0.00)
β: 0.00
(S.e. = 0.00)
electricity coverage 0.18b
(0.07)
0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.00)
Technical PCS visit –3.21
(5.59)
0.07
(0.08)
–0.97c
(0.031)
Financial or managerial 
PCS visit
14.64b
(7.32)
–0.02
(0.12)
0.06b
(0.03)
Technical training 1.94
(5.06)
0.06
(0.04)
0.06c
(0.02)
System age –2.17
(1.95)
–0.02b
(0.01)
–0.001
(0.015)
Trust of neighbors 0.74c
(0.14)
0.12
(0.14)
0.003c
(0.001)
Region or program dummy 
variable
–1.58
(5.78)
0.09a
(0.05)
0.015
(0.028)
one borehole –0.012
(0.023)
Population per borehole –0.004b
(0.002)
Reliable alternative source –0.03
(0.026)
Intercept 27.40a
(16.35)
0.68c
(0.12)
0.63
(0.13)
Pseudo R2 value 0.30 0.08 0.17
Number of observations 77 89 175
Source: Author(s)
a Significant at .10 level.
b Significant at .05 level.
c Significant at .01 level.
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neighbors also have a higher percentage of satisfied households. Finally, in ghanaian villages with 
large populations per borehole, a smaller percentage of households are satisfied; we interpret this 
as consistent with the results for population per borehole in Table ‎5.4 above.
5.2 lessons learned
If these findings turn out to be as robust as we hope, it seems that demand-driven, community 
management, coupled with access to spare parts and some technical expertise, is succeeding as 
an approach to rural water supply provision in developing countries. Important puzzles remain, 
however, for policy makers, investors, and managers in rural water supply systems. These are 
discussed below, and the chapter then concludes with suggestions on themes for further research.
Implications for maintaining and expanding rural water supply systems
our conclusions on the relationship between post-construction support and sustainability are more 
tentative than those on the workability of the demand-driven, community management model, 
and merit further investigation in other field sites. The communities in our study solicit and use a 
wide range of post-construction support services. We find no evidence that providing communities 
with free repairs or free technical assistance, or implementing an intensive supply-driven post-
construction support program like MoM in parts of ghana, improves technical sustainability or 
increases household satisfaction.
This supports the wisdom of the original conception of the demand-driven community management 
model—that communities can and should take full responsibility for their systems. The unsolicited 
PCS activities that appear most promising from this study are those that help communities to renew 
and further develop their capacities: post-construction training for system operators and non-
technical support visits to help vWCs with administrative functions or water use disputes.
our findings also present some major puzzles for proponents of the demand-driven, community 
management model.
The first puzzle is that even communities whose cost-recovery systems seem to be meeting program 
objectives (i.e., those villages that pay 5–10 percent of capital costs and collect tariffs to cover 
operation, maintenance, and repairs) are not moving toward a financially sustainable future in 
which they can either (1) replace infrastructure when it reaches the end of its economic life, or (2) 
expand system capacity to accommodate population and economic growth. The donor-funded 
rural water supply programs studied have been structured as one-time investment programs, 
designed to meet only the immediate needs of rural communities. This means that the moral 
obligation assumed by higher-level government and donors is not over. The current financing 
system ensures that these communities will keep returning for capital subsidies, just as some are 
doing now for repairs.
In large municipalities, new water systems are routinely designed with excess capacity in both 
the distribution system and the water source to provide for growing populations. But in the rural 
water sector everywhere, capital subsidies are limited, and excess system capacity is one of the 
first casualties when investment funds are scarce. Moreover, few demand-driven rural water supply 
programs have incorporated a systematic approach for providing follow-up capital subsidies to 
villages that have outgrown their current systems or want to upgrade to a higher-level of service. 
Though some observers might argue that this is not a problem—that as long as poor people need 
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help they should get it—the indirect consequences of this capital-financing model need to be 
carefully considered.
In Bolivia, one consequence of a per capita cap on capital expenditure (designed to provide a 
disincentive for communities to ask for capital-intensive, perhaps inappropriate, facilities) seems 
to have been that some communities restricted their service boundaries, leaving households on 
the periphery without piped services. These unconnected households were provided with wells, but 
they may prefer in future to upgrade to the level of service enjoyed by their neighbors. expanding 
coverage in these Bolivian systems will be complicated by the fact that the water sources in 
many villages are not large enough to serve more people; already two thirds of the women who 
participated in our focus group discussions felt that the quantity of water provided by PRoSABAR 
systems was insufficient or “just enough to meet community needs.” About 20 percent of the 
PRoSABAR communities studied had experienced decreases in the quantity of water supplied 
during the dry season in the period since their system was constructed.
In ghana, part of the reason why some households continue to rely on traditional water sources 
appears to be that capital subsidies were spread too thinly, and that too few boreholes were 
installed to serve a growing population. Some of the communities in ghana need to plan for 
piped distribution systems that can support new businesses and other enterprises, and the current 
model for the provision of subsidized boreholes will not ease this transition. Without the option of 
gravity-fed distribution systems such as in Peru and Bolivia, the ghanaian communities will have 
higher o&M expenses. They will also need to plan for expenditures on system expansion. For a 
village to do this on its own will require a cost-recovery system that can generate a much larger 
and more regular stream of revenue.
This brings us to the second puzzle: why is it that the vWCs in a significant number of villages 
are not collecting tariffs at all, or are collecting too little revenue from households to cover the 
financial costs of major repairs—much less the costs of system expansion or capital replacement? 
one possible explanation is that villagers’ required initial contribution to capital costs (5–10 
percent of capital cost through cash or in-kind contributions) was too small to act as an adequate 
demand filter—that is, to exclude households who could not afford the full financial (and non-
pecuniary) costs of operating and repairing the new systems. We cannot rule out a possible link 
between low capital contributions and poorly performing tariff collection systems. But neither do 
we have evidence that increasing the initial capital contribution would lead to better cost-recovery 
from households.
Rather, our findings suggest three other reasons why vWCs are unable or unwilling to charge 
households more. First, generating substantial cash balances creates problems for the vWCs. 
These rural communities lack access to a convenient, secure banking system for the management 
of cash. Among the villages in our sample, those in Bolivia were a median distance of 24 km 
to the nearest municipality, those in Peru were on average 15 km from a paved road, and those 
in ghana were on average 15 km from the urban centers where the area mechanics live and 
work. Moreover, many households have little cash to spare, and cash flow is irregular and highly 
seasonal. Households are also often distrustful of the accounting and security of cash balances, 
and vWC members may distrust each other or not want the responsibility of securing cash.
Second, when vWCs do accumulate cash balances, villages often want to spend these monies on 
other development projects. There is thus little incentive for vWCs to attempt to generate the funds 
necessary for major repairs to the water system if they will “lose” them anyway. In such a situation, 
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it makes sense to just try to raise funds when the need arises. For all these reasons, life is much 
simpler for members of vWCs if the cash on hand is only sufficient to pay for minor o&M costs or 
is only collected at the moment when funds are needed.
Third, vWCs may well be right to believe that future capital and repair subsidies will be 
forthcoming when needed, whether from donors, ngos, or higher levels of government. In the 
projects studied, not only was the bulk of the capital provided at no cost to the communities at the 
time of construction, but a significant number of vWCs in our sample had found ways to insulate 
households from the cost of repairs to the water systems. They had obtained donations, free spare 
parts, and free repairs from a wide variety of ngos, church organizations, private individuals and 
companies, and even local governments.
Herein lies a third puzzle for rural water supply policy: does the sector’s current capital financing 
model—and the post-construction activities of these ngos and other actors—create a moral 
hazard that will undermine the principle of community self-reliance in the post-construction phase?
In ghana, the fact that one in six of the sample villages had received grants from outside sources 
after the construction of the project may not seem very significant, but it does suggest that almost 
all vWCs would know that ngos and others are active and nearby. For a committee, it may seem 
like a reasonable bet to wait until major repairs are needed and see if an ngo might provide 
the cash required. Moreover, an effort by a vWC to establish some kind of sinking fund to make 
major repairs and replace capital at some future date may make the community appear less needy 
to an ngo, and preclude it from receiving such support. Indeed, small towns in the united States 
face similar disincentives to financing their own capacity expansion and system rehabilitation.
To an ngo, repairing a handpump or fixing a broken transmission line for a piped distribution 
system may well seem like an ideal project, offering its funds great perceived leverage. With a 
relatively small amount of incremental funds, the ngo can reasonably claim to its donor base 
that all benefits of the infrastructure are due to its involvement, because without the incremental 
investment the system would have remained broken. ngos (and indeed other donors) are 
especially attracted to such opportunities.
This approach to development assistance raises two important questions. First, would the community 
have managed to raise funds locally and made the repair if the ngo had not been ready to step 
in? Second, if all the kudos for the infrastructure goes to the last investor that contributes, who will 
be willing to continue making the capital infusions necessary to replace the aging capital stock, 
i.e., to do the “heavy lifting” that is required under this capital financing model? Will higher levels 
of government and donors step into these rural communities five or ten years down the road, when 
these systems are fully depreciated, and replace the capital that ngos have kept running?
The situation in the rural communities in our sample is not financially sustainable without new 
infusions of capital relatively soon—both to replace existing infrastructure and to provide for 
economic growth. The moral hazard from the active involvement of ngos, religious groups, and 
other non-state actors in the rural water sector is likely to prove an important factor undermining 
cost-recovery efforts and may discourage communities from making their own investments in water 
infrastructure to support economic growth.
Achieving long-term financial sustainability requires a different policy model. Communities do 
want and need help, but this assistance should not perpetuate their dependency on ngos or 
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on higher levels of government for limited capital subsidies that lock them into infrastructure 
systems that are unsuitable for achieving economic development or for accommodating growing 
populations. nor should it undermine local initiatives to pay for higher levels of infrastructure or 
infrastructure expansion. Methods for achieving better coordination of the policies of ngos with 
government and with each other seem especially important and worthy of future research. ngos’ 
involvement in the sector has proven important for fostering policy innovation, serving the poorest 
of the poor, and helping communities to find the resources they need to keep their water systems 
running. But, as suggested by our findings, ngos can also create moral hazard problems that 
may ultimately undermine rural economic development. one important role for ngos in future 
could be as catalysts for post-construction support, rather than as dispensers of capital subsidies 
for communities that cannot manage to repair their water projects.
In summary, the demand-driven, community management planning model has come a long way 
towards finding the key to success in the rural water sector. The next frontier seems to be the 
design of a policy framework that will enable communities to handle the twin challenges of system 
rehabilitation and expansion.
5.3 Suggestions for further research
Many unexplored questions lie ahead for additional research. our research design, given its 
ex-post, cross-sectional nature, did not allow us to compare benefit measures before and after 
the projects were constructed, or provide an opportunity to understand how PCS has changed 
and affected sustainability over time. Donors should consider more systematically monitoring PCS 
programs in which they have invested resources, to gather additional data for analysis. Fieldwork 
considerations also deserve mention. Though our project enabled us to estimate the impact of 
PCS over much larger samples than in previous studies, our village sample sizes were still quite 
small. Future studies that investigate PCS over a wider cross-section of villages would yield more 
precise and robust findings, while case-study research within specific villages would help to 
understand the dynamics of PCS and how or why PCS has been effective in some areas while 
failing in others.
The large number of communities with functioning systems and satisfied users provides 
evidence that the water sector is learning from its mistakes and that community-based models 
of development can effectively bring potable water to people over time. It would be interesting 
to learn whether different types of PCS can “make or break” the maintenance and use of a 
water system in a more challenging setting, or whether other project and community factors are 
preconditions for PCS to work effectively.
As water practitioners urge villages to begin setting aside their own funds to replace and expand 
their systems, more research will be necessary to determine whether a systematic PCS effort can 
help enhance the capital side of financial sustainability (and what resource costs are necessary to 
achieve this). Household-level models that predict the effects of PCS on individual payments would 
strengthen the existing literature on economic demand. In particular, studies that specify measures 
of the economic benefits of village water supply projects can help in comparing the costs and 
benefits of providing PCS programs.
Finally, in-depth longitudinal studies that collect data on economic benefits in communities that 
received varying forms of PCS could help to pinpoint when communities asked for assistance of 
various types, and when they received it, and assess how the assistance affected the consistency 
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of system performance and benefits. Such studies would isolate how effectively post-construction 
assistance responds to specific problems, and would compare communities that demand and 
obtain more external support with communities that try to rely on their own resources until their 
systems need a complete overhaul. Research on all of these topics would assist policymakers in 
designing PCS programs that better enable communities to be efficient stewards of their drinking 
water resources.
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